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Abstract 
 
This research seeks to understand the contemporary artistic labour of 
painting in a ‘post-aesthetic’ view, in which artistic knowledge is seen as 
socially situated, embodied, and emergent; existing in processes rather than 
artefacts. This has implications for understanding the ‘work’ of painting.  
Debates on artistic subjectivity and creative work ignore skilled and cognitive 
processes of labour (Taylor, 2011).  An exception is Roberts (2007) who 
proposes that artistic subjectivity has become ‘decentred’, distributed across 
people, skills and tools.  However, his labour theory does not address 
painting in any depth.  My research explores decentred artistic subjectivity 
from within painting.  Using a practice-led method, it explores how painting 
can evolve a practice in line with new norms around ‘spectatorship’, and 
asks how we might understand this labour.   Painter-researchers have done 
much to understand artistic subjectivity as distributed across bodies and 
materials, but lack focus on ‘social’ conditions of practice.  My research 
brings this social focus, employing a framework of ‘ecological cognition’ to 
develop a theory and practice of painting as emergent knowledge that 
unfolds in relationships between bodies, materials, the ‘social’, and the 
environment.  It tests a new practice-led perspective for understanding 
creative work, exploring cognitive processes of contemporary artistic labour. 
It brings a ‘social’ perspective to understanding the work of artist and 
audience in painting as research.  It develops a post-Cartesian 
understanding of ‘making-as-thinking’ that involves body and material 
interactions, rhythm and gesture.  It considers the embodiment of social 
structures in artefacts and individual habitual practices, examining cognition 
as a ‘social’ process.  It suggests that ‘co-responsibility’ (Bolt, 2007) 
encompasses artist, audience, and artefacts in meaning-making.  It 
contributes a practical framework for sharing artwork and proposes that 
‘creative labour’ (Gulli, 2005) can be a shared art of inquiry that is not just a 
way of knowing; it reveals social ‘being’.   
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Preface 
This written thesis both develops and conceptually supports the emerging 
practice by developing and testing a posthuman, new materialist framework 
of contemporary artistic labour as a process of ecological cognition to 
develop insights about the creative work involved in painting as inquiry. 
The practice is documented on videos which are hyperlinked within the text, 
so you will find it easier to read the eThesis on the accompanying CD.  The 
accompanying DVD contains videos for each of the three practice events.  
The complete dataset is held at https://doi.org/10.5518/361 (Kirk, 2018).  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The central concern of my research is to understand the contemporary 
artistic labour of painting in a ‘post-aesthetic’ view, and particularly to 
understand the work of painting as inquiry.  I use the creative work of 
painting as a method of inquiring into our feelings and responses to human 
responsibility for climate change.  In this uncertain climatic context, we need 
to consider our relationship with different kinds of knowledge, including 
practice-based forms (Wilson, 2010).  Revisiting our ways of ‘knowing’ the 
world, particularly in the context of what has been termed ‘the 
Anthropocene1’, is something that is being addressed with increasing 
urgency amongst artists (Macfarlane, 2016; Davis & Turpin, 2015).  This 
coincides with changes in the way that we ‘view’ art which has been termed 
the ‘post-aesthetic’2.  The conditions of contemporary artistic labour in a 
post-aesthetic view include changing notions of spectatorship and of the way 
that ‘art’ is defined and valued.  Contemporary creative practice situates 
knowledge within processes “of creating, mediating and encountering art” 
(Sutherland & Acord, 2007: 125) rather than in the final form.   For example, 
the American artist Eve Mosher in High Water Line drew a chalk line along 
the New York City waterfront to indicate the potential extent of flooding from 
climate change (Brown, 2014: 224), whilst talking to passers-by about 
climate change and actions we can take.  Her stated objective was to have 
these conversations.  This has its roots in the Performance Turn of the 
1960s in which artists began to turn away from traditional art methods and 
materials (and the ‘rules’ of spectatorship embedded within traditional forms 
and institutions), instead employing the materials and spaces of everyday 
life.   Movements such as ‘Happenings’ and the FLUXUS group challenged 
notions of artistic authority and authorship, with artists such as Allan Kaprow 
                                            
1 The term ‘Anthropocene’, included in the Oxford English Dictionary in June 2014, was first coined 
by Paul Crutzen in 1999 at a conference on the Holocene (Macfarlane, 2016). 
2 Removing distinctions between ‘art’ and ‘non-art’; construing art as life rather than autonomous 
from life; and valuing art in terms of its efficacy at ‘revealing’ life and ‘truth’ rather than in terms of 
beauty, form, or economic value (Babich, 1989). 
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and Joseph Beuys removing perceived boundaries between art and life in an 
attempted democratisation of art (Harrison & Wood, 2003). The question is 
whether this ‘democratisation’ is possible with painting, a traditional art form 
which carries a history of ‘viewing’ practices and associated ‘rules’.  These 
can be difficult to renegotiate.  Painters are grappling with these issues.  For 
example, the Tate exhibition: A Bigger Splash: Painting after Performance 
(Wood, 2012) asked: “How have painters devised alternatives … to 
Kaprow’s two options: to make neo-Pollocks or to give up painting and make 
happenings?” (Wood, 2012: 14).     
Structures that have sustained the identification of ‘art’ are dissolving and 
new norms are developing.  But what do these new conditions mean in 
terms of the artistic labour of painting, traditionally reliant on the unique 
‘hand’ of the artist?  Where does artistic subjectivity now reside?  Cultural 
economist Calvin Taylor points out that debates on artistic subjectivity and 
the conditions of creative work have tended to ignore the skilled and 
cognitive processes of labour that go into the ‘work’ of artistic production 
(Taylor, 2011).  An exception is provided by the art theorist John Roberts 
(2007) who develops a theory of artistic labour after the ‘readymade’ which 
called into question the role of the artist’s ‘hand’ in authorship.  He proposes 
that artistic subjectivity has become ‘decentred’, with authorship ‘distributed’ 
amongst multiple players (through collaboration) and across various 
technical tools of reproduction.  However, his theory, in focusing on new 
technologies, does not address the labour of painting in any depth3.    
Understanding artistic knowledge as socially situated process (rather than 
situated in the artefact) raises questions for understanding the work of 
contemporary painting.  My research explores decentred artistic subjectivity 
from within painting practice.  It explores how painting can evolve a practice 
in line with new norms around ‘spectatorship’, and seeks to understand how 
we might understand this labour as a process of embodied cognition.   
Practice-led painter-researchers have done much to reconsider ways of 
‘knowing’ through a focus on ‘material’ processes (e.g. Barrett & Bolt, 2013).  
However, this type of research does not tend to focus on the ‘social’ 
                                            
3 Discussed in Chapter Two. 
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conditions of artistic practice or audience experience, and that is what my 
research does.  Understanding contemporary artistic authorship as 
‘decentred’ has implications for practice-led research in painting.  My 
research explores these implications by using the central framework of 
‘ecological cognition’ to develop a theory and practice of painting as 
emergent knowledge that unfolds in relationships between bodies, materials, 
the ‘social’, and the environment.  This brings an embodied, practice-led 
perspective to the field of creative work – specifically to understand cognitive 
processes of contemporary artistic labour – and brings a ‘social’ perspective 
to understanding the work of both artist and audience in practice-led 
research in painting.  The outcome is a case study of creative work, during 
which an ‘extended’ practice of painting as inquiry was developed alongside 
a theoretical model of contemporary artistic labour as ecological cognition4.   
 
This chapter introduces this model.  It summarises the trajectory of the 
practice-research and indicates how ideas develop through each chapter.  It 
explains the context and need for my research in a literature review which 
shows how research questions were developed.  It states the research aims 
and focus, and then outlines the philosophical and methodological principles, 
including the rationale for the format of a practice-led submission.    
First, let me introduce my practice and its context. 
1.1 Painting as inquiry 
My research is grounded in painting as a form of inquiry, which I refer to as 
‘painting as inquiry’.  Through practice, I explore ‘painting’ as anthropological 
inquiry into subjectivity in the context of climate change.   I will first outline 
what I mean by ‘anthropological’, and then explain what I mean by an 
‘inquiry into subjectivity’.  Finally, I will explain my artistic methodology.  
                                            
4 Conscious of the post-medium debate (Krauss, 2006), I use ‘extended’ to signify that painting 
moves beyond the studio and beyond the medium; for example, to incorporate mediation of the 
event-space, and technologies such as video. 
 
- 4 - 
1.1.1 Anthropology 
I adopt the anthropologist Tim Ingold’s view of anthropology as “a sustained 
and disciplined inquiry into the conditions and potentials of human life” 
(2011: 3) in which ‘life’ is “a path of movement” (ibid: 4). For Ingold, 
anthropology is a process of tracing these paths of becoming alongside 
those who make them, to “follow what is going on” (ibid: 14) [original 
emphasis].  Advocating art-making as a method, Ingold proposes an 
anthropology with art (rather than of art) which aims “to correspond with it in 
its own movement of growth or becoming” (2013: 8).  This is an “art of 
inquiry” (ibid: 6) in which making is thinking.  The visual anthropologist 
Amanda Ravetz describes this as reverie, “a way of ‘thinking through 
making’” (2016: 159) with no preconceived outcome, where knowledge is 
emergent in play with materials.  By thinking with my practice I explore 
personal and collective responses to human responsibility for climate 
change.  I collect photographs of climate change affected landscapes; 
cultural images that form our view of climate change and our emotional 
response to it.  I combine these with snapshots of myself as a child.   
 
Figure 1.1 Shelter, 2014, acrylic and collage on board, 40 x 34 cm 
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Photographs are a way of seeing ourselves in relation to our landscape.  
Traditionally landscape painting has formed our view of this relationship, 
from signifying ownership (e.g. Gainsborough’s Mr and Mrs Andrews) to 
representing our emotional landscape (e.g. Friedrich’s Wanderer above the 
Sea of Fog).  By constructing a relationship between climate-change 
affected landscapes and childhood snapshots through painting, I invite an 
imaginative engagement with this world in which a viewer can think 
differently about their relationship with it.  Through practice I explore ways in 
which painting can help us to make sense of climate change responsibility.  
This enters the newer field of ‘visual anthropology’, which I will now outline.   
Grimshaw and Ravetz (2015) take a critical look at attempts to align the 
fields of art and anthropological practice, and in particular at the 
‘ethnographic turn’ within which these have often been framed.  Highlighting 
differences in the ways in which artists and anthropologists have interpreted 
and expanded the ‘ethnographic’, the authors warn that these expanded 
notions of ethnography can obscure important differences.  Art and 
anthropology involve different ways of knowing, with art seeking to disrupt 
and sustain uncertainty, whereas anthropology seeks to build cumulatively 
on what is already ‘known’ (ibid: 430).  Both fields, they suggest, share a 
concern for aesthetics – but for anthropology this concerns a ‘vehicle for 
content’, whereas for art it is an open space of not knowing (ibid.).  With 
these differences in mind, I position myself as an artist rather than an 
anthropologist.  I make a claim to ‘anthropological inquiry’ because I am 
exploring with my practice our ‘felt’ experience, addressing the need to pay 
attention to cultural responses to climate change (Smith et al, 2014) through 
rethinking subjectivity, taking a posthuman and new materialist approach as 
I will now explain.    
1.1.2 ‘An inquiry into subjectivity’  
1.1.2.1 The Posthuman 
For Humanities theorist Rosi Braidotti, ‘subjectivity’ refers to how we think, 
know, and represent ourselves (2013: 12).  Her book, The Posthuman, is 
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centrally concerned with devising ways to think differently about ourselves 
“in the era known as the anthropocene” (Braidotti, 2013: 186).  The 
‘posthuman’ refers to theories that are literally ‘after humanism’ in their 
aspiration to rethink subjectivity beyond anthropocentricism.  It is an 
approach that breaches dualisms between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, distancing 
itself from social constructivism which distinguishes between nature as 
‘given’, and culture as ‘constructed’.  The new field of environmental or 
‘anthropocene Humanities’ (Braidotti, 2013: 159) informs the debate on 
climate change by examining social and cultural factors underpinning the 
representation of climate change.  My practice of painting as inquiry as 
described above is situated in this space.  One strategy that Braidotti 
suggests to achieve a post-anthropocentric view of subjectivity is 
defamiliarization from habitual ways of thinking by employing imagination as 
well as critical thought – to think differently (ibid: 88).  My practice of painting 
as inquiry seeks to think differently about how we know and make ourselves 
in our changing world.   
1.1.2.2 New materialism 
Braidotti’s approach centres on a concept of ‘vital materialism’.  This stems 
from the Spinozist concept of ‘monism’ (ibid: 56) which led to the 
development by French philosophers of ‘vital materialism’ which is also 
known as ‘radical immanence’ in its rejection of transcendentalism.  This 
means that materials as living, interconnected processes are of and in this 
world (‘immanent’), not expressions of essential forms that live in the world 
of ideas (‘transcendental’).  Theories stemming from the idea of a ‘vital 
materialism’ (e.g. Bennett, 2010) tend to be grouped under the rubric of ‘new 
materialism’, and focus on ‘matter’ and its processes.  These approaches 
aim to overturn the dominant anthropocentric narrative of humans ‘making’ 
the world – which has ethical, ecological and political consequences – and 
replace it with a perspective that puts material processes centre-stage (Bolt, 
2013: 2–3).  Performance theorist Rebecca Schneider (2015) explains the 
core ideas of new materialism, which in summary are: i) matter has agency; 
ii) agency is distributed in relationships between materials; iii) matter is 
‘discursive’ or a non-linguistic way of thinking about meaning.  Political 
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theorists Coole and Frost (2010) identify three strands of new materialist 
thought, which can be summarised as: i) a posthuman focus on ontological 
reconsideration of matter as vibrant, lively and agential; ii) a focus on 
biopolitical and bioethical issues raised by scientific and technological 
developments; and iii) a critical new materialism that considers relationships 
between the materiality of everyday life and socio-economic structures. 
My research develops ideas from the first and third of these new materialist 
strands.  I explore a new materialist ontology by examining the processes of 
handling materials as a way of thinking that focuses on the interactions of 
the material flows of the body with the material flows of the materials of art-
making.  I then venture into critical new materialism, looking at ways in which 
the ‘social’ is material and embodied in habits and artefacts.  Thus my 
research responds to the posthuman project of thinking beyond the 
anthropocentric whilst remaining realistic about political power by 
considering the materiality of ‘the social’.  I adopt ‘new materialism’ to 
reconsider the artistic labour of painting, in which artistic subjectivity occurs 
between things, and agency is distributed in an ‘assemblage’ of bodies, tools 
and materials through which political power emerges.  Through the 
exploration of these theories (in particular, the ideas of Tim Ingold and the 
political theorist Jane Bennett), I develop an extended practice of painting 
that enacts the rethinking of subjectivity that we need to see in the world.  I 
will now describe this practice methodology.   
1.1.3 Artistic methodology 
I use collage techniques, cutting and re-arranging printed images until I see 
something that feels interesting.  I use these collages as a source from 
which to paint, letting the material qualities and bodily gestures shape the 
painting.  This leaves room for ambiguity and ‘accident’.  I use artisanal and 
new technologies, including digital imaging, found materials, and sound.  I 
use studio footage as creative material.  As such, my practice enters the 
‘post medium debate’ in which artwork is no longer defined by its medium, 
and is instead underpinned by ‘technical support’ (Krauss, 2006).   I continue 
to use the term ‘painting’ to represent this extended practice, as it is 
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grounded in painting.  My practice includes curating and mediating dialogic 
encounters between participants and paintings.  The process of curating the 
artefacts and of facilitating audience participation is central to the practice 
and not an end point.  This dissolves boundaries between the ‘internal’ world 
of art-making and the ‘external’ world of exhibiting.  A key influence on my 
facilitation style is my experience of the ‘silent crit’.  Ravetz (2007) describes 
this UK arts teaching practice, in which the audience give their responses to 
the artwork without prior presentation of the artist’s intention.  The approach 
emphasises “the centrality of the relationship between the audience […] and 
the work” (ibid: 257) in which it is “the affect of the work as relayed through 
the audience that takes priority and is valued” (ibid: 258).  In group crits at 
college, I preferred this polymorphous space to imposing my own (tentative) 
meanings or ‘intention’.  I did, however, reject the ‘inside out’ therapeutic 
assumption that my work was an ‘inner’ expression (telling us all something 
about my childhood).  Instead, I felt that the meanings expressed by others 
represented a collective articulation of shared cultural anxieties or longings.  
Ravetz’s work with students, in which they explored photographs as a 
means of opening up dialogue, suggests a method of investigating “social 
worlds that are ‘in the making’, relational and unfinished […]” (ibid: 262).   
Through painting I bring an added dimension to this dialogue.  Many 
contemporary painters explore photographic sources by painting (e.g. 
Rugoff, 2007), including artists who have been a key influence on my work 
such as Gerhard Richter, Marlene Dumas, and Luc Tuymans.  Painting 
provides a method of imaginatively exploring photographs, allowing the body 
to intervene in the production and reproduction of cultural images, and 
bringing the audience body into dialogue with the paintings through sharing 
their affective response.  The art work is in this shared dialogue.   My inquiry 
explores concerns about climate change.  These are not private concerns.  
They constitute a shared anxiety which is social, global, and mediatised.  
This practice of painting as anthropological inquiry into subjectivity sits within 
a wider context of artistic responses to climate change, as follows. 
  
- 9 - 
1.2 Artistic context 
The enormity of the Anthropocene poses a challenge to artists – but also an 
opportunity to shock us out of our tendency to move on and ignore it 
(Macfarlane, 2016). As highlighted by both Macfarlane (2016) and Davis and 
Turpin (2015), a common starting point for artists is climate change.  Much 
contemporary climate change art involves art-science collaborations such as 
the Cape Farewell project (Giannachi, 2012).  But these ignore personal 
responses to the ‘everyday’ experience of climate change:  
Artistic explorations should not be restricted to illustrating our 
scientific discoveries […] Instead, a work of art may help us to 
experience and reveal our inner5 participation with climate, the 
rupture of its balance and its meaning for our inner world, in the same 
way as landscape artists who reframed the relationship of humans to 
their environment. (Knebusch, 2008: 3)   
My paintings depict figures in landscapes, drawing upon a visual heritage 
influenced by Hopper and Friedrich, both of whom used landscape to 
represent an ‘inner’ state.  Knebusch suggests that climate is experienced 
phenomenologically as landscape, a “multidimensional phenomenon in 
which are combined the contributions of nature, culture, history and 
geography, but also the imaginary and the symbolic” (2008: 5).  Painting can 
engage imagination and emotion.  An exhibition of paintings in Melbourne, 
Climate Change: The Wonder and the Dread (Metro Gallery, 2012) aimed to 
target emotions rather than educate on the science (McCulloch, 2012).  A 
supporting video documentary revealed the artists’ processes.   
The latter represents a wider contemporary interest in presenting artists’ 
processes as part of the work.  For example, the Tate exhibition A Bigger 
Splash: Painting after performance (Wood, 2012) looked at the relationship 
between painting and film in the work of Pollock and Hockney. Wood 
suggests that the “collision of the designed arena of painted space, and the 
reality of living or performing to camera, is a productive contamination that 
                                            
5 Knebush uses the term ‘inner’ participation. I interpret this as ‘affective’ participation; enacted and 
occurring in a phenomenological moment, rather than a ‘thing’ to be found inside. 
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bleeds both ways” (ibid: 22).  This ‘productive contamination’ occurs in my 
own practice through edited videos of studio activities.  The Bigger Splash 
exhibition included painters who perform, for example the artist Joan Jonas 
who is interested in what happens when you draw in front of an audience. In 
Reanimation she responds to issues such as glacial melt in a collaborative 
performance with jazz musician Jason Moran (Young, 2013).  Her concerns 
are similar to mine, including human impact on climate change, and the 
visibility of artistic process as part of the artwork.  But whereas Jonas 
employs live performance, I use recorded footage, only bringing myself into 
the frame as a performer in the third event6 – in which I performed modernist 
collage skills of cutting and placing rather than traditional artisanal skills.  
Another key difference between my work and Jonas’ is my staging of the 
‘exhibition’ as a shared inquiry.  A transition occurred through my three 
practice events, as the audience shifted from ‘viewer’ (event one) to 
‘participant’ (event two) to ‘collaborator’ (event three).  By events two and 
three, the audience’s participation was key in the making of the work.  I don’t 
situate the work in the artist’s actions through staging a performance.  I do 
retain the primacy of the artefacts by drawing awareness to the process of 
engaging with them.  I will show through this thesis and the accompanying 
practice documentation how my practice evolved to remove the artist from 
the centre of the meaning-making process, culminating in the final practice 
event in which I created an experience of distributed artistic subjectivity 
(Chapter Five).  This practice evolved with, and is supported by, the 
development of a posthuman, new materialist model of contemporary artistic 
labour as ecological cognition.  I will now introduce this model, along with the 
first phase of practice during which the model was developed. 
1.3 Making as thinking: Artistic labour as ecological 
cognition 
At the start of my research, in August 2012, I started working in my studio 
with a simple objective: To explore my concerns about climate change 
through making images. This studio practice involved selecting images that 
                                            
6 This will be explained in Chapter Five. 
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‘drew’ me to paint them, experimenting in the studio with ideas and 
materials, and simultaneously working out how to record the process and 
make sense of it.  I started to work with images of climate change affected 
landscapes, and through play, the idea emerged of combining these with 
family snapshots.  During this phase I was also reading.  Whilst I mulled over 
what I had read and jotted down reflections on theory and practice in my 
studio journal, a tentative model of artistic labour started to emerge.  What 
follows is a description of the logic of that model.   
 
Through painting, I explore making as a process of thinking.  ‘Making’ 
involves the socialised, skilled artist body labouring with materials, 
responding constantly to tactile, visual and emotional feedback from the 
emerging form.  Whilst I am manipulating and rearranging materials in my 
studio, I am making more than a painting – I am making sense.  My 
imagination is engaged alongside the rhythmic gestures of brush strokes, 
exploring the emerging object as a landscape, inhabiting it, exploring its 
contours.  In this process, I come to know more about the concerns that 
occupy me – problems of the nature of human dwelling in the world.  This 
has been explained as ‘extended’ cognition, with the made artefact as an 
‘outside’ reflection of ourselves mediating meaning (Crowther, 1993: 166) – 
but this sustains a Cartesian ‘inside-out’ assumption of ‘mind’ seeing a 
‘reflection’ of itself.  Taking an ecological view of cognition, knowledge of the 
world comes from engagement with things (Ingold, 2011).  Rather than 
studying the world as an object, we “correspond with it in its own movement 
of growth or becoming …” (Ingold, 2013: 8).   This ‘correspondence’ sets up 
a relation with the world which opens up our perception to what is going on 
so that we can respond to it (Ingold, 2013: 7).  Knowledge is emergent as 
the artist engages with the environments and processes of practice.  
Adopting a conception of cognition as ecological assumes thinking and 
perceiving occur as an organism moves through its environment (Ingold, 
2000).  It is not a hidden, unconscious internal knowledge that is ‘expressed’ 
to be ‘mirrored’ in the artefact.  It is a knowledge that is performed in the 
moving interactions of body, material, and social actors in space and time of 
which the artefact is a trace.     
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This is a social process.  I look at artworks and see how they have been 
critiqued by curators or commentators, and memories of these judgements 
influence my decisions.  I may put aside ideas as unfashionable, or I may 
exploit them for that reason.  There is an invisible but very real web of social 
structures that I flutter against, either getting stuck or breaking beyond.  The 
forming of the artefact in a process of wrestling with ideas, gesture, tools, 
materials and a sticky social web, is a way of ‘knowing’.  And this way of 
‘knowing’ through ‘making’ is not contained purely within the artist’s studio, 
but is also in the encounters with the artefacts.  Artistic labour includes 
mediating the ways in which those encounters are shaped.  Therefore 
artistic authorship involves co-responsibility7 of physical, social and material 
agents situated in a particular time and space.  This is ‘artistic labour’ 
understood as a process of ecological cognition.   This model forms the main 
theoretical framework which has been developed in relation with the 
practice; informing, forming, and formed by it.  
 
Figure 1.2 Artistic labour as ecological cognition 
 
                                            
7 I explain this term in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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I have deliberately included the ‘social’ as a lens of the model, rather than 
taking a purely new materialist position, in order to retain a focus on power 
relationships.  Critics of new materialism have suggested that it can ignore 
the contributions of the social turn (e.g. Bolt, 2013; Schneider, 2015), 
obscuring the political reality that there is often an unequal balance of power 
for humans and other ‘things’8.  This is a particular issue given the current 
context of environmental fragility.  I have sought to address this critique by 
employing a ‘critical’ new materialism (introduced earlier) which I develop in 
Chapter Four to consider relationships between ‘body’, ‘material’ and the 
‘social’.  By ‘social’, I mean the ways that humans communicate, organise, 
and transform things; the embodied and material processes of creative 
labour (Gulli, 2005) that make a social world9.  To learn about that social 
world, I’ve employed a cultural phenomenology (Csordas, 1999)10 which 
understands ‘reality’ as experienced by human senses, by a body immersed 
in a culture.   
However, there are challenges in trying to marry two different philosophical 
approaches.  For example, Ingold (2000) suggests that the concept of the 
‘social’ risks implying a division between biology (or nature) and culture.  
Ingold says that humans come into being as “organism-persons” (2000: 5) in 
a world inhabited by human and non-human organisms.  Therefore, he says, 
“relations among humans, which we are accustomed to calling ‘social’, are 
but a sub-set of ecological relations” (ibid: 5).  Ingold suggests that the 
‘cultural’ phenomenology proposed by Csordas, in moving ‘the body’ from 
biology to culture, risks ‘disembodiment’ of the organism.  Embodiment as a 
process, says Ingold, is the development of the human organism in its 
environment through the development of skills.  This skills-based 
perspective brings culture and biology together, as body and mind are 
employed in situated activity in an environment.  We need, he says, to look 
at how people engage in their practical activities “in the lived-in world” (ibid: 
171).  For this reason, I have employed a practice-led methodology to learn 
about artistic labour from within that world.   Through the employment and 
                                            
8 See Chapter Three. 
9 See Chapter Five. 
10 See Chapter Two. 
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development of my own skills, I have investigated how the ‘social’ is 
embodied in habits and artefacts11 of everyday practice, rather than seeing 
‘the social’ as a cultural ‘object’ separate from nature.  
I have used the model above as a methodological tool which allows me to 
retain a sense of control over the messiness of creative practice 
(Trimmingham, 2002).  It represents a hermeneutic-interpretive spiral “where 
progress is not linear but circular; a spiral which constantly returns us to our 
original point of entry but with renewed understanding […] as one part of 
understanding changes, the whole changes too” (ibid: 56).  The model does 
not represent artistic labour, but is a tool to help make sense of it.  It is not a 
map, but a framework to hang onto whilst exploring the often chaotic 
processes of creative labour.  The centre of the model as viewed through its 
‘lenses’ is not as neatly categorised as it looks.  Gaze into the lens of the 
cornea of the human eye, and you see something like this: 
 
Figure 1.3 Representation of 'messy middle' of the model 
 
As well as representing the ‘messiness’ of creative practice, this visualisation 
also represents the difficulty in using two different philosophical approaches 
as described above.  Branches intertwine and overlap, but don’t necessarily 
graft together comfortably.  A bee, flitting between branches, could take 
pollen from the flowers of each and this could create a stronger hybrid.  It 
                                            
11 See Chapter Four. 
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could also create a specimen that is unproductive or vulnerable to attack.  It 
could create both.     
Using the model as a framework for my research, I focused on one lens at a 
time to reflect on and evolve my practice, and from this, to develop 
theoretical insights about artistic labour.  Research insights unfold 
throughout the following chapters, and are summarised in Chapter Six.  The 
following section introduces the trajectory of the research and an outline of 
the chapters.   
1.4 Trajectory of research and outline of chapters 
Chapters Two, Three, and Four are structured around the lenses of ‘body’, 
‘material’, and ‘social’ respectively.  Chapter Five focuses on overlaps of the 
three lenses to achieve a closer focus on ‘ecological cognition’.   
The first phase of practice from 2012 to 2013 focused on ‘body’, exploring 
processes of embodied cognition to understand creative practice as a 
corporeal activity.  I started using collage techniques, cutting, tearing, and 
superimposing images, whilst simultaneously finding ways to digitally record 
these corporeal processes.  This phase culminated in the first event: The 
Gesture of Thinking in May 2013, which presented paintings, videos of 
studio process, tools, journals, and materials.  It aimed to create a ‘felt’ 
sense of embodied cognition for the audience by inviting them to ‘touch’ 
artefacts and materials.  It invited them into my world, revealing my artistic 
subjectivity.  The audience, at this formative stage, were ‘viewers’.  Chapter 
Two reflects on this first phase of practice, focusing on the lens of ‘body’ and 
the intersection with ‘material’.  It moves artistic intentionality out of the 
artist’s head, exploring how ‘thinking’ extends into and beyond the body, with 
materials and emerging artefacts forming part of an ‘extended’ cognitive 
apparatus (Clark, 2011).  It considers what might be learned by focusing on 
painting through Roberts’ (2007) lens of ‘decentred’ artistic subjectivity.  It 
raises questions about the role of rhythm and movement in making-as-
thinking. 
The second phase in the latter half of 2013 focussed on ‘material’ and the 
intersections with ‘body’ and ‘social’.  The starting point for studio work was 
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the question: Is it possible through painting and video to explore and 
fragment agential and social boundaries of ‘self’?  This question mirrored the 
theoretical understanding of ‘decentred’ artistic subjectivity which I was 
starting to develop.  During the first event, I had been struck by a sense of 
significance of video footage of cutting out a figure.  For this second phase 
of studio work I played with this technique within the painting process.  
Chapter Three reflects on one of the resulting paintings to exemplify how the 
artefact facilitates the artist’s cognitive process through an exegetical 
(meaning-making) process of critical reflection on artefacts made through 
material handling.  This critical process connected the personal to the 
political.  Reflecting on studio practice journals, the chapter considers the 
role of movement and rhythm in the handling of materials in achieving a 
‘liminal’ state, using theories from anthropology (Ingold, 2013) to develop an 
understanding of ‘gesture’ as a technical act in which hand, tool and material 
are brought together.  It explores body and material interactions as ‘material 
thinking’ (Carter, 2004; Bolt, 2004), and the importance of movement in 
perception, a key aspect of ecological cognition (Gibson, 1986).  Finally, it 
considers theories which pose that ‘material’ is also ‘political’ (Latour, 2005; 
Bennett, 2010) such that the ‘social’ is present in interactions between 
bodies and materials.  It proposes that ‘material thinking’ could be expanded 
to include ‘sociality’.    
Chapter Four addresses this proposed expansion of ‘material thinking’ by 
focusing on the ‘social’ and the intersections with ‘material’ and ‘body’.  It 
reviews concepts of ‘practices’ and ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977) which seek to 
explain production of social structures through repeated and learned 
embodied behaviours.   Referring to specific examples of studio practice 
from the second phase, it uses these theories to explore how the ‘social’ is 
inscribed in the emerging artefact such that it affects the body of the artist as 
she works.  Adopting a critical new materialism (Coole & Frost, 2010) 
(introduced earlier), it considers how the social is embodied in and 
performed through individual habits and public objects (Turner, 1994).  It 
proposes that materials and artefacts are mediators of what is socially 
determined as ‘art’, thus having ‘political agency’ (Latour, 2005; Bennett, 
2010).  This leads to a consideration of audience meaning-making.  The first 
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event raised questions concerning the viewer’s processes of meaning-
making.  Are they just a ‘viewer’?  The second event, Feeling a way through 
… (December 2013) moved from showing my artistic subjectivity, to 
attempting to share artistic subjectivity.   I aimed to make audience meaning-
making consciously part of the event, such that the audience become aware 
of their role in the ‘work’ of art, shifting from ‘viewers’ to ‘participants’.  In the 
chapter, I explore audience responses to seeing artistic process on video to 
understand whether there is meaning in seeing the work done.  I propose an 
addition to Bolt’s theory of ‘co-responsible’ artistic authorship (2007) to 
include the audience as well as the artist and her materials in processes of 
inquiring and meaning-making.  I suggest that framing painting as a social 
practice in which artistic agency is ‘distributed’ raises questions of 
implications for painting ‘viewing practices’, the place of the artist’s voice, 
and her skills of mediating encounters with artefacts. 
The third phase from 2014 to 2017 drew together the ‘body’, ‘material’, and 
‘social’ to review what the perspective of ecological cognition had 
contributed to understanding contemporary artistic labour for painting – for 
both artist and audience.  Chapter Five describes how a growing ecological 
sensibility has shaped my studio practice and the way in which I share 
artistic process through video.  It discusses how the third event, The Garden 
of Earthly Delights held in May 2017, was designed to facilitate an 
experience of ‘distributed’ artistic subjectivity.  In the second event ‘process’ 
had distracted from ‘content’, sometimes obscuring what the artwork was 
about.  The third event sought to navigate this tension between the artist’s 
voice (what she intends the work to be about), and creating space with an 
audience to ‘make’ meaning from the work.  The chapter performs a 
selective analysis of this final event by focusing on the creative work of the 
audience, their bodily gestures, use of tools and materials, and their creative 
responses to the videos of artistic process.  It suggests that in taking up an 
invitation to ‘make’ work through provision of sketchbooks and materials, the 
audience ‘enacted’ a human compulsion to ‘make’ things.  They became not 
just ‘participants’ but also ‘collaborators’.  The chapter proposes that this 
‘creative labour’ of the audience is social ontology (Gulli, 2005); not just 
‘knowing about’ the ‘social’ but being it.  It suggests that the artist’s voice 
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could help to mediate this awareness by framing the ‘social’ that is being 
made in the room.     
Chapter Six returns to the research aims and questions and summarises key 
insights gained and their implications.  It considers methodological 
implications of my research for painting as inquiry, and reflects on what has 
been learned from the research methods used.  It suggests how the 
research insights might contribute to current debates in creative work and 
painting as research.  It considers limitations and questions for future 
research.  
 
Throughout the above research trajectory, ‘gesture’ became a repeated and 
central theme, and my understanding of it evolved as follows.  I started by 
looking at the painterly gesture as a physical dimension of thinking, rather 
than as the expression of an ‘internal thought’.  I came to realise that these 
‘thinking’ gestures involved rhythm, forming a dialogue between body, tools 
and materials to find a ‘liminal’ or ‘flow’ state of focused awareness.  These 
gestures leave a trace on the artefact; a trace of knowing and of being that 
can be ‘felt’ by a viewer.  This extends the ‘value’ of the painterly gesture 
beyond the monetary one defined by ‘uniqueness’ of the artist’s hand.  
Reflection on the second phase of practice introduced a social dimension to 
understanding ‘gesture’ as something that is learned and embodied through 
repeated practice, and constitutive of a social habitus of making ‘art’.  The 
final phase of practice reflected on audience gestures, bringing together the 
different understandings of ‘gesture’ to encompass both bodily knowing 
through movement, and carrying and constructing cultural meaning.  I 
noticed ‘mirroring’ of bodies, and explored this insight using the notion of 
‘migration of gesture’ (Noland & Ness, 2008).  Gestures seemed to be 
‘copied’, and this may have represented a collectively negotiated ‘staging’ of 
the body.  In summary, this evolving notion of ‘gesture’ provided a central 
analytical tool that was consistent with the framework of ecological cognition.    
 
Having described the research trajectory and structure of this thesis, I will 
now explain in more detail the context and need for my research. 
- 19 - 
1.5 Literature review and research questions 
The following literature review shows how the research questions were 
developed (questions are indented in the text).  First, it outlines how the 
position of the ‘viewer’ has changed and suggests that contemporary 
accounts of creative work are inadequate to understand these changing 
conditions of practice.   It introduces Roberts’ labour theory of ‘decentred 
authorship’, and identifies a gap in his theory for understanding 
contemporary painting.  It suggests that understanding creative work 
requires understanding how knowledge is formed through the interaction of 
the whole body and socially inherited practice, as well as the agency of 
material ‘things’ with which human bodies interact.    It proposes that arts 
practice-led research provides a way of investigating these interactions, in 
particular the painter Barbara Bolt’s ‘material thinking’ (2010).  It considers 
what is missing from Bolt’s approach in terms of a focus on the ‘social’, and 
suggests that ‘thinking in context’ (Sullivan, 2010) would help to understand 
painting as a public, dialogic, research process.  It introduces cultural 
industries theorist Nick Wilson’s concept of social creativity (2010) and 
suggests that this can bring a sociological perspective to Bolt’s theory, by 
moving beyond the studio into the contexts of ‘viewing’.   Finally, it discusses 
digital reflection (using digital technologies to facilitate creative reflection 
(Kirk & Pitches, 2013)) as a method of finding new insights and learning. 
1.5.1 The position of the ‘viewer’ – the ‘post-aesthetic’ 
The term ‘post-aesthetic’ does not imply that we are ‘beyond aesthetics’ or 
that aesthetics are no longer important.  The term ‘aesthetic’ is concerned 
with ideas of beauty and taste (Munro & Scruton, 2017), and has come to be 
understood in many different ways including “a kind of object, a kind of 
judgment, a kind of attitude, a kind of experience, and a kind of value” 
(Shelley, 2017).  Aesthetic theorisation today divides over questions such as 
“whether to define aesthetic experience according to its phenomenological 
or representational content” and “how best to understand the relation 
between aesthetic value and aesthetic experience” (Shelley, 2017).  Clearly 
as a painter, I work with aesthetics in terms of representation.  But I also 
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situate the ‘aesthetic’ in the experience of making sense of the artefacts, and 
this is where the ‘post-aesthetic’ comes in.  The ‘post-aesthetic’ perspective 
develops ideas of the ‘aesthetic’ rather than rejecting the concept.  It is 
concerned with changing understandings of the consumption of artwork, with 
spectators demanding a more active role (Bishop, 2006). Viewers are 
increasingly seen as co-authors of meaning, rather than ‘receivers’ of a 
message (Rancière, 2011)12.  Art work can be seen in the context of its 
process of production, in which viewers may collaborate or participate.  The 
artist does not ‘know better’ than the viewer, who may create meanings from 
the artwork that the artist had not considered.   The artefact can be seen as 
an intermediary in this process, rather than ‘containing’ meaning (Rancière, 
2011).  Walmsley and Franks (2011) observe how the role of some arts 
organisations has changed from ‘gatekeeper’ to ‘facilitator’, with audiences 
invited into the creative development process to create their own meaning or 
collective response.   A prominent example is the Tate Modern’s Bloomberg 
Connects project (launched in 2013) which uses digital technologies to 
create opportunities for visitors to make responses to the collection.  
Through different types of digital activity audience responses are invited 
through mark-making, reflective questions, and invitations to add their own 
captions.  Artists’ processes are made visible through live events and video 
(Tate, 2017).      
These changing notions of spectatorship raise questions for contemporary 
painting, providing the context for my primary research question, which is:   
How does painting evolve a practice in line with new norms around 
‘spectatorship’, and how can we understand this labour?   
I address the first part of this question through the development of my 
practice.  By reflection on that practice, this thesis addresses the latter part, 
showing how developing an understanding of artistic labour as ecological 
cognition has enabled me to develop an artistic practice in which artistic 
subjectivity can be experienced by artist and audience as ‘distributed’. 
                                            
12 I discuss Rancière’s ‘active spectatorship’ in Chapter Four. 
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This question seeks to develop an understanding of the artistic labour of 
painting in these changing conditions of practice.  I will now explain why this 
is important, and why it suggests an original perspective on understanding 
‘creative work’. 
1.5.2 Artistic labour and artistic subjectivity 
Cultural industries theorist David Hesmondhalgh (2008) explains the 
importance of understanding the conditions of creative work.  By the late 
1990’s the term ‘creative industries’13 was being adopted for cultural and 
education policy, and included media, visual arts and crafts, computer 
software, and anything related to intellectual property (ibid.).  The ‘creative 
industries’ have in the last decades been seen as key to economic growth, 
and this has led to cultural policy becoming subject to the values of the 
market.  Hesmondhalgh points out that in a context largely controlled by 
large corporations, following market-oriented values in cultural policy is less 
than ideal.  We need, he says, to pay attention to the relationships between 
culture, society and economy, and to critique creative industries policy with 
this in mind.  One route to do this, he explains, is by looking at the conditions 
of ‘creative work’.  Another reason that understanding creative work is 
important is because this labour is what produces ‘cultural value’, as 
identified by cultural industries theorist Mark Banks (2015).  Banks also 
notes that the labour of cultural work is subject to tensions between 
‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ value, and concludes that the economic imperative 
appears to be threatening the cultural values of creative work.  He suggests 
that this art-commerce tension requires ‘academic attentiveness’ to the 
conditions under which cultural workers operate.   
Hesmondhalgh (2008) points to ways in which labour has formed a basis for 
critique of cultural policy.  Some approaches find that the conditions of 
creative labour are characterised by ‘precarity’, exploitation and the stresses 
of self-employment.  Others look at the art-commerce relationship in terms of 
                                            
13 Defined as “those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and 
which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of 
intellectual property” (Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2016). 
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how artists’ desire for ‘freedom’ and ‘autonomy’ act as self-disciplining 
devices leading to self-exploitation.  Banks (2007) outlines traditions that 
underpin this type of research, including Marxist and Foucauldian 
approaches which tend to employ social constructionist methods, exploring 
narrative constructions of ‘creative identity work’ (e.g.  Bain, 2005; Taylor 
and Littleton, 2008).  These are valuable approaches which show that 
policies used to support ‘creative’ industries can come close to “endorsing 
inequality and exploitation associated with contemporary neoliberalisms” 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2008: 567).  However, Taylor (2011) suggests that they 
ignore the cognitive processes that go into the ‘work’ of artistic production.  
He notes that accounts of creativity within the creative industries are either 
over- or under-socialised, mistrusting concepts of ‘agency’ or falling back on 
enlightenment notions of artist-as-genius (ibid.).   Taylor suggests that we 
need to reintroduce human cognition into the picture “to tie creativity back to 
socially situated individuals as creative agents”’ (2011: 45) [my emphasis].  
Therefore, rather than doing the type of ‘identity’ work described above, I 
have used a practice-led approach to explore creative work from within 
practice.  I use new materialist approaches that value my embodied, material 
and social experience as a process of ecological cognition, thus accounting 
for social structures and artistic agency.  My research tests a new 
perspective for understanding creative work by developing a situated case-
study of contemporary painting. 
It looks at ways in which cognition can be collective and social, situating 
creative work within relationships between artist, audience and artefacts.  
For this, I am indebted to Roberts’ (2007) theory of ‘decentred’ artistic 
subjectivity which locates authorship and artistic agency within relationships 
between the artist, the society in which they are embedded, and the skills 
and techniques that they employ. His labour theory of culture aims to explain 
how avant-garde art (and particularly the readymade after Duchamp’s 
Fountain) changed our understanding of artistic authorship, from value 
created by the individual expressive artisan, to value as created by 
productive labour dispersed amongst ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ hands in 
“circuits of artistic authorship” (2007: 1).  He questions what happens to 
authorship once you remove ‘the artist’ from the centre of production, and 
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“what happens to the artist’s identity after the artistic subject can no longer 
derive its stability and security from a sense of its own expressive unity, from 
the idealisms of a self-enclosed subjectivity?” (ibid: 102).  One of the ways in 
which he addresses this is to consider the move from artisanal craft to what 
he calls ‘general social technique’ (modern tools of technical reproducibility).  
He suggests that the move away from ‘craft-based’ authorship, towards 
artistic labour which involves employing technology and science in the 
service of conceptual ideas, changes the way we understand authorship.   
Skill in art is no longer defined as handcraft, but incorporates prosthetic 
devices and technical (especially digital) tools of reproduction (ibid: 102).  
Roberts suggests that artistic subjectivity is this use of tools (ibid: 15).  The 
artist’s agency does not sit outside of these skills and techniques; rather 
authorship is the employment and development of skills (ibid: 103).   Roberts 
insists that the first person singular is not lost altogether, but is simply unable 
to speak outside of its embeddedness within intellectual and technical 
sociality.  This, he says, is why concepts of ‘inner creativity’ no longer make 
sense.     
However, his focus moves away from traditional artisanal skills, rather than 
incorporating them into a wider set of techniques14.   And whilst he focuses 
carefully on the role of the artist’s hand, the rest of the body does not receive 
the same attention.  Taylor suggests that one way to investigate the 
cognitive processes involved in creative work is to understand how 
knowledge is formed through ‘innovation traditions’ and embodied in the 
work of individuals (2011: 45).  Within performance, for example, practice 
can be seen to be both embodied and socially transmitted (e.g. Pitches, 
2012), combining taught craft and the cultural conventions of a community of 
practice with the tacit embodied knowledge of the practitioner.  We need to 
understand the interaction of the whole body with socially inherited practice.  
And as I discussed earlier, a new materialist approach suggests that we also 
need to consider the agency of the material ‘things’ with which human 
bodies interact (e.g. Bennett, 2010). 
The following sub-questions aim to investigate these multiple interactions. 
                                            
14 See Chapter Two. 
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i) How do bodies and materials interact in creative practice?   
ii) How do social processes, cultural and environmental factors 
interact with human and material bodies in creative practice?15    
iii) What is the place of the artist’s voice in a shared ecological 
artistic subjectivity?    
I use a practice-led method to address these questions, and I will now 
explain why I use this approach, and how my research also offers 
methodological insights into understanding painting as a research method. 
1.5.3 Practice-led research 
Practice-led research takes place in the settings of artistic practice focusing 
on practitioner creative processes (e.g. Barrett & Bolt, 2010; Leavy, 2009; 
Sullivan, 2010).  As such, it is a suitable methodology within which to 
develop a situated account of creative work.  Creativity and cognition 
researcher Linda Candy distinguishes between practice-led research, which 
“leads primarily to new understandings about practice” (2006: 1) and 
practice-based research in which “a creative artefact is the basis of the 
contribution to knowledge” (ibid).  Practice-led research is that in which 
artistic practice can be viewed “as the production of knowledge […] derived 
from doing and from the senses” (Barrett & Bolt, 2010: 1).   A helpful 
framework for painting as inquiry is offered by Bolt (2004) who develops a 
logic of practice in which the material processes of making the work through 
‘material thinking’ put ‘reality’ into the painting, and the painting reflects this 
back into the world, creating real effects.  In this way, she argues, the visual 
image can move beyond pure representation, towards performativity – “to 
bring into being that which it figures” (2004: 3–4).   But if the ‘knowing’ is in 
the making, does that just get ‘disseminated’ through the artefact, or is it also 
‘produced’ during processes of making and viewing?  If the latter, attention 
needs to be given to sharing the making, and to the way that the artwork is 
viewed (Chapter Four addresses these questions).  Bolt’s valuable insights 
focus on the ‘making’ process, but with little focus on the ‘social’ in terms of 
                                            
15 This considers ways in which the ‘social’ is material and corporeal, rather than assuming that 
‘human’ and ‘material’ bodies are separate from the social and cultural.   
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the conditions of creative work, the contexts and ways in which audiences 
make meaning from the work, and how this shapes the artist’s process – 
‘thinking in context’ (Sullivan, 2010: 137).   In artist and scholar Graeme 
Sullivan’s typology of ways in which painting can contribute to knowledge, he 
suggests that ‘painting as idea’ researches with painting, acknowledging 
“that artistic practice is not only a personal pursuit but also a public process 
that can change the way we understand ourselves in the world we inhabit” 
where the “purpose is to open up dialogue between the artist and the viewer” 
(2008: 245).   
In summary, painting as inquiry often has little focus on the social conditions 
of artistic practice or audience experience.  By attending to the ‘social’ 
immanent in studio practice, and to the ways in which I curate and facilitate 
engagement with artefacts for an audience, my research offers a 
sociological perspective to Bolt’s theory of painting as research; one that 
accounts for decentred authorship in painting.  Specifically, it asks:      
iv) What are the implications of decentred artistic authorship 
(Roberts, 2007) for practice-led research in painting?   
To help me to focus on audience experience, I turned to a particular type of 
performance research which investigates audience engagement with 
scenography in immersive performances (McKinney, 2015; Shearing, 2014).  
In these types of performances, materials and objects are placed within a 
multi-sensory constructed environment, and audiences are guided through 
the space and invited to explore and intervene.  Guidance mechanisms are 
subtle and simple, such as written labels.  These researchers investigate 
questions of co-authorship and dialogue with audiences, an area that tends 
to be neglected in painting.  This represented an opportunity to conduct an 
interdisciplinary exchange to consider how painting can learn from research 
into audience experience of immersive scenographic performance.  Paying 
attention to the ways in which audiences can encounter and experience the 
artefacts is important because we need to understand creativity as a social 
process, as I will now explain.  
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1.5.4 Social creativity 
Wilson (2010) has argued that we need to reclaim creativity as a potential 
force for transformation – for which he argues we need to understand 
creativity as a social phenomenon rather than the preserve of ‘artistic’ 
individuals.  Wilson’s concept of ‘social creativity’ responds to our current 
climatic context of complexity and uncertainty in three ways: i) by 
challenging authority and authorship of knowledge; ii) by considering our 
relationship with different kinds of knowledge (including practice-based 
forms); and iii) by attending to how that knowledge is shared “to promote a 
culture of reflexivity and dialogue” (2010: 9).  Arts sociologists Sutherland 
and Acord suggest that the future of public engagement with creative 
practice requires focusing on the viewer’s relationship with the work of art, 
understanding knowledge as situated in that relationship as an action (2007: 
127).  This suggests that a practice-led painting methodology needs to move 
beyond the artist’s studio into the environments in which the artwork is 
shared, paying attention to how it is experienced.  It also requires 
attentiveness to how studio process (‘knowing’ produced by making) can be 
shared and how that might be experienced by an audience.  For this, I used 
video recording and editing in a process of ‘digital reflection’ which I will now 
explain. 
1.5.5 Digital reflection 
Previous research (Kirk & Pitches, 2013) investigated the potential for digital 
technologies to enhance creative development processes.  ‘Digital reflection’ 
refers to ways in which digital technologies can be used to capture and 
archive creative practice, and to facilitate creative forms of reflection on the 
digital artefacts produced.  The term means more than just ‘looking again’ at 
recorded material, but also manipulating it using the skills and language of 
the creative practitioner.  This employs techniques such as montage and 
juxtaposition to intuitively explore the material.  In this process, it can be 
possible to find something ‘new’.  In an ethnographic project, Ravetz 
described using video editing as a research process, in which she aimed “to 
be sensitive to the presence” of things “as they appeared in the material”; 
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and “to reorder this material in such a way that [she] might discover and 
communicate something [she] had not known before” (2002: 21).  This can 
be understood as ‘digital reflection’, both ‘re-viewing’ and ‘creatively 
manipulating’ material intuitively to find new insights and learning.   
The role of documentation in practice-led research is well discussed, usually 
focusing on artistic process (e.g. Fortnum & Smith, 2007; Lehmann, 2012; 
Nimkulrat, 2007) or providing a durable record of ephemeral performance 
research outcomes (Nelson, 2009).  However, the ways in which digital 
documentation forms a reflective part of the artist-researcher’s process and 
an artistic outcome which can lead to new insights is not much discussed16.  
Through testing and evaluating the effectiveness of digital reflection as a 
method my research asks:  
v) What can digital reflection as a method contribute to practice-
led research? 
 
Having detailed the research context and questions, the aims and focus can 
now be summarised, as follows. 
1.6 Aims and focus 
My research aims to understand the labour of painting from inside the 
activities, rather than ‘inside’ the psyche; that is, without falling back on the 
‘inside-out’ psychoanalytical model of artistic expression and authorship.  It 
aims to problematise the individualistic model of artistic subjectivity from 
within practice, and to ‘rehearse’ an ecological alternative.  The central focus 
is to understand what decentred authorship means for a painter engaged in 
a practice of painting as inquiry.   
  
                                            
16 A search of three collections of writings on practice-led research (Sullivan, 2010; Biggs & 
Karlsson, 2010; Grey and Malins, 2004) found that ‘documentation’ was not included in the index.   
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The research aims can be summarised as follows:- 
1. To develop a situated case study of painting as inquiry which offers 
an account of decentred artistic subjectivity, agency and authorship, 
and contributes towards understanding the conditions of ‘post-
aesthetic’ creative labour; 
2. To critique Roberts' view of a decentred authorship aligned with 
general social technique (2007), and its implications for practice-led 
research in  painting; 
3. To contribute an epistemological grounding for practice-led research 
in painting that accounts for social structures and artistic agency;  
4. To contribute insights to practice-led research methods, in particular 
'digital reflection' (Kirk & Pitches, 2013). 
 
1.6.1 Scope of written component 
Through practice, I have carried out projects of inquiry into subjectivity in the 
context of climate change, with the meta-project of reflecting on that practice 
to develop insights about the creative work of painting as inquiry.  Thus there 
were two projects, looking at my practice and looking through my practice.  
The limits of a PhD research project in terms of time and word-count meant 
that I couldn’t include both of these projects in the scope of the written 
thesis.  The core focus for this written component is to develop an 
understanding of contemporary artistic labour through the body, material and 
social lenses of the ‘ecological cognition’ model. The practice of painting as 
inquiry that is being reflected upon explores cultural responses to climate 
change, insights from which are embedded within the practice itself, rather 
than being included in the written thesis.  I have curated a set of suggested 
insights in Appendix A, and as I suggest in Chapter Six, further research 
could consider in more depth the ‘meanings’ made from the artwork. 
The term ‘creative’ practice as used throughout this text refers to the labour 
involved in making original artworks – where ‘labour’ includes artist and 
audience, and ‘artworks’ include practice events as well as artefacts.  Whilst 
this necessarily references ‘creativity’, itself a much-debated concept, my 
research does not specifically address these debates.  Definitions of 
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‘creativity’ include both ‘originality’ and ‘effectiveness’ (which can take the 
form of ‘value’) (Runco & Garrett, 2012).  Original artworks which look at the 
‘familiar’ in new ways have the ‘value’ of stimulating dialogue, out of which 
new understanding might emerge through cultural disruption and 
estrangement. This strays into the ‘cultural value’ debate, and into the 
‘sociology of art’ (e.g. Tanner, 2003), but this thesis does not directly 
address these debates.  The main focus of this text is to develop a situated 
account of the creative work of painting as inquiry.  Thus the prime 
methodology is practice-led, as I will now explain in more detail. 
1.7 Philosophy and methodology 
The methodological principles which underpin my research design can be 
summarised as:   
 Practice-led  
 Hermeneutic  
 Attentive to social relations 
1.7.1 Practice-led 
Focusing on creative labour suggests a practice-led method, and therefore 
the primary method involves making artworks and events, reflecting-through-
practice, and employing reflexive methods to reflect-on-practice.  Rather 
than observing my practice as a ‘found object’, I reflexively develop a 
practice which I simultaneously record and theorise.  In this way, theory and 
practice emerge together as praxis.  I write in order to reflect, and through 
writing, the practice develops.  Writing is generative, and has been 
described as ‘discursive writing’ (Murphy, 2012) and as a ‘method of inquiry’ 
(Richardson, 2000).  Through scholarly writing I generate new questions and 
lenses to facilitate my ongoing sense-making of, and within, practice.  
Through an inquiry process of making artwork, the work of art is investigated 
through different theoretical lenses of the ecological cognition model. The 
building of these lenses and the exploration of them through practice affect 
each other.  Sense making emerges through a hermeneutic process.   
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1.7.2 Hermeneutic 
My research takes a phenomenological perspective (Merleau-Ponty, 2012) 
to understand ‘reality’ as experienced by bodily senses, constantly emergent 
as organism and environment interact.  This ongoing process can be 
‘revealed’ through a hermeneutic approach.  Hermeneutics is an interpretive 
methodological principle that requires the parts to be understood in relation 
to the whole through a hermeneutic spiral in which whole and parts are 
repeatedly revisited, with understanding added at each loop of the spiral.  
Trimmingham (2002) outlines a suggested hermeneutic methodology for 
practice as research in Theatre and Performance.   Rigour, she suggests, 
may be provided by setting tasks guided by clear aims and objectives. The 
process of evaluating the work at each stage, and setting new tasks, aims or 
objectives maintains a sense of control over the research process. She 
advocates paying careful attention to the entry point to the spiral, as a basic 
hermeneutic principle is that of the question always determining the answer.  
She suggests initially asking a very open question, then progressively aiming 
to ask better questions as the research progresses.  Following these 
principles, I started the practice with an open objective, and developed more 
focused questions throughout each phase.  Trimmingham takes this method 
of open questioning from a phenomenological approach which is aware of 
the “accretions of culture, habit, prejudice” (2002: 57) and aims to strip away 
preconceptions whilst simultaneously being aware that this is not always 
possible.  Here I run slightly counter to Trimmingham’s methodology, as 
rather than attempting to strip away the ‘cultural’17, my research adopts a 
‘cultural phenomenology’ which is  “concerned with synthesising the 
immediacy of embodied experience with the multiplicity of cultural meaning 
in which we are always and inevitably immersed” (Csordas, 1999: 143).  
This is explained in Chapter Two, but in principle requires attentiveness to 
social relations. 
  
                                            
17 This refers to phenomenological ‘bracketing’, an approach which I have not detailed fully here.  
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1.7.3 Attentive to social relations – (critical) autoethnography 
This phenomenological approach is combined with the critical realist view 
that human experience is always embedded in social relations that humans 
both re-produce and are produced by (Bhaskar, 1989; 1998).  I follow 
Turner’s (1994) suggestion that social structures are embodied in habits and 
behaviours or material artefacts18.  An autoethnographic approach has been 
used to develop a first-person study of a culture of practice – although with 
some caution.  Autoethnography is defined by Ellis and Bochner as “an 
autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers 
of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural” (2000: 739).  
However, de Freitas and Paton (2008) deconstruct the notion of ‘self’ as it is 
used in autoethnographic texts, questioning whether readers believe that 
they are reading ‘realist’ tales about the self.  They explore the tacit notions 
of the self that appear within these texts, noting a tension between the 
espoused understandings of a posthuman ‘fragmented’ self, and the 
humanist ‘authentic’ self that often seems to appear.   Guarding against this, 
I have critically reflected upon my own first-person account, which I term 
‘critical’ autoethnography (described in detail in Chapter Four).  This brings 
me onto considerations of subjectivity – where I am as a researcher in this.    
1.7.4 Researcher subjectivity 
This written thesis reflects on practice to address the research questions.  
This has been achieved through an aware development of my emerging 
creative practice which has simultaneously been informed by theory.  The 
researcher adopts a dual role – artist (project), and theorist (meta-project).  
As both voices author this report, some further explanation might help you to 
understand the philosophical reasons for this.   Taking an ‘ecological’ 
approach to cognition assumes a view of knowledge as emergent in our 
interactions with the world.  ‘Labour’ is the point at which the body interacts 
with the material and the social (Figure 1.2).  Hence the primary method is 
practice-led through ‘labouring’.  The key orchestrating agent of this report is 
                                            
18 See Chapter Four. 
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the artist, whose role is to understand the world through experiencing it and 
articulating an account of that experience. To facilitate this, links to short 
video clips in the text provide a trace of artistic practice at critical points, and 
these need to be viewed as they are encountered within the text to give you 
a full understanding of praxis.  The theorist aims to provide a more 
‘distanced’ level of interpretation, through employing theoretical frameworks 
and retaining a conscious focus on the lenses of the model.  This brings me 
onto the place of the practice in the format of the submission. 
1.7.5 Philosophical rationale for the format of submission 
The contributions from my research concern the nature of artistic labour in a 
post-aesthetic view, and particularly the labour of painting as inquiry.  This 
needs to be experienced by doing this work.  Philosopher Mark Johnson, 
who writes on embodied cognition and aesthetics, suggests that the ‘work’ 
involves researching through art to enhance knowing through a process of 
inquiry rather than creating a body of knowledge (Johnson, 2010).    
Johnson draws upon Dewey’s view that we develop ‘patterns’ of behaviour 
from past experience and inherited through culture.  In problematic situations 
(such as climate change) we may need to change these patterns, and 
inquiring into them provides an opportunity to transform experience (ibid: 
147).  My inquiry into climate change responsibility is experienced as a 
process over time, in which knowledge is emergent.  Artefacts, rather than 
being bodies of knowledge, exist “as enacted in and through us” (Johnson, 
2010: 150).  This enactment of knowledge involves the presence of an 
audience.  Their experience of ‘making sense’ of the work is the work, and 
this cannot be wholly transcribed (although it can be reflected upon).  The 
practice documentation provides a trace of this experience, but cannot 
substitute for it.     
The practice events ‘present’ findings in the form of an experiential inquiry – 
the curation, facilitation, and design of which have been informed by insights 
from the practical and theoretical research.  They are complementary to the 
written submission.  ‘Exegesis’ as a process of ‘knowing with’ the artwork 
occurs in the event, which therefore forms part of the final submission.  The 
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artist Graeme Sullivan outlines the history of the term ‘exegesis’ which was 
originally used to refer to the hermeneutic tradition of interpreting religious 
texts (2010: 120).  Today, ‘hermeneutics’ is used to describe meaning-
making more broadly, and the term ‘exegesis’ is sometimes used for 
practice-led PhD research to refer to a written component.  This is often 
understood as ‘contextualising’ the arts practice, but has also been 
described as a method of developing ideas (ibid: 221) or “a mode of 
revealing” (Bolt, 2010: 34).  For Bolt, the job of the exegesis is to articulate 
what has emerged through practice (ibid: 34).  In my research, knowledge 
emerges in the process of audience participation, exegesis as ‘event’ rather 
than articulation in a written form19.     
 
But this understanding of the audience’s work came in the last two events.  
Going back to the beginning of my research, I started by paying attention to 
the artist’s ‘making’ as a process of thinking through the ‘body’. The next 
chapter discusses ‘embodied cognition’ and the insights gained. 
  
                                            
19 In Chapters Four and Five I investigate how an audience holds shared responsibility for exegesis. 
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Chapter 2 The Gesture of Thinking: Embodied Cognition 
The aim of this chapter is to begin to develop an account of artistic labour as 
ecological cognition through reflection on the first phase of practice, starting 
with a focus on the lens of ‘body’ and particularly the intersection with 
‘material’ (‘handling’) (Figure 2.1).  It develops a post-Cartesian 
understanding of ways in which ‘thinking’ is extended into and beyond the 
body.     
 
Figure 2.1 Artistic labour as ecological cognition – 'Body' 
 
This chapter explores the following research sub-question from the 
perspective of bodies:- 
i) How do bodies and materials interact in creative practice? 
The methods and sources used to consider this are:- 
 studio practice (journal and digital reflections) 
 design of, and reflection on, event one (artwork, documentation, 
audience postcards, observations) 
 reflective mechanisms (literature review, scholarly writing, digital 
reflection)   
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After introducing the first practice phase, the chapter outlines perspectives 
on ways that ‘the body’ can be ‘known’ as both nature and culture (Weiss, 
1999).  It suggests how the perspective of ecological cognition can 
transcend this nature / culture dualism (Gibson, 1986; Ingold, 2000).  It then 
takes this perspective to reflect on the first phase of practice.  It proposes 
that making is a process of ‘embodied cognition’ in which the materials and 
emerging artefacts form part of an extended cognitive apparatus (Clark, 
2011).  It further explains ‘digital reflection’ (Kirk & Pitches, 2013) and shows 
how using an audio recorder as an ‘extended cognitive apparatus’ created a 
trace of affect (McIlwain, 2006).  It further explains and critiques Roberts’ 
(2007) theory of post-Cartesian artistic labour including his detailed 
consideration of ‘handling’, and considers what might be learned by 
considering painting through his lens of ‘decentred’ artistic subjectivity.  It 
looks at the painterly gesture as thinking, rather than as the expression of an 
‘internal thought’, and raises questions about the role of rhythm and 
movement in making-as-thinking.  It proposes that movements leave a 
physical trace on the artefact; tactile properties that can be perceived by the 
viewer-body.  It reflects on insights from the first practice event (see below) 
and raises questions for the second phase of practice.  
   
First, let me introduce the first phase of practice which forms the basis for 
the theoretical reflections which follow.   
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2.1 Practice phase one 
 
Figure 2.2 Warehouse, 2012, Oil and collage on paper, 21.5 x 15 cm 
 
During the first months, my studio practice involved feeling for the concerns I 
wanted to explore through painting, experimenting in the studio with ideas 
and materials, and simultaneously working out how to record the process 
and make sense of it.  Following Trimmingham’s (2002) hermeneutic 
principle of initially asking a very open question, I started with a simple 
objective: To explore my concerns about climate change through making 
images.  I started to work with found images of climate change affected 
landscapes, combining these with family snapshots of my childhood.  My 
research objective was to explore ideas of embodied cognition through 
practice and reading, recording reflections through writing and audio 
recording.  In an attempt to ‘study’ embodied practice, I video recorded my 
movements, and reviewed the digital artefacts by editing videos through 
‘digital reflection’.  This involved capturing digital records of studio practice 
and spoken reflection.  These were then reviewed and edited in a process of 
deepening creative reflection (Kirk & Pitches, 2013).  Digital devices create a 
record of a body acting in its environment, and these records provide both a 
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trace of practice, and a distancing mechanism.  The creative process of 
digital editing enables a ‘felt sense’ of process. The digital records are 
montaged in a process of layering of reflections allowing insights to emerge 
through playful juxtaposition (Nelson, 2006: 109).  This alternative aesthetic 
means of analysis uses the language of vision, sound and movement.       
The Gesture of Thinking was the first event, held on 9th May 2013 in Alec 
Clegg studio, stage@leeds at the University of Leeds.  It aimed to show 
creative practice as a corporeal activity, foregrounding body, movement, and 
materials.  I aimed to create for the participant an embodied, ‘felt’ sense of 
the work through: (i) inclusion of materials and objects from the studio; (ii) 
edited video footage; and (iii) an invitation to ‘touch’ the artworks, objects 
and materials – first when I greeted visitors, and secondly by labels on the 
work.  I invited visitors to record their responses on a postcard using either 
words or images.   Reflection prompts on the card read:  i) I’m noticing… ii) 
I’m feeling … iii) I’m wondering …. The drop-in event had around 25 visitors, 
and 19 returned postcards.  The event is documented here:  The Gesture of 
Thinking.  You may find it helpful to watch this video before reading on. 
 
The next section reflects upon this first phase of practice through the lens of 
‘body’.     
2.2 ‘Embodiment’ 
The body could be described as a tangible fleshy ‘object’ – a physical entity.  
However, it seems the question is whether it can be studied as such.  How 
do we come to know about this body (as distinct from biological knowledge 
of cellular structures)?  Philosopher Gail Weiss challenges the idea that ‘the 
body’ or ‘body image’ can be a discrete phenomena of investigation, quoting 
Merleau Ponty’s view that the body is “never isolated in its activity but 
always already engaged with the world” (1999: 1).  She also challenges the 
use of the definite article – ‘the body’ – which she suggests assumes a 
neutral body “unaffected by the gender, race, age, and changing abilities” 
(ibid.).  For Weiss, body images are not discrete, cohesive or coherent, but 
are formed of overlapping identities.  There is also a question as to whether 
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we can ‘watch’ our body or whether, as philosopher Drew Leder (1990) 
suggests, it resists observation remaining largely invisible.  It seems 
conscious study of the body may be problematic.  What about the 
unconscious functioning of our body?  Weiss notes that a number of 
researchers distinguish between conscious awareness of one’s body, and a 
“prereflective awareness of how one’s body occupies space” (1999: 2).  
According to this view, ‘body image’ comes from conscious reflection, 
whereas ‘body schema’ (or corporeal schema) refers to the unconscious 
dynamic organisation of bodily capabilities.  According to Weiss, Merleau 
Ponty, whilst not making this distinction explicit, suggests that “consciously 
focusing on one’s body already presupposes a more primary, prereflective 
way of experiencing the body” (ibid: 2).   
Foucault (according to Weiss) challenges this notion of unmediated 
‘prereflective’ relationship to our body, arguing that body images are socially 
constructed by disciplinary practices.  Relations between self and body are 
not ‘private’ but are embedded in power relationships.  Hoy (1999) further 
explains that Foucault and Bourdieu suggested that subjectivity is socially 
and culturally constructed unconsciously – and therefore invisible to 
(ahistorical) phenomenological introspection.  Bourdieu saw bodily 
comportment as formed by social structures (habitus) and bodily orientation 
(hexis) which were acquired through culture or class (ibid.).  As such, 
Bourdieu and Foucault see ‘body’ as a culturally defined concept rather than 
a natural ‘essence’ – a view which Hoy sees as problematic in two ways.  
First, if the body is socially constructed rather than natural, how can its 
‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ be critiqued?  And secondly, if agents are 
powerless to change their comportment, how can bringing acculturated 
bodily constructions to light meet the ‘emancipatory’ claims of these writers?  
Weiss (1999) also cautions that placing too much emphasis on social 
construction of body image risks ‘disembodiment’, and argues that both 
discursive and physiological factors play a part in the ongoing construction of 
bodies.   
The anthropologist Thomas Csordas (1999) deals with this ‘split’ between 
body-as-phenomenological and body-as-cultural by proposing a ‘cultural 
phenomenology’.  This proposes that studies of embodiment as an 
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“existential condition in which the body is the subjective source or 
intersubjective ground of experience” (ibid: 143) are not about the body, but 
are about culture as it is understood by a body-in-the-world.  Thus a cultural 
phenomenology is “concerned with synthesising the immediacy of embodied 
experience with the multiplicity of cultural meaning in which we are always 
and inevitably immersed” (ibid: 143).  Csordas also makes a methodological 
distinction between ‘body’ and ‘embodiment’ which he likens to Barthes’s 
‘text’ (as object) and ‘textuality’ (as activity of discourse).  He defines ‘body’ 
as biological, material entity and ‘embodiment’ as “an indeterminate 
methodological field defined by perceptual experience and by mode of 
presence and engagement in the world” (ibid: 145). 
2.2.1 An ecological account of cognition 
So it seems body can be understood as both nature and culture.  But, as 
philosopher John Sanders (1999) points out, what do these mean, and 
where do you start?  Sanders goes back to a principle of ‘first philosophy’.  
He argues for an ecological perspective of human beings functioning in an 
environment, understanding the world by interacting and evolving with it 
regardless of whether their ways of dealing with it are ‘natural’, cultural or 
social.  One way in which he suggests we can do this is via the principle of 
affordances.  This is a term developed by the American psychologist James 
Gibson to describe “opportunities for action in the environment of the 
organism … [which are] ‘picked up’ by organisms as they negotiate the 
world” (Sanders, 1999: 129).  According to Sanders’ account of Gibson, it is 
affordances (rather than objects or sense data) that are the basic objects of 
perception, and they are perceived directly as opportunities for action.  We 
move to sit on a chair because it affords a horizontal surface at the right 
height relative to our knees, rather than because we first identify it as ‘chair’.  
Thus Gibson’s concept of affordances transcends the nature/culture 
dualism.  Gibson (1986) suggests that our consciousness is the intentional 
movement towards affordances.  Perceptual activity consists in the 
“intentional movement of the whole being […] in its environment” (Ingold, 
2000: 166).  ‘Intentionality’ in Husserl’s phenomenological sense means that 
“consciousness is always the consciousness of something” (Sepp & 
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Embree, 2010: 151); it is a holistic action. Consciousness is the reaching-
out-towards, rather than consciousness first, which then reaches out20.  This 
intentional movement is perception: “the body is given in movement, and 
that bodily movement carries its own immanent intentionality […] it is 
because of this intentionality that the subject’s action is […] a movement of 
perception” (Merleau-Ponty, cited in Ingold, 2000: 170).  Intentional 
movement transcends mind/body dualism – we don’t ‘see’ a thing with our 
head/eyes, and then instruct our body to move towards it.  Ingold’s ‘dwelling’ 
perspective (2000; 2011) transcends another dualism, which is the split 
between ‘things’ and their ecosphere.  ‘Things’ interact with elements such 
as temperature or airflow, so our engagement with them is physical and 
cultural and mediated by the properties of things and surrounding elements.    
Taking this perspective to look at the work of the artist, knowledge of the 
world comes from engagement with things (Ingold, 2011) and is emergent as 
the artist engages with their world of practice (material, social and 
environmental).   By looking at Ingold’s conception of ‘skills’ as “the 
capabilities of action and perception of the whole organic being (indissolubly 
mind and body) situated in a richly structured environment” (Ingold, 2000: 5), 
the next section will examine the process of developing a ‘body’ of work by a 
whole body immersed in its environment.    
2.3 Practice as ‘embodied cognition’ 
To make sense of my practice, I adopt a cultural phenomenology (Csordas, 
1999) in which I pay attention to my subjective experience as a body-in-the-
world, seeking to understand what this tells me about the cultural.  I observe 
my body as ‘text’ through watching video to become aware of its movements 
‘outside’ my subjective bodily in-the-moment experience.  And I observe the 
‘textuality’ of my embodied experience through written and spoken journal 
entries, trying to articulate the feeling that I get.  In making sense of these 
observations, I adopt an ecological perspective to understand ways in which 
I negotiate the world of practice.  In the following section, I review theoretical 
ideas alongside observations from journal reflections (indented in boxes) 
                                            
20 See, for example, Merleau Ponty’s discussion of motor intentionality (2012: 112-113). 
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and videos (hyperlinked).  The video clips provide a trace of artistic practice 
at critical points, and need to be viewed as they are encountered within the 
text. 
2.3.1 Extended cognition and tool use 
In November 2012, whilst trying to ‘get to know’ one of my paintings, I used 
audio reflection to externalise my thoughts.  (You can listen to these 
reflections in the video Looking, which I will refer to throughout this chapter.)  
‘Externalise’ suggests something ‘inside’ that I needed to get ‘out’, as if I 
wanted to ‘capture’ pre-existing thoughts with the voice recorder assisting 
my memory.  But was it just assisting memory?  Without it, would I have had 
the same thoughts?  Did I put my ‘mind’ into it, or did it become part of my 
mind?  Many writers have attempted to dissolve the Cartesian dualism of 
mind/body which assumes that ‘thinking’ is done in the head by the brain 
which the body is slave to.  The philosopher Teed Rockwell (2005) employs 
a pragmatist inspired approach to develop a post-Cartesian theory of mind 
heavily influenced by Dewey.  In this theory, ‘mind’ is “equally dependent on 
the interactions among a brain, a nervous system, a body, and a world” (ibid: 
xii).  Through exploring neuroscience, Rockwell unpicks the assumptions of 
Cartesian dualism, finding for example that ‘mind’ is hormonal (located in the 
body) as well as neural.  “Almost anything that takes place within the skin 
has some claim to being part of the embodiment of mind” (ibid: xv).   
And it would appear that cognition doesn’t end at the skin.  Professor of 
Logic and Metaphysics Andy Clark (2011) tells us of the Nobel Prize winning 
physicist Richard Feynman, who said that his original notes and sketches 
were not a record of the work but the work itself. Clark suggests that the 
‘loop’ into the external medium was integral to the intellectual activity, and 
that Feynman was actually thinking on the paper.  “The loop through pen 
and paper is part of the physical machinery responsible for the shape of the 
flow of thoughts and ideas” (ibid: xxv) – and thus a functional part of an 
extended cognitive ‘machine’.  Clark argues for an extension of the 
‘machinery of mind’ out into the world, where human sensing, learning, 
thought and feeling rely on our body-based interactions with the 
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extraorganismic environment.  The reflective mechanisms that I use such as 
a written journal or audio recorder are part of an extended cognitive 
apparatus.  By audio recording my ‘wandering’ around the painting, I’m 
extending my ‘mind’ using technology.  The exploration of the painting did 
not involve words-forming-in-the-head that I then recorded via my voice onto 
the recorder.  The looking/talking/recording happened simultaneously.  
‘Thinking’ is realised in action as a process in which knowledge is emergent.  
The recording extends the effectiveness of cognitive performance, providing 
a trace of this emergent process.  Listening again to the recording carries 
this process forward, providing a feedback loop to reflect upon and further 
‘process’ my ramblings.  There is additional information in the qualities of my 
voice which attracts my attention – changes in tone, speed and energy.  
Audio reflection employs different bodily gestures to writing (using 
voice/tongue/lips/ears) and culturally it uses different conventions (Mey, 
2006).  Langue in written form uses syntactic signs and textual framing, 
whereas parole in audio reflections employs the performative rhythms and 
pitches of voice – which may afford possibilities for “play, intuition, chance 
and imagination” (ibid: 206).    
‘Thinking’, says Clark, often relies on ‘environmental supports’ such as the 
arrangement of Scrabble tiles to prompt word recall21.  This is an example of 
what Clark and Chalmers describe as ‘epistemic action’, one which involves 
altering things ‘in the world’ to help with a cognitive activity such as 
recognition (Clark, 2011: 222).  This contrasts with a ‘pragmatic’ action, in 
which things are altered for a practical purpose.  The human organism and 
its external ‘tools’ create a ‘coupled system’ without which cognitive 
performance would be reduced.  Hence this coupled process is cognitive, 
despite not being ‘in the head’.  Language itself (together with other symbol 
systems) is a ‘tool’ with which we think, an external structure with which our 
brain evolves in a coupled system (ibid: 225) – and this would include the 
visual language of art-making.   
                                            
21 ‘Scrabble’ is a word game using tiles containing single letters which are arranged by players into 
words.  Randomly organising your letter-tiles can prompt ideas for word formations.  
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It must be noted that the extended cognition thesis is not without its critics, 
who fear that the ‘questionable’ benefits of such a disruptive theory come at 
the unacceptable cost of losing the “standard object” of cognitive theorising, 
which is “the stable persisting individual” (Wilson & Clark, 2009: 71).  
However, this ‘stable’ individual is also under question, as we shall see. 
 
In the process of exploring my concerns about climate change through 
making images, I started to use collage techniques.  I created source images 
from which to paint by cutting out figures and placing them in landscapes.  
My consciousness is the reaching-out-towards those images, an intentional 
movement which is perception.  This process of ‘thinking’ involves selecting 
and manipulating the printed and cut out images, extending my ‘mind’ using 
collage techniques. The collage materials are ‘environmental supports’ and 
playing with the pieces to see how they ‘fit’ together is an example of 
‘epistemic action’.  The collage pieces become part of my cognitive 
apparatus.  But what I’m looking for as I create these images is a sensation, 
a gut feeling that has no words.  The painting is also an ‘environmental 
support’, a landscape which I wander around, recording my ‘rambling’ as I 
search for sensation.  The digital technology of the voice recorder affords the 
opportunity to capture the emergent knowledge contained in the 
performative rhythms and pitches of voice.  Through ‘digital reflection’ – 
using digital technologies to enhance reflection on creative processes (Kirk 
& Pitches, 2013) – I look-and-listen again whilst editing footage of the 
painting surface.  Reflection is a ‘felt’ process, using an ‘expressive’ medium 
which can illuminate more ‘explanatory’ linguistic reflective modes (Reason 
& Hawkins, in Kirk & Pitches, 2013: 215).  The resulting digital artefact can 
be reviewed to find new learning, such that knowledge is emergent in 
processes of framing and re-framing reflections (Moon, in Kirk & Pitches, 
2013: 225).  Watching and listening again to the video Looking creates 
sensation which knocks on the door of ‘thought’.  These sensations which 
are before words or understanding can be likened to ‘affect’.   
  
- 44 - 
2.3.2 Affect 
Psychologist Doris McIlwain provides working definitions of ‘affect’, 
‘emotion’, and ‘feeling’ (whilst cautioning that there is no agreement within 
psychology on definitions).  She suggests the following: i) ‘affect’ is best 
used “to denote primary affects, individuated at the level of the body”; ii) 
‘emotion’ can refer to the modification of affect from “the coassembly 
(through experience) of affects with cognition” where the same basic ‘affect’ 
might co-assemble in multiple ways to produce different ‘emotions’.  And iii) 
‘feeling’ can be taken to refer to phenomenological experience as in “the 
feeling of what happens” which cannot be totally explained by affective or 
emotional responses (McIlwain, 2006: 385).  Philosopher Brian Massumi 
(2002) discusses affect in the context of understanding the impact of images 
(specifically film) on a viewer, which historically has employed structural 
terms (semiotic or narrative meaning).  He suggests that what is often lost is 
what he calls the ‘expression event’.  By this, he means an intensity of 
experience in which “nothing is prefigured” (ibid: 27).  He equates this 
intensity with affect, which he says has increasingly been used by arts 
disciplines as an alternative way of understanding image-based culture to 
the dominance of deconstructionist theories of signification.  Massumi also 
suggests that emotion differs from affect, as an emotion “is a subjective 
content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience” (2002: 28).  
Thus emotion is that in which affect is qualified by convention, consensus, 
narrative, and semiotic structures.  Affect is unqualified – and for this reason 
there is no recognised language to use to critique it.  However, affect 
matters because it has political potency.  Bennett (2010) discusses the 
importance of affect and its micro-political and ethical power, arguing that “if 
a set of moral principles is actually to be lived out, the right mood or 
landscape of affect has to be in place” (2010: xii).  She argues that ‘things’ 
have agency which can affect human bodies and therefore have political 
power (ibid: xii)22.   
 
                                            
22 This will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
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I listen again to the video Looking to hear how the painting affects me in my 
spoken exploration.  The first responses suggest material excitation on my 
body – ‘thick brushstrokes’ – the thick texture of the voice communicates a 
sense of response to the material.  The material qualities lead me into the 
reflection.  The voice then wavers and rambles as it quietly traverses the 
colours of the land and sky – and then lands with a pitch of certainty at the 
‘solid’ building. A bored monotonous reading out of financial scraps of 
information follows; some quiet musing on the splash – and then a shift in 
tone on the discovery: “Actually if it comes over it’s going to engulf that 
child.”  The voice lifts, has more energy.  It strengthens as a narrative 
develops: “actually the next thing that would happen is it would engulf her.”  
The voice gains in power as it describes the girl being “too big – towering.”  
At the end there is a deepening of tone and a staccato certainty: “big. 
oblivious. about. to go. under.”  I can hear traces of ‘affect’ in my voice, 
shifting from uncertain and exploratory, to an increase in energy and 
assertiveness as realisations start to ‘drop into place’.  These are ‘primary’ 
affects which can be felt without being ‘translated’ into emotion or feeling.  In 
terms of a response to climate change, the realisations of what that painting 
was ‘doing’ (for me at that time) become apparent towards the end of the 
video, and hearing the qualities of my voice and how it changes adds a 
dimension that would be missing in transcription.  The audio reflection 
helped me to get to grips with how the painting affected me.  By creating a 
trace of the embodied process of ‘rambling’, and letting my body listen to this 
‘trace’ through paying attention to affect, I deepen my reflections.     
2.3.3 The invisible body 
Mind extends into my body, and through the cognitive apparatus of the audio 
recorder and the painting, it extends into the world.   But it does take some 
coaxing.  I find that my train of thought recedes, whistling into a tunnel as 
soon as I start recording.  Leder describes this as ‘nullpoint’ – the part of the 
body that does the perceiving can’t perceive itself (1990: 13–14).  The mind 
that is ‘mulling’ disappears when I focus on it.  It seems that you can’t watch 
yourself think without externalising it.  This is where Clark’s (2011) ‘loop’ into 
an external medium comes in handy.  But this ‘invisibility’, Leder suggests, 
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even extends to tool use.  Leder describes tools as “part of an equipmental 
structure that tends to withdraw from our explicit attention” (1990: 33).  He 
illustrates this (referring to Polanyi and Merleau Ponty) with the example of 
the blind man’s stick which becomes an extension of touch, disappearing 
from awareness as a tool.  But if mind extends into body and tools, why does 
Cartesian dualism retain such a strong hold?  Leder suggests that mind 
remains uppermost, because body is effectively ‘invisible’ to us.  We cannot 
see the part of our body that does the perceiving.  In action, our attention is 
focussed outwards such that we are not aware of the body that acts (Leder, 
1990: 18).   
As I paint, I am both acting and perceiving and it is impossible to untangle 
the two.  I am not conscious of my body’s movements.  My whole body is 
involved in making a painting, but I can’t ‘watch’ how it is doing it.  If I tried, I 
would lose the qualities of ‘flow’ or absorption.  ‘Digital reflection’ methods do 
the ‘watching’, enabling my body to ‘disappear’, which Leder suggests is 
crucial for lived embodiment.  Lack of perception of body regions is a 
necessary condition for their effective operation (1990: 111).  So our 
everyday lives assume the Cartesian ‘I’.  Roberts (2007) suggests that the 
workings of consciousness itself also disappear from view.  From the 
perspective of neurology, he suggests consciousness has no ‘centre’ but is 
the dynamic outcome of a “vast distributive network” (2007: 112).  We form 
our subjectivity out of a range of possibilities, ‘authoring’ human agency by 
electing the best ‘self’ for the task in hand.  Roberts suggests that it seems 
essential to our effective cognitive functioning that our introspective activities 
do not reveal this, or our consciousness would be ‘swamped’.  So much for 
the ‘stable persisting individual’. 
If agency is distributed across a network that includes tools of extended 
cognition, what does this mean in terms of understanding artistic labour?  
Who is the ‘artist’ who labours to ‘know’ the world?  Where does artistic 
subjectivity reside?  Roberts (2007) considers these questions partly by 
examining the changing role of the ‘hand’ in artistic labour.   
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2.3.4 Handling   
Roberts develops a post-Cartesian labour model of artistic subjectivity, 
defined as the use of tools, copying devices and so on.  He explores the 
replacement of traditional artisanal technique with a reskilling of what he 
calls ‘general social technique’ (referring to technical tools and techniques of 
reproduction used in avant-garde arts practice).  The ‘sensuousness’ of 
artistic labour, he says, is transformed into ‘immaterial forms of labour’ in 
which skills move from ‘craft-based’ to ‘immaterial’ skills (2007: 87–89).  This 
“divergence between skill and expressive movement” (ibid: 89) represents 
for Roberts a new set of ‘cognitive relations’ between eye and hand.  In this 
context, he suggests that the place of the artist’s hand needs to be revisited, 
using the example of the Picasso/Braque papier collés which involved the 
hand in placing, ordering and selecting rather than the expressive 
manipulation of paint (ibid: 88).  With the posthuman landscape of 
digitalisation, in which machines have signalled a move away from the 
handcraft of tool use – a “crisis of handcraft” (ibid: 98) – Roberts insists that 
there is still a place for the hand.  With the advent of the readymade, he 
suggests the hand was released from “expressive mimeticism”, instead 
finding “new forms of dexterity and facility through the manipulation and 
transformation of the sign-values of extant symbolic materials” (ibid: 98).  
This ‘craft of reproducibility’ involves skill in the precise control through the 
fingers of surrogate devices that control the manipulation of technology.   
 
In my practice, I worked with readymade images, sourced digitally, then 
manually rearranged and replicated.  Using video, I focused on these 
activities of selecting, cutting out, organising and placing (see the video 
Explore through collage, which will also be referred to later).  These activities 
involved a range of ‘old’ and ‘new’ tools – from computer mouse, to scissors 
and glue.  Working with collage, I made simple juxtapositions.  I cut out 
figures from childhood snapshots and placed these into landscapes.  
Instantly it felt right, a frisson of excitement, an affect.  These sensations 
were felt in my whole body, thus involving more than just my hand.  The 
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‘cognitive relations’ involved hand, eye and whole body in a movement that 
is perception.   
During the first event, I cut out figures and placed them on a growing pile of 
collage pieces on the floor.  I noticed that some audience members 
crouched down to see these better.  Some of them moved the pieces 
around, placing figures into landscapes, creating new pictures.  I hadn’t 
anticipated this. The original intention was to share the materials and 
processes of making.  This was a key insight in which I realised 
opportunities for audience participation, for carrying out the same skills of 
selection and placement, thinking with the pieces as environmental supports.     
 
  
Figure 2.3 Collage pieces – before and after audience intervention 
 
Roberts’ model of ‘decentred’ artistic subjectivity is central for my research, 
providing an alternative to the ‘inside-out’ model of artistic authorship.  
However, as a painter, I feel that it does leave some gaps for understanding 
my practice.  I merge the craft of reproducibility with traditional artisanal 
technique, moving from digital to paint and collage, and back into digital.  
Roberts focuses on the implications for artistic labour of modernist artisanal 
practices, considering how the role of the hand changes with mechanical 
technologies.  His discussions of the post-readymade “crisis of craft” 
describe a ‘split’ from craft-based authorship to immaterial labour; from 
“expressive mimeticism” to “conceptual acuity as an expression of craft” 
(2007: 98).  The point he is making is that this split forced a reconsideration 
of artistic labour, as art’s value could no longer be located in the unique 
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expressive ‘hand’ of the individual artist.  His consideration of the ways in 
which we understand artistic authorship and labour therefore shifts away 
from traditional artisanal practice.   From my experience as an artist using 
both traditional and mechanical artisanal practices, I think that there is 
something to be gained from bringing back a focus on the direct gestural 
handling of materials whilst also understanding artistic subjectivity as 
‘decentred’.  It must be noted that Roberts’ theory was developed to 
understand a post readymade world under Capitalism.  It addresses the 
need to understand artistic labour through the employment of skills and 
techniques rather than “expressive and formal uniqueness” (ibid: 18).  
However, I propose that there is value in ‘expressiveness’ that extends 
beyond the monetary one defined by ‘uniqueness’, in that it is a physical 
trace of knowing and of being (I discuss this more fully in Chapter Five).  
‘Expressive’ need not mean ‘inside-out’ expression but can refer to the 
traces of bodily movement – gesture as thinking; traces of an intentional 
movement towards in the sense of affordances.  In the context of art’s ability 
to help us find new ways of knowing and of being, this has value – but sadly 
this may not be understood as ‘economic’ value under Capitalism.   So – can 
Roberts’ model explain the contemporary artistic labour of painting (as an 
extended practice that includes digital and traditional artisanal 
technologies)?  What might be learned from considering painting through the 
lens of decentred artistic subjectivity? 
2.3.5 Post-Cartesian authorship for painting 
Roberts does address the question of whether the craft of reproducibility can 
translate back into painting.  He suggests that in Duchampian scholarship, 
painting craft “is remade as painting as idea as craft” (2007: 57).  In the 
phrase ‘idea as craft’ the body (or bodies) in artistic authorship seem to be 
made subservient to the head.  This echoes a common view of making as a 
project that progresses from idea, through to the making of the form, 
resulting in an artefact – an approach that Ingold (2013) describes as 
hylomorphic (from the Greek ‘hyle’ (matter) and morphe (form)).  Instead, 
Ingold proposes that we view making as ‘growth’, where the maker ‘joins 
forces’ with the materials to see what might emerge from an intervention in 
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processes that are already going on – a process which he describes as 
morphogenetic, or “form generating” (ibid: 22).  Roberts himself says that 
knowledge “is not a property of abstract mind, but of the mind-body through 
its motor-intentional and labouring modes” (2007: 196).  From the 
perspective of ecological cognition ‘motor-intentionality’ is not hylomorphic – 
a brain forming an order that is dictated to the musculature – but occurs in 
spontaneous action in relation with things.  Roberts,  describing Benjamin’s 
skills-based analysis of art post-readymade,  describes how the ‘new’ skills 
of replication, reanimation and montage redefined the relationship between 
hand and eye such that “(b)y not painting […] the artist’s hand is able to act 
on intellectual decisions in a qualitatively different kind of way” (2007: 23–
24)[my emphasis].  Roberts goes on to say “[t]he hand moves not in 
response to sensuous representation […] but in response to the execution 
and elaboration of a conceptual schema …” (ibid: 24) [my emphasis].  The 
‘execution’ of a ‘conceptual schema’ again seems to evoke hylomorphism.   
A ‘conceptual schema’ suggests something ‘mental’ (a thought) or an ‘idea’ 
(abstract), located in the ‘head’.  The skills of selection, arrangement, 
juxtaposition, and so on can be employed without a prior ‘conceptual 
schema’, by using intuition and play.  However, we could also understand a 
‘conceptual schema’ as morphogenetic by locating ‘thought’ in the 
processual relationships between the whole body and the objects that it is 
handling; as an ‘epistemic action’ where ‘mind’ is an extended cognitive 
machine.   Roberts is certainly clear that the move to immaterial production 
(in the service of a conceptual and intellectual framework) has not moved 
artistic production to the ‘head’.   “Machines mediate and transform artistic 
subjectivity” (2007: 104) – but it is the hand of the artist who determines the 
use-value of the technology.  But, he says, the forced split between 
traditional handcraft and the craft of technical reproducibility brings into 
question where the artist’s voice speaks from.  The artist can now speak with 
multiple voices or from a collective voice through collaboration (ibid: 116).   
My intention has been to exploit this forced re-consideration of the location 
of the artist’s voice, whilst also healing the apparent ‘split’ between 
traditional and new artisanal technologies.  Using the much older social 
technology of paint and brush, what happens when painters intervene in the 
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ongoing flow of digital images?  Does a painter have to be understood only 
as ‘expressing’ an inner self, or can painting be another set of tools for the 
post-Cartesian artist?  Roberts makes the point that the idea of authorship 
and subjectivity as ‘embedded’ in skills, competencies, and conditions of 
sociality can apply equally to painting techniques (ibid: 115), and that the 
materials of painting are essentially ‘readymades’ – they use manufactured 
canvases and paints which already have the labour of others incorporated in 
them (ibid: 52–53).  His term ‘circuits of authorship’ refers to the way in 
which the artwork transfers from the artist’s hands to ‘non-artistic’ hands; 
from an instruction to delegated manufacture.  He develops this idea of 
authorship as a network-in-process (ibid: 177), a discussion in which he talks 
about the use of cultural images: “The recycling and appropriation of images 
and texts involves a continuous process of negotiation with the dominant 
culture” (ibid: 182).  He suggests this re-contextualisation of images has a 
‘denaturalizing’ function, as the post-Cartesian artist “re-narrates readymade 
elements” (ibid: 183).   
This can be achieved in paint.  Many contemporary painters work with 
photographic sources, re-narrating images from visual culture using a range 
of painting styles, ‘expressive’ or otherwise (e.g. Rugoff, 2007).  Painters 
such as Gerhard Richter, Marlene Dumas, Luc Tuymans, and Michael 
Borremans all explore photographic sources.  Richter’s hyper-realist 
portraits, for example, deliberately use technical aids (projecting the image 
onto the canvas) to reject painterly ‘expression’.  Dumas and Tuymans 
exploit the ‘accidental’ properties of the painting medium to create dreamy 
(in a nightmarish sense) ‘expressive’ paintings which both affect the viewer 
and engage imagination.  Their technique works with the medium, allowing it 
to smear, drip, and run away of its own accord.  So – if painting is being 
combined with new technologies of reproduction, then we need to explain 
post-Cartesian artistic authorship for these painters (including myself).   
Painters work with ‘readymade elements’ by re-making, ‘materialising’ and 
transforming images, rather than re-presenting found entities.  They retain 
gestural mark-making as part of the process.  Painting allows the body to 
intervene in its own language of intuition and imagination:   
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As I’m painting, I’m immersed in imagination […] I’m imagining myself 
into the space of the image while my body and its tools and materials 
create a new image from that space.23  
Imagination as part of our phenomenological experience is commonly a 
language used by artists (particularly in surrealism).  As the above journal 
extract demonstrates, imagination is ‘caught up’ and interwoven with the 
gestures of the making body (this is discussed in Chapter Three).  By 
painting, rather than copying and re-presenting printer-ly images, I materially 
transform and distort them using whole body movements in interaction with 
the materials and properties of painting, as follows.       
2.3.6 Gesture and movement  
I spend ages looking at something I’ve made or painted, exploring its 
surface […] just letting my gaze wander around it, resting at certain 
places.  I like oil paint, the play of light on the brushstrokes, and the 
shadows cast by textures.  I enjoy it like a mini-landscape.  There is 
no conscious evaluation or planning going on – the best words to 
describe this type of ‘looking’ are wandering, gazing, grazing.  Later, I 
will evaluate, but not yet… 24  
My eyes and imagination explore the space, my gaze wandering the 
landscape of the surface, getting lost in the world it contains.  Ingold asks 
whether we should understand a painting as an image to be interpreted, or 
as “a node in a matrix of trails to be followed by observant eyes” (2010: 16).  
Are paintings of things, or are they like things, such that we “find our ways 
through and among them, inhabiting them”? (ibid: 16). This describes my 
feelings as I paint, of inhabiting and exploring a world.   
I enjoy painting it because I feel I am visiting a world, or creating a 
world […].  I get lost in both images (the source and the painting)25  
                                            
23 Journal 22/11/12 – journal extracts will be identified by indented boxes throughout this thesis. 
24 Journal 01/11/12 
25 Journal 22/11/12 
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As I’m immersed in making a painting, I become absorbed by the emerging 
image.  I inhabit and dwell in it.  My eyes wander around the painting and I 
start to feel as if I am there.   All the time, my body is moving to form the 
image even as I am dwelling in it.  There seems to be a link between 
rhythmic movement and gesture, materiality, and imagination.  Seemingly 
incoherent threads of thought become woven; sensory activity creates 
sense.  And in this concurrent weaving of materials and imagination, I work 
out what matters.  Making paintings involves movement, gestural skill, and 
enhanced tactile and sensory awareness.   
Philosopher and ex-dancer Maxine Sheets-Johnstone suggests that we 
‘think’ in movement and that this kinetic way of being is “foundational to 
being a body” (2009: 39).  This is something that is implicit, she suggests, in 
Merleau Ponty’s account of Cezanne’s description of “thinking in painting” as 
a process in which “vision becomes gesture” (ibid: 39).  From this, Sheets-
Johnstone suggests that he is describing perception as ‘interlaced’ with 
movement, rather than movement following perception.  In Eye and Mind, 
Merleau Ponty says: 
[…] we cannot imagine how a mind could paint. It is by lending 
his [sic] body to the world that the artist changes the world into 
paintings. To understand these transubstantiations we must go 
back to the working, actual body – not the body as a chunk of 
space or a bundle of functions but that body which is an 
intertwining of vision and movement.  (Merleau Ponty, 1964: 2) 
Leder uses the concept of ‘motility’26 to break down distinctions between 
perception and movement, suggesting that “perception is itself a motor 
activity” (1990: 17).  The perception of objects or spatial depth is only 
possible, he suggests, for a body that moves through space.  In the example 
I gave earlier of participants in the first event crouching down to rearrange 
collage pieces on the floor, I had (unwittingly) created an opportunity for 
body motility, encouraging movement within the space; a movement that is 
                                            
26 Derived from ‘motile’: “a person whose mental imagery strongly reflects movement, especially 
his or her own” (Collins English Dictionary, 2018). 
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perception.  The action of crouching down involved their whole body and a 
shift in perspective.  This insight, however, only crystallised during the third 
phase of practice, in which I became consciously aware of the role of 
audience body motility in perception, as will be explained in Chapter Five.   
I used video editing to explore my movements by choreographing footage, 
picking out gestural phrases, and noticing pace and rhythm (see the video 
Wordless fragments).  I notice that besides the ‘practical’ movements 
required to hold a brush and make marks, there are also ‘thinking’ 
movements that occur in the pauses between brushstrokes.  They might be 
an example of what Clark describes as ‘material carriers’, a concept which 
suggests that bodily gesture is an actual dimension of thinking and not just 
an expression of an inner thought (2011: 126–127).   Gesture is making 
meaning rather than conveying it.  The gestures that become apparent in the 
edited video may be a part of the cognitive process of developing the work.   
(In Chapter Five, I revisit this idea in relation to the audience’s gestures).  
This makes me wonder about the role of bodily rhythm in ‘thinking’.  If 
thinking happens in movement, does rhythm enhance it in some way?  Do 
repeated, ‘ritual’ rhythmic movements help access a ‘limen’ or threshold 
state where ‘newness’ is possible?  I address this question in Chapter Three. 
The materiality of the frayed edges, working the primer into them, I 
was making angrier movements feeling the frustration.27  
The rhythmic gestural engagement with tools and materials leaves a 
physical trace in the ‘painterly gesture’.  The physical trace of this corporeal-
material-affective transformation (or production) has tactile properties that 
can be directly perceived by the body of the ‘viewer’.  The painting is not a 
representation of the world, it is a thing in this world that is perceived through 
movement, light and haptic response.  The materials carry a history of 
movement which can be traced; their transformation can be seen both in the 
layers of the painting, and in the layers of the video. 
                                            
27 Journal 22/11/12 
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What am I looking for in the video?  I find that what it does is bring 
back memories of the studio.  The sensory experience – soft silence, 
smells of oil paint and paper, the feel of the materials.28   
The sensory experiences of studio making are significant.  Whilst the digital 
and material are just different tools for art making, for my practice, painting is 
central and the ‘digital’ aims to recreate a connection to the studio; to 
recreate the feeling that I get.  The sensuality of the tools and materials play 
a part in their effectiveness as ‘extensions’ of cognitive processing.  Painting 
involves gesture, feeling and sensing of materials.  To understand how the 
whole body thinks through making I needed to look at how the rhythmic 
engagement of gesture corresponds with materials.  This will be the focus 
for the next chapter.  Meanwhile, the next section considers what I learned 
from the first event by looking at it through the lens of ‘body’ and ‘handling’. 
2.4 The Gesture of Thinking 
 
Figure 2.4 Still from The Gesture of Thinking 
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The first phase of practice had the simple objective: To explore my concerns 
about climate change through making images.   Insights started to emerge 
from processes of digital reflection, such as the audio-reflection video 
Looking in which a child, too large for her environment, is oblivious to the 
wave about to swamp her.  By watching the video Explore through Collage, I 
started to realize that there were potential meanings in ‘seeing things done’ 
which had resonance:   
I also thought, as I was reviewing my digital files, about ‘cutting myself 
out’ of a photo, detaching myself from my environment... 29  
I realized that there may be significance for a viewer in seeing the actions of 
cutting out the figure, marking its boundary and removing it from its 
environment.   This led me to think about focusing the camera on the work 
being made as a meaningful act.  The Gesture of Thinking was reflective 
and documentary, revealing my artistic subjectivity through sharing these 
experiments with how to document embodied processes.  By reflecting on 
the event I realised that the audience postcards were a tool of extended 
cognition – and a part of the experience of the artwork itself.  One of the 
postcards echoed my words at the end of the Looking video: “Big. Oblivious. 
About to go under.”  Another viewer seemed to be stimulated to make her 
own work: “cut. paste. make. draw. paint. For myself.”  I started to become 
aware of the audience’s role in making the artwork, not just as ‘feedback’ but 
as actors in the event.  I began to think of the event as ‘immersive’, partly 
because of the role of sound in the space, and partly because of the 
absorption of the audience in postcard and collage activity.  ‘Immersive 
performance’ combines “the act of immersion – being submerged in an 
alternative medium where all the senses are engaged and manipulated – 
with a deep involvement in the activity within that medium” (Machon, 2013: 
21–22).    
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I was interested to further explore how a viewer’s experience might be 
enhanced if they were invited to touch the work and explore it with their 
fingertips in the same way that I do.  If the hand plays a role in thinking, 
should a viewer be able to touch the artwork?  What might ‘touch’ add to the 
experience of ‘painting’ for an audience?    “Touching is the body asking 
questions and finding answers […] The participation of the body in exploring 
art expands the possible sources of meaning” (Driscoll, 2013: 111) [my 
emphasis].  From the postcards, there was a range of responses to the 
invitation to ‘touch’.  One said “I like the encouragement to touch the work.”  
Another was “Immersed in texture.”  But quite a few felt that they couldn’t 
touch.  For example: “Can’t touch for some reason – it’s simply not right to 
do so.”  This surprised me.  I had given spoken permission, and I had labels 
inviting participants to touch.  What this brought to the fore was a social 
convention of habits and codes of viewing practice, a history of the 
prohibition of touch in museums and galleries (Candlin, 2004).  I wondered 
what would happen if I drew attention to, and invited the breakage of, these 
‘rules’.  Another ‘code’ of viewing practice that I observed was the 
participants’ silence.  This created a quiet contemplative space – however, it 
meant that opportunity for shared meaning-making was lost.  Immersive 
performances such as those of Punchdrunk often have a separate space for 
post-show meaning making, and I started to consider how I could create 
such opportunities.  I also considered feedback mechanisms, learning from 
research into audience experience of immersive scenographic performance 
(Shearing, 2014). The main formal feedback mechanism that I had used was 
postcards. There was a second, informal, feedback mechanism in that I was 
present in the room, and a couple of people talked to me.  The third form 
was observation – through watching participants I observed their reluctance 
to touch, and also their play with collage pieces. 
From these observations, I developed three aims for the second phase of 
practice: 
i) To test how videos and paintings work together as artworks.  If 
knowledge emerges in the process of making, is it the painting (as a 
noun) that is performative as suggested by Bolt (2004), or is it 
painting as a verb?  If so, does that process need to be shared?  I 
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aimed to explore how seeing an edited process of making affects the 
meanings that are made from the artwork.  Does seeing video of the 
painting develop enhance or stimulate a sense of ‘inhabiting’ 
paintings for a viewer?   
ii) To test ideas around ‘touch’ as participation or immersion.  I aimed to 
explore what ‘touch’ (or the conscious realisation of a barrier to touch) 
would contribute to the experience of the artwork.        
iii) To test practical ideas for facilitating and capturing audience 
meaning-making.  Through paying attention to place, sound, and 
dramaturgy, I aimed to re-present ‘painting’; to find ways to present 
process, materials and artefacts as part of an event in which the 
viewer’s meaning-making is part of the art work.  Through making 
their own artefacts and discussing their observations, feelings and 
thoughts, my hope was that the audience become aware of their part 
in the ongoing ‘making’ of the art work. 
These aims can be summarised in the following questions: 
 What meanings does a viewer make from seeing the work made?     
 In what ways can viewers’ awareness of their participation in the work 
of art be facilitated? 
These questions were taken forward into phase two of practice, and are 
addressed in Chapter Four. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the sub-question: i) How do bodies and materials 
interact in creative practice?  Focusing on the lens of ‘body’ and ‘handling’ 
(Figure 2.1) it reflected on the first phase of practice.  It showed how 
knowledge can be understood as emergent in our interactions with things, 
and perception can be understood as intentional movement towards 
affordances.  Developing a post-Cartesian understanding of ways in which 
‘thinking’ extends into and beyond the body, it showed that making paintings 
is a process of ‘embodied cognition’, in which the materials and emerging 
artefacts form part of an extended cognitive apparatus.  It demonstrated how 
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tools of digital reflection can act as external supports to embodied cognition.  
It introduced Roberts’ (2007) theory of post-Cartesian artistic labour, and 
considered what might be learned from considering painting through the lens 
of decentred artistic subjectivity.  It looked at gesture as thinking, rather than 
as the expression of an ‘internal thought’, and proposed that the ‘painterly 
gesture’ has value, not in terms of the unique ‘hand’ of the artist, but as a 
trace of knowing and being, with tactile properties that can be physically 
apprehended.  It raised the question of the role of bodily rhythm and 
movement in making-as-thinking.  If thinking happens in movement, does 
rhythm enhance it in some way?  Do rhythmic movements help access a 
‘limen’ or threshold state where ‘newness’ is possible? 
It considered what was learned from the first practice event.  Key insights 
included: (i) the realisation of opportunities for audience participation in 
‘making as thinking’, using collage pieces as environmental supports; (ii) 
recognising the potential meaningfulness of recorded studio work and its 
significance for a viewer; (iii) recognising that the audience postcards were 
tools of extended cognition and part of the artwork itself; and (iv) becoming 
aware of the audiences’ role in making the artwork.  These insights were 
taken into the second event (see Chapter Four).  
 
The next chapter addresses the above question of ‘rhythm’, exploring the 
interaction of the whole body with the ‘material’, including the role of 
movement, gesture, and materiality in imaginative process. 
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Chapter 3 Moving Stuff: An Extended ‘Material Thinking’ 
The aim of this chapter is to focus on ‘materials’, their agency, and the way 
that the material and corporeal interact through ‘handling’ to form ‘artefacts’ 
(Figure 3.1).  It moves into the second phase of practice, reflecting on studio 
processes to explore ‘making’ as a process of extended cognition involving 
material thinking (Bolt, 2004; Carter, 2004).   Following up on questions 
raised in Chapter Two, it suggests that ‘material thinking’ provides a useful 
framework, but does not consider the role of movement or the ways in which 
the ‘social’ is embedded in practice as a ‘material thing’.    
 
Figure 3.1 Artistic labour as ecological cognition – 'Material' 
 
This chapter explores the following research sub-question from the 
perspective of materials:- 
i) How do bodies and materials interact in creative practice? 
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The primary methods and sources used are:- 
 exegesis 
 studio making (evidenced by written and digital reflection, and 
artefacts) 
One of the ways in which I investigated how bodies and materials interact 
was to consider how the emerging artefact facilitates the artist’s cognitive 
processes of sense-making.  The first section looks at the ‘artefact’, and how 
the artist developed meaning from an artwork before it was shared with an 
audience.  This is not to infer authorial intention in terms of communicating 
those meanings to an audience.  Rather, the purpose is to exemplify how the 
process of exegesis (Bolt, 2010) carries the work forward.  Through an 
exegetical exercise I explore how the emerging artefact operates as a 
mediator of meaning as I make the work.  Reflections on meaning emerge 
during the ‘making’ process as well as from ‘looking’ at finished artefacts, 
and the exegesis considers both by reflecting on an edited video of studio 
practice.  The use of political theory connects the personal to the social, and 
exemplifies how the ‘social’ is embedded in the ‘material’ development of the 
‘artefact’.     
The second section looks at studio processes to consider the artistic labour 
involved in making the ‘artefact’.  It reviews concepts of ‘material’ and 
‘materiality’ (Hong, 2003), before reflecting on studio journal extracts using 
ideas from anthropology (Ingold, 2013), ecological cognition (Gibson, 1986), 
and material thinking (Carter, 2004; Bolt, 2004) to examine ways in which 
bodies and materials interact in creative practice.  It examines the role of 
rhythm and gesture in stimulating a state of absorption, using ideas from 
dance theory (Sheets-Johnstone, 2009) and anthropology (Ingold, 2013; 
Ravetz, 2016).  It recognises that the ‘social’ is always present in 
interactions between bodies and materials (Latour, 2005; Bennett, 2010) and 
proposes that ‘material thinking’ could be expanded to include sociality.    
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3.1 Section One – artefacts and exegesis 
This section reflects on selected artefacts created through painting as inquiry 
to exemplify the cognitive meaning-making processes involved in the 
development of a body of work.  Insights are tentatively suggested from the 
artworks below, rather than trying to authoritatively ‘narrate’ the work.  
According to Bolt, the job of the exegesis is to explore and articulate what 
has emerged “through the process of handling materials and ideas” (2010: 
34).  The section also refers to the Keep Off video and you might find it 
useful to watch this before reading on.     
 
Figure 3.2 Keep Off, 2013, acrylic and collage on board, 40 x 34 cm 
3.1.1 Background and introduction to the work 
I started this second phase of studio practice with a general inquiry, with little 
idea of how (or whether) I might answer it: Is it possible through painting and 
video to explore and fragment agential and social boundaries of ‘self’? 
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My starting point for this painting was a photograph taken after the USA 
hurricane ‘Sandy’ in the summer of 2012.  I have combined this image with a 
childhood snapshot of myself.  The painting panel is covered with fragments 
of a torn map which I found in a charity shop, and which had several biro 
annotations suggestive of orienteering.  A second (separate) map of 
Aldershot is used in the video.  The video was an attempt to share studio 
making processes with a viewer.  Unsure whether the ‘emergent knowledge’ 
from studio making is apparent purely in the resulting artefact as Bolt has 
suggested,  or whether there may be benefits in sharing the ‘process’, I 
started to consider what might happen if I shared studio process using video.  
Artist and academic Michael Jarvis argues that an effective articulation of the 
tacit (or unseen) dimensions of creative practice can facilitate a closer 
relationship between artist, artwork, and viewer – developing a “more 
informed viewer” (2007: 212), and activating dialogue between the artwork 
and the viewer.  I edited studio footage, selecting material that recreated the 
feeling that I get as I’m making a painting (footage which triggered embodied 
memory), and moments of action that felt significant (as I was watching the 
footage), using ‘digital reflection’ (Kirk & Pitches, 2013). 
In my journal, I mused on what the painting and the video might suggest in 
response to the above question, from which I will share extracts.  The journal 
reflections were written just after I had edited the video, on the 9th August 
2013, before the public event in December 2013.  I watched the video, 
pausing to make notes of observations and interpretations.  I then wrote 
down thoughts and observations from the painting as if I were looking at it as 
a stranger.  Some of the reflections were audio or video recorded in the 
studio whilst making the work, and these have been hyperlinked in the text.  
The journal extracts indicate meanings that occurred to me at that time.  
Interpretations are never definitive, and can change.  Viewers may see 
different meanings, associations or interpretations (Chapters Four and Five 
will look at how I have facilitated audience meaning-making). 
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3.1.2 Exegesis   
Watching the video, themes of land ownership and the military felt 
significant, and I connected this to the early memory of my parents’ role in 
the British Royal Air Force.  In terms of the fragment agential and social 
boundaries of ‘self’ question which framed my artistic inquiry, this raised (for 
me) questions of tribalism (the collective) and the need to protect territory 
(boundaries).  The ‘social’ or collective identity marked by ‘land’ is just as 
‘bounded’ as the individual ‘self’.   Fragmentation of these marked 
boundaries is represented by the torn ‘islands’, which tangibly re-form … 
Tearing and making islands out of maps.  The map becomes land 
mass, as viewed on an atlas, or from space, a change in perspective, 
a fragmentation and expansion at the same time.  The map that was 
a detailed marking out and labelling of territory becomes an object like 
an island, a physical thing with edges and mass.30 
… and become connected    
Connecting up the islands by tracing lines between the roads.  
Making new roads.31 
The geopolitics of self, family, and community are associated with land, 
protection of ‘home’ and rights to the resources of the land.  The footage of 
the grass in a summer garden connects this marked-out territory (map) with 
footage of ‘home’ and of my patch of land and nature (the grass blowing in 
the wind), and my appropriation of it (the hand picking the grass).   
Warmth and natural footage of grass in sunshine, gentle breeze.  
Hand strokes, and then plucks the grass.  Cuts to gluing it onto 
painting, colours are cold.  Adding something ‘real’ from nature, but 
stilling it, killing it, controlling it.  Gluing it, like the figure, to another 
remote landscape.  Displacing it.32 
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The politics of climate change are beset by power inequalities around 
ownership of, and rights to, resources.  The repetition of the figures in the 
video felt significant.  The same children kept appearing.  The process of 
painting five girls in blue jumpers in a row, performed hurriedly by a hungry 
body, evokes a factory process, with lack of care or precision so that each 
figure differs.  The politics of climate change are further complicated by a 
growing population (the repeated figure) which needs more resources, and 
by overconsumption from a media-manufactured consumerism which has 
become careless of resources, both human and non-human.   
 
Figure 3.3 Painting of the five figures 
The hand cuts out a figure, distances it from its environment, sticks it onto 
another.  The digital reflection video Talking about edges of figure on ‘Keep 
Off’ shows how I started to make meaning from this process by thinking out 
loud with my painting. 
She is glued into place.  The glue is very physical.  The process is 
highlighted by the uncanniness of seeing it from two viewpoints.  
Sometimes the timing matches perfectly; other times not quite. There 
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is slippage.  The slippage is made more apparent by the moments 
that seem synchronised.33 
Evoking the ease with which we travel, the boundary of the figure is located, 
cut, detached, plucked out into the air, and dropped into another 
environment.  This has social, political and environmental consequences.  
We expand our boundaries, we can travel and ‘fit in’ anywhere.  Just glue 
ourselves down.  This may not be easy if we have been displaced because 
of climate change. 
The child – the original cut boundary is visible, she has been ‘shrunk’ 
but her original impact is visible, she is stuck on, her mass/materiality 
is visible.   
The glue is running out.34 
 
Figure 3.4 Detail from Keep Off 
  
This piece evokes issues around ‘land’ and the ongoing processes of owning 
it, marking it, remaking it, obliterating the marks, exploring it, claiming it, 
defending it.  The child turns her back on the signs that say ‘Keep Off’.  ‘Self’ 
is defined by ‘homeland’ or by power over land, ability to travel and claim 
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land.  ‘Self’ is indistinct from ‘land’, and is interdependent with ‘place’ which 
is our labelling and claiming of territory.   
The above observations and personal connections can be further explored 
through theoretical research connecting the personal with the ‘social’.  
Becoming posthuman involves redefining our attachment to our ‘shared 
world’, our sense of territory and belonging (Braidotti, 2013: 193).  A sense 
of connection between identity and land is critical in understanding the 
politics of climate change even at a local level.  So-called NIMBY (‘not in my 
back yard’) behaviour can be linked to ‘place attachment’ (Devine-Wright, 
2009), an emotional connection with place which affects our sense of 
identity.  The material connection to our natural environment indicated by the 
grass, and the sense of displacement that comes from taking it out of its 
context, could be related to our ‘compulsion’ to draw out the resources of the 
world into ‘standing reserve’ (Heidegger, 1977).  Maps and boundaries can 
be explored further – for example, Ingold talks of the drawn outline as a 
“cultural construct: the visible expression of a process by which the mind […] 
more or less arbitrarily divides the continuum of nature into discrete objects 
that can be identified and named” (2013: 134–135).   The painter Christian 
Mieves explores the beach as an ambiguous ‘boundary zone’ (2008).  
Looking at landscape and agency, Olwig understands the representation of 
landscape as a political act, from the definition ‘lLand’ “something to which a 
people belong” and -scape (-ship) from Germanic ‘shape’ “the abstract 
‘nature’, ‘state’ or ‘constitution’ of something” (2005: 20).  So landscape 
could be understood as the abstract constitution of something to which a 
people belong.  Olwig suggests that creating a representation of this 
‘abstract nature, state or constitution’ makes it a ‘concrete’ object enabling it 
to be grasped and shaped as a social and material phenomenon, enabling 
ownership of rights and therefore loss of rights and alienation.   
The scope of this thesis precludes going further into theoretically informed 
exegesis.  However, the above paragraph illustrates how following up with 
theoretical research can feed the next phase of practice, to continue making 
sense of these ideas alongside and with artistic practice.  This process of 
critical reflection on artefacts made through material handling deepens my 
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inquiry.  It carries the body of work forward as it draws together strands from 
artefact, political theory, and autobiography.    
3.2 Section Two – Art ‘work’ processes 
The next section considers the artistic labour involved in making the 
painting.  It looks at studio processes and suggests ways in which bodies 
and materials interact in creative practice to ‘form’ the artefacts.  It 
addresses the question raised in Chapter Two: If thinking happens in 
movement, does rhythm enhance it in some way? Do rhythmic movements 
help access a ‘limen’ or threshold state where ‘newness’ is possible?   
The section refers to short extracts of video which provide a trace of artistic 
process at critical moments in the development of the theory, and I 
encourage you to view these as they are encountered within the text.  It 
refers to a thematic analysis of, and extracts from, studio journals.  
Sometime after writing the journals, I undertook a thematic analysis using 
the three lenses (body, material, social) as categories.  I then assigned ‘tags’ 
to themes (or ‘units of meaning’).  I kept a document in which I recorded 
insights during this process.  I used ‘Wordle’35 to create word clouds as a 
‘check’ that I was not ignoring often-repeated words.  The journal themes are 
developed in the following analysis using theoretical ideas from anthropology 
(Ingold, 2013), actor network theory (Latour, 2005), material thinking (Bolt, 
2004; Carter, 2004) and the political ecology of matter (Bennett, 2010).  
‘Ecological cognition’ (Gibson, 1986) continues to provide the central 
framework.     
3.2.1 ‘Material’ and ‘materiality’ 
First, a note on terminology.  The terms ‘material’ and ‘materiality’ have a 
long and complex history of use in philosophy and aesthetics, with ‘material’ 
referring not just to physical matter, but more broadly to anything that can be 
‘formed’ (for example, ‘digital’ material).  Art historian JeeHee Hong (2003) 
outlines this history, in which discussions of art and philosophy have long 
struggled with the split between ‘form’ and ‘content’.  The ‘material’ turn in art 
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in the early 20th Century involved a Greenbergian concern with defining art 
by its physical manifestation and the way this could affect corporeal bodies; 
whilst Fried emphasised form over the specificity of material.  More recent 
theories of media and cultural studies have taken the ‘material’ to include the 
‘immaterial’, and used the term ‘materiality’ to signify the difference between 
any ‘material’ form, and that which has physical substance.  However, 
‘materiality’ can also signify something that has agency (can affect 
outcomes) without necessarily having observable content or form, such as 
electricity.  In the next section, ‘material’ indicates physical substance or 
object, and ‘materiality’ references the tactile, sensorial nature of physical, 
textural mediums and artefacts.  I work with both physical ‘material’ and 
cultural ‘material’.  Whilst the two are interrelated, the primary focus for this 
chapter is on the physical, reflecting a contemporary concern with the 
corporeal and sensorial experience of art (e.g. Bacci & Melcher, 2013; 
Barrett & Bolt, 2013).  I explore a new materialist ontology (Coole & Frost, 
2010) by examining the handling of materials as a way of thinking that 
focuses on bodily rhythm and movement, and on the interactions of the 
material flows of the body with the material flows of materials and tools.   
3.2.2 Material thinking 
Let me first share with you a journal entry scribbled after a moment of 
realisation in the studio: 
[…] the sensory, tactile pleasure of wielding brush and primer, 
stroking onto canvas, the familiar feel of it […] The smell of the primer 
and feel of the material through my finger-tips, responding to gesture 
and handling of the brush.  […]  The silence, gentle sounds of the 
brush tapping against the pot, of scrubbing the primer into the 
textures of the cloth-covered panel.  It is deliciously sensual and it 
prepares my ‘mind’, relaxes me, I feel more ‘together’ as a body; it is 
contemplative […]36 
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The sensory qualities of materials and the feedback from handling them 
affect my physiology in a way that prepares my mind and is contemplative 
(“expressing or involving prolonged thought”37).  Materials and bodies 
interact in creative practice as a form of cognition.  Studio making involves 
handling materials, responding constantly to tactile, visual and emotional 
feedback from the emerging form.  This is also a sense-making process, as 
meanings and feelings emerge out of the sensory immersion in practice.  As 
I rearrange and paint images, the materials in front of me enable imagination 
to be enacted.  I incorporate materials as part of a cognitive apparatus, such 
that the ‘thinking’ happens on the canvas in a process of ‘extended 
cognition’ (Clark, 2011).  I will now explore this process of ‘material 
imagination’ prompted by the thematic ‘tags’ from my journal of: ‘material 
histories’; ‘material tactility’; ‘material imagining’; ‘flow’; ‘handling/ gesture/ 
rhythm’; and the ‘material/social artefact’.  Rather than these forming an 
organising framework, they are woven throughout the analysis. 
I use painting as a way of inquiring into the existential challenges of facing 
up to climate change responsibility, working intuitively without a vision of the 
end-piece in mind, but always attentive to what is emerging in front of me.   
I have cut out my little figures (videoed) and placed them on my 
landscapes.  As I was recording, I played with my figures as a group, 
seeing how they worked as a multiple, but repeated, figure.  As I was 
placing them, I started to place both figures on each landscape, 
although my original intention was one solitary figure.  It felt right to 
put both in; it suddenly started to make sense.38 
This entry shows an example of playing, placing, and arranging in a process 
of making as thinking, rather than thinking a way into making.  Ingold 
describes this as “prising an opening and following where it leads” (2013: 7).    
I stop when it suddenly feels right, a sense of completeness that I 
experience bodily as affect.  But at that point, I don’t necessarily know what 
the work might be saying.  Significance is ‘felt’, and meaning may later 
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emerge in dialogue with the work.  This is in direct conflict with the model of 
artistic authorship that relies on artistic intentionality, or what the artist 
intended to ‘say’ (e.g. Wolff, 1993). Instead, it is an ‘art of inquiry’ in which, 
rather than studying the work of art as an object and aiming to trace back to 
its original ‘intention’, we “correspond with it” (Ingold, 2013: 8).   Ingold 
suggests that the artist ‘joins forces’ with materials to see what might 
emerge from an intervention in “processes that are already going on” 
(Ingold, 2013: 21) [my emphasis].  An example of this is my use of collage 
elements such as texts or maps which have a previous history of use.  
Whilst ‘playing’ with the map of Aldershot in the Keep Off video I disrupted a 
socially inscribed ongoing process of marking and claiming ‘land’.  The 
digital reflection video Talking about Aldershot Map records my studio 
reflections on the significance of this map; a significance which became 
richer to me during the process of making (and reflecting on) the work.   
Another example is my use of found images as source material.  Each 
photograph is a trace of a moment documented by someone else, shared 
globally.  The original photographer of the Keep Off image (Evans, 2017) 
saw a significance which I have re-appropriated.  In reworking these 
materials I am intervening in an ongoing durational and social process of 
looking and recording, paying attention to what we pay attention to.   
According to Gibson’s concept of affordances, what we ‘pay attention to’ 
(what humans perceive) is not ‘things’ in themselves, but the opportunities 
that they afford for action (Gibson, 1986)39.  The materials and tools that I 
work with afford opportunities for action.  In the above example of ‘playing’ in 
the studio with the map, I was recording the process.  As I explored 
materials and images in my studio, I realised the possibilities of including the 
camera as a tool in my exploration, and exploiting the potential of video 
editing.  By having the camera in the room, I became aware of the 
participation of a potential audience (in Chapter Four, I develop this 
understanding of ‘social imagination’).  This awareness emphasised 
potential ‘meaning’ and significance in my activities (placing the figures; 
drawing new roads) and actions (making ‘ritual’ movements):   
                                            
39 I expand on the concept of ‘affordances’ in Chapter Five. 
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Select a piece of map from a pile, place it down.  Palms placed flat, 
deliberately, either side of the island of map, pause.  Remove and 
place on another pile.40 
The digital tools, once introduced to the studio for documentation purposes, 
became tools for art-making rather than just documenting.  This, according 
to Gibson’s theory of ‘affordances’, was a cognitive process in which I 
perceived opportunities for action amongst the tools available to me.  In this 
‘emergent’ process, which the camera makes me hyper-aware of, materials, 
tools and my bodily movements co-respond  (to use Ingold’s term) in a 
process of material thinking (Carter, 2004; Bolt, 2004).  The artist Paul 
Carter suggests that materials have a propensity to form and perform in 
particular ways (a map will tear according to the orientation of its fibres and 
the folded history of its use).  He suggests that this activity can be described 
as discursive, a process in which “something else emerges” (2004: 180).  
This exercise of ‘material imagination’ can lead to chaos, in the Greek sense 
of a gap or opening in which there is a mutual reciprocity between creativity 
and materials.   
Tearing and making islands out of maps.  The map becomes land 
mass […] an object like an island, a physical thing with edges and 
mass.41 
Material thinking relies on the plasticity of materials, their ability to “yield 
information through their creative transformation” which goes beyond purely 
the ‘dreams’ of their maker-artist (ibid: 186–7).  Carter sees this as a process 
of inventing, remembering, or imagining – quoting Bachelard: “Through the 
imagined image, we come to know that absolute of reverie that is poetic 
reverie” (Bachelard, cited in Carter, 2004: 188).  Bachelard’s ‘material 
imagination’ suggests that “poetic images had the power to evoke and 
revivify the deep affective bonds between human subjects and the objects 
and spaces of their everyday world” (Lane, 2006).  The map as island 
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becomes a tangible landscape to explore, transformed into the physical 
space it represents. 
But what is ‘imagination’?  Can it be ‘out there’ in the image rather than an 
‘imagined image’?  Gibson discusses the relationship between imagining 
and perceiving, making a distinction between “surfaces that exist and 
surfaces that do not” (Gibson, 1986: 256).  The ‘imaginary’ does not exist.    
He discusses the difference between an object and “an image in the space 
of the mind” (ibid.).   This recalls the idea that a painter has an image in their 
mind which they paint (intentionality).   This may be true for some.  For me, 
the image emerges as I paint, so the imaginary image is only ‘in the space of 
the mind’ if the mind extends onto the canvas – if it is ‘thinking out loud’ in 
the language of images, colour, form, and texture as an intuitive act.  Could 
this be described as ‘material’ imagination?  Coole and Frost suggest that 
we tend to ‘distance’ ourselves from material and talk about ‘immaterial’ 
things like agency, imagination, emotions, and meaning, “presented as 
idealities fundamentally different from matter” (2010: 2) [my emphasis].  In 
the same volume, Frost discusses Hobbes’ account of the causes of ‘fear’ as 
a learned affect, in which ‘imagination’ is something that does not purely 
have an origin within us, but is made up of previous and current perceptual 
experiences, affective responses, and physiological stimuli forming a type of 
‘memory’ which each ‘thinking-body’ carries as its own particular history 
(Frost, 2010).   
[…] I’ve been thinking I want to add texture to the canvas surface e.g. 
through stitch.  Then […] I thought instead about torn fragments or 
rips or scored, split fabric.  This ‘urge’ to add texture to my panels is a 
‘felt’ thing […]42 
This ‘tactile imagination’ is made up of previous felt experiences of materials.  
And as discussed previously, materials (such as maps) also carry their own 
histories, which each ‘thinking-body’ will perceive and interpret according to 
their history and the context of encounter.  It could be said that imagination 
emerges in ongoing interactions between ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’.  Frost 
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describes imagination as “a composite of sensory percepts and memories 
that arise and resound as the body ages, moves, and encounters and 
responds to the context of its action” (ibid: 162) [my emphasis].  Note the 
predominance of verbs in this description – ‘moves’, ‘encounters’, ‘responds’ 
– imagination is something that is done.  And, returning to the question of 
rhythm and movement raised in Chapter Two, that ‘doing’ seems to be 
enhanced by rhythm, as follows.    
3.2.3 Material thinking and gesture 
Imagination is engaged in an entwinement with the emerging image or 
material object, and the gestures of the making body.  I experience this type 
of ‘rhythmic imagination’ as something in movement, in which the rhythmic 
actions of my body take over and I experience something like ‘liminality’ – a 
state of being ‘in-between’, of passing through “a period and area of 
ambiguity” (Turner, 1982: 24).  I “‘play’ with the elements of the familiar and 
defamiliarise them” (ibid: 27), which cultural anthropologist Victor Turner 
suggested can be a source of innovation in culture (ibid: 28).  Carter’s (2004) 
account of ‘material thinking’ does not consider the role of movement and 
gesture, the physical engagement of bodily rhythms in, perhaps, achieving a 
liminal state.  How does the ‘gesture of thinking’ work together with the 
plasticity of materials?  Liminality occurs (for me) once I enter a kind of ‘flow’ 
state or enhanced immersion in studio making.   To better understand this 
experience in which bodies and materials seem to interact seamlessly, I 
reviewed a video of myself painting during a period when I know that I 
experienced a switch into that state of ‘flow’.  You can see this in the video 
Painting the Sea, in which I’ve juxtaposed studio footage with video that I 
took of the sea whilst I stood watching the waves, absorbing their rhythm.  
The notes below were made after re-watching the studio footage, and are 
based partly on observations from that footage, and partly from the 
embodied memory of the studio experience: 
[…] I can see where rhythm takes over, my movements are more 
gestural, faster, my whole body moves, less careful, I step back more, 
and this is where I experience a state of ‘flow’, where the emerging 
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image and my own movements merge so that I am not looking, 
analysing, deciding, making a mark.  Rather, I am moving and mark-
making and the image is emerging and this is all one process.  And 
this involves more of my body, and it involves rhythm.43 
This ‘rhythmic imagination’ might be similar to what many fellow artists have 
described colloquially as ‘being in the flow’.  However, this is not necessarily 
the same thing as psychologist Csikszentmihalyi’s ‘flow’ (1996) – although it 
does have similar characteristics, including immediate feedback and merged 
awareness/action such that self-consciousness, worry and distraction 
disappear and sense of time is lost.  But I don’t have ‘clear goals’; nor do I 
know that the actions are the ‘correct’ ones.  I do things by ‘feel’, but when 
something ‘feels’ right, it is not necessarily ‘correct’.  What is missing from 
Csikszentmihalyi’s account of ‘flow’ in terms of understanding my own 
experience is the rhythmic movement that occurs in material engagement 
with the sensuality of materials that stimulates this ‘flow’ state of absorption 
in the present moment.   
Dance theorist Sheets-Johnstone suggests that as humans became bi-
pedal, movement was not just functional but also enjoyable and meaningful 
in an aesthetic way, so that “self-movement is close to play and to rhythmic 
patterning” (2009: 319).  She says “rhythm is inherent in the movement of 
living bodies, inherent in their kinetic ways of going about making a living for 
themselves” (ibid: 320–321) and further suggests that “(r)hythmic qualities of 
painting […] in fact derive from a sense of movement” (ibid: 321).  Relating 
our rhythms of movement to our perception of the environment, she cites 
Duncan whose idea of dance “came from the rhythm of the waves” (Duncan, 
cited in Sheets-Johnstone, 2009: 320).  In Keep Off, the painting of the sea 
was a ‘problem-solving’ exercise until I ‘felt’ a switch to a rhythmic state of 
relaxation in which the gestures formed the waves and I felt their ebbs and 
flows as my body swayed from side to side.  This created a state of focused 
concentration in which the rhythm was not metronomic (or mechanical), but 
formed a continuous dialogue between hand, tool and material (Ingold, 
2013: 115) and the emerging image.  In this rhythm, my body remembers 
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how to paint as “hand and tool are […] brought into use, through their 
incorporation into a regular pattern of rhythmic, dextrous movement” (ibid: 
116) [original emphasis].   It is this continuous, responsive, and focused 
dialogue in the ‘gesture’ (or technical act) in which hand, tool and material 
are brought together that Ingold describes as ‘correspondence’ (ibid: 115).  
This experience of immersion (in the context of drawing) is described by 
Ravetz (2016) as achieving a ‘heightened awareness’ in which self becomes 
merged with surroundings.  She refers to the painter Marion Milner, who 
overcame her block to painting through finding “a rhythmic interchange of 
two kinds of attention” (2016: 168) – one analytic and focused, and one of 
embracing the world, a ‘dreamy’ state.  The ‘heightened awareness’ 
stimulated through reverie and play demonstrates “interplay between 
movement, rhythm, dreaminess, improvisation, intentionality, action, focus, 
planning and knowledge” (ibid: 169).  Ravetz likens this state of ‘reverie’ to 
the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott’s ‘transitional object’ – “an object both 
created and discovered that involves two kinds of attention: the focused kind 
that recognises the separate identities of things in the world and the 
embracing kind that dissolves boundaries between things and child” (ibid: 
169).  Through immersion in the rhythmic painting of the waves, focusing on 
their form, I became the sea – a “loosening of boundaries between self and 
world” (ibid: 158). 
However, the sensory experience of handling can also be unsatisfactory, 
disrupting this rhythm and immersion: 
[…] the feeling from the fingertips did have such a profound effect on 
my experience of painting.  Both from my actual fingertips (skin-to-
canvas) but also from the brush – feeling the resistance of the brush 
instead of it gliding smoothly across the surface.  This slowed and 
interrupted the ‘dance’ and I wasn’t enjoying it as a tactile experience.  
I couldn’t get absorbed, and the painting was unsatisfactory.  […] it 
was the materials and the tactile experience that interrupted the flow 
of painting.  It didn’t ‘flow’ at all – it ‘juddered’ and ‘scraped’.44 
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The rhythm was interrupted, which disrupted my focused concentration.  It 
should be noted that this ‘disruption’ or interruption can also be productive, 
stimulating surprise and unpredictable outcomes.  However, in this case 
rhythm was affected by a dissatisfying tactile experience.  This can also be a 
result of environmental conditions and their effect on materials.  Material 
properties work together with bodily movement and environmental 
conditions.  Ingold uses the example of flying a kite (2013: 99). The kite is 
affected by the air, which affects your movement, which affects the kite.  The 
paint I use affects my gesture and the speed with which I paint, which affects 
the image.  On a hot day, painting with fast-drying acrylic paint, I have to 
move fast with firm gestures, and the resulting image is dynamic, sketchy 
and builds up in layers.  With oils which dry very slowly, I have more time, 
and the work is more considered.  However, because the paint dries slowly 
and I am impatient, I am more likely to complete a painting in one sitting, 
rather than build it up in layers.  Even the smell of the paint affects my mood, 
which changes my body pace, movement and sense of immersion.  As I 
paint, my imagination is exercised in an entwinement with the emerging 
image, material responses to environmental conditions, and the rhythmic 
movements and sensations of my body.  In this connection between sensory 
stimulus, rhythmic movement, imagination and immersion in the forming 
image, I inhabit the emerging object as a landscape.   Ingold (2010) 
suggests that we find our way through paintings, that we inhabit them, and 
whilst he is talking about the viewer this also describes my feelings as I 
paint.  In this process, I explore some of the social problems of human 
dwelling in the world.    
3.2.4 Material thinking and sociality  
The art work evolves over time, as it takes elapsed time for potential 
meanings to emerge.  I might suddenly realise interpretations that seem 
'meant' but were not intentional.  This ‘realisation’ (in the sense of something 
coming into being) can be triggered by an observation from a viewer, by 
current events, or by a conversation.  I see this ‘making sense’ as an 
ongoing social process, and one that yields information about the ‘social’.   
Actor Network Theory (‘ANT’), as explained by philosopher, anthropologist 
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and sociologist Bruno Latour (2005), suggests that the ‘social’ is not a thing 
that exists, but it can be made visible by following the associations between 
actors.  ANT recognises the enduring inequalities of power relations in social 
life (a particular problem in finding solutions to climate change) and 
proposes that their durability is enabled by objects (2005: 65).  Power 
relations are enacted by associations of agents, which include objects as 
participants in action.  An object can be an actor because it can mediate 
meaning (in the sense of transforming or modifying it in some way) – rather 
than simply carrying meaning as an ‘intermediary’.  ‘Things’ can “authorise, 
allow, afford, encourage …” (ibid: 72) as in Gibson’s affordances.  The map 
is a good example, as a highly symbolic coded material in which ‘social’ 
power relations are inscribed.  In the studio, the map became a mediator of 
meaning.  The process of looking at and playing with this map (and 
recording and reviewing that playful process) drew out multiple signifiers 
relevant to my art inquiry, leading me to think about ‘land’ and ‘landscape’ 
more critically.  According to Latour, action occurs between mediators rather 
than one agent ‘causing’ the other to do something.  For example, 
puppeteers often report that their puppet ‘made’ them do something, as if 
they control the strings together (ibid: 60).  The puppet and the puppeteer as 
mediators co-act rather than act and react in cause and effect.  Knowledge 
emerges in the dynamic relationships between social actors (corporeal and 
material) and the ways that these are mediated.  In the process of painting, 
an imaginary world evolves ‘on the surface’ of the developing artefact and 
this ‘artefact’ mediates meaning in a fluid process in which I am both 
forming, and in-formed by the emerging image:  
[…] I feel I am visiting a world, or creating a world.  I get lost in both 
images (the source and the painting) and I’m making up 
narratives/make believe/it’s like a dream space or a ghost space [...]   
I’m imagining myself into the space of the image while my body and 
its tools and materials create a new image from that space.45 
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It might be helpful to clarify how I am using agency here; who is the ‘I’?  
According to Latour, action is distributed amongst multiple actors in “a 
concatenation of mediators” (2005: 62) in which the ‘origin’ of the action is 
uncertain (ibid: 46).  (Human) actors may tell an account of action, in which 
they refer to ‘agencies’ (ibid: 52) where:- 
i) agencies are presented as doing something; 
ii) they are given a figure of some sort (which may not be human); 
iii) they are opposed to other competing agencies; 
iv) they are accompanied by a theory of action.  
In the above journal account, I present the agencies of ‘my body, tools and 
materials’ as creating a new image.  The ‘space of the image’ is also an 
agency in which ‘I get lost’.  ‘I’ as the figured agent ‘imagine myself into the 
space of the image’ (I do imagination and inhabit the image-space); whilst 
opposed to this is ‘my body and its tools and materials’ changing that image.  
Although I describe ‘me’ as the agent ‘making up narratives’ this ‘action’ 
occurs as a ‘concatenation of mediators’ (canvas-space of the image, body, 
material, and tools).  In this way, the image ‘affects’ me and I affect the 
image.   
 
The term ‘agency’ has, however, been challenged by Ingold, who suggests 
that saying ‘things’ need to be sprinkled with ‘agency’ to bring them to life 
ignores the material processes of becoming that are always ongoing – ‘life’ 
itself rather than ‘agency’ (2011).  He suggests instead that we think of 
objects in terms of their material forces, processes and ways of coming into 
being.  His view here is consistent with Bennett who suggests a vitality or 
force that is material rather than a spirit in the material (Bennett, 2010: xiii).  
Bennett says an ‘actant’ is “a source of action” using Latour’s definition (ibid: 
9), and that ‘actant’ is a substitute for the term ‘agent’.  Thus an agent, for 
her, is a source of action.  However, it is Bennett’s (and other theorists’) use 
of the term ‘agency’ that Ingold objects to.  In his essay When ANT meets 
SPIDER (2011a) he pinpoints his objection to the term by defining it as an 
action that involves perception and skill.  He says it is attentive movement 
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that qualifies it as action and therefore the actor as an agent.  All action, he 
says, is skilled, and skill is developed over time.  Thus, he argues, it does 
not make sense to attribute agency to objects that do not grow or develop 
(ibid: 94).  In Making, Ingold takes up this challenge again, this time centring 
it on connotations of causality – ‘agency’ is something that is ‘internal’ or 
‘within’; actions can be causally attributed to agency of which the action is an 
effect (2013: 96).  Ingold suggests that neither humans nor nonhumans 
‘possess’ agency – “[t]hey are rather possessed by action” (ibid: 97).  He 
suggests that this language of causation is not fit for the purpose of 
explaining processes of growth.  “We need a theory not of agency but of life” 
he concludes (ibid: 97).     
The definition of ‘agency’ according to Merriam Webster is: “the capacity, 
condition, or state of acting or of exerting power […]  a person or thing 
through which power is exerted or an end is achieved.”46  This language 
does seem to imply that power is ‘prior’ to the action, and then enacted 
through the agent – ‘…an end is achieved’ implies the ‘end’ was in mind 
prior to the action that ‘achieved’ it.  However, a posthuman new materialist 
perspective suggests rather that power is emergent through action, and that 
‘ends’ may be emergent outcomes (which may also be unintended).  In this 
emergent sense, agency concerns the ongoing production of power through 
action.  Therefore I will use the term in the sense of power emerging through 
action, rather than assuming meanings of prior intentionality, causality or 
choice.  This clarification aims to facilitate a post-human perspective on 
ways in which agency and authorship can be ‘distributed’.  It does not, 
however, infer that human agency in the context of climate change is 
incapable of ‘intentional’ or choiceful action.   Having clarified these points, I 
will now return to Bennett to explore how an artefact has political power. 
 
Jane Bennett is an American political theorist whose book Vibrant Matter 
addresses two aims: first a political project: “How would political responses 
to public problems change were we to take seriously the vitality of 
(nonhuman) bodies?” (2010: viii); and second, a philosophical project: To 
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avoid the trap of assuming human uniqueness when discussing subjectivity 
by using Latour’s ideas of actant (any source of action that does things) and 
distributive agency.  Bennett uses the expression ‘vibrant materiality’ to refer 
to the capacity of things to act as agents with tendencies of their own, 
including propensities to affect other matters (including human bodies) in 
unpredictable ways.    Borrowing from Deleuze and Guattari, Bennett locates 
agency in assemblages of human-nonhuman working groups (ibid: xvii) 
where “agency always depends upon the collaboration, cooperation, or 
interactive interference of many bodies and forces” (ibid: 21).  Things are 
neither subjects nor objects but ‘modes’, subject to modification and 
modifying others in alliances within assemblages.  The process of 
modification is not hierarchical and is subject to tension and to chance 
encounter (ibid: 22).  In what she calls this ‘event-space’  “… power is not 
distributed equally […] not governed by any central head […] the effects 
generated by an assemblage are, rather, emergent properties” (ibid: 23).  
These effects are the property of the assemblage as a whole, rather than the 
“sum of the individual parts” (ibid: 23–24). She discusses the inherent 
creativity of all materials, and their ability to improvise to the situation that 
they find themselves in.    
Adopting Bennett’s approach of ‘vibrant materialism’ to look at my studio 
practice would pay attention to the processes that are going on in the 
ecosystem of the studio.  An ecosystem looks at interactions within a 
community that includes biotic (organisms) and abiotic (environmental 
factors – air, water, temperature) components, and at how energy flows 
between them.  My bodily movements and rhythms work in partnership with 
tools, materials and climate, and they affect each other.  Movement is 
notably affected by a sore shoulder, my mood is affected by the poor quality 
brushes and the rough texture of canvas across which the paint will not 
glide, and by the paint that dries too fast because it is hot and the sun is 
bright and it gleams on the wet surface and it hurts my eyes and this disrupts 
the ‘flow’ of energies and activities.  Dust floats and settles on the surface, 
glue sticks to my fingers, there comes a point where I have to stop and clean 
brushes, or let the paint dry a little before I can work further.  Some parts 
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work wet-in-wet where others won’t.  All the time the image is emerging and 
affecting me and my body responds by looking, moving, and feeling.     
There is a point where I think ‘that’s it’ and it is ‘me’ who decides.  Being 
open to the agency of other bodies, materials and elements does not mean I 
have to deny my own agency.  We work as an assemblage, but I still make 
decisions and have choice over my actions; when to pause or stop.  But I’m 
not sure ‘how’ I decide.  It ‘feels’ right; an affect.  But this will also be 
influenced by social ‘benchmarks’ or things I have seen from which I am 
making a judgement.  It might ‘feel’ right because it is like a ‘Hockney’ or a 
‘Tuymans’.  This is the ‘social’ as a thing in the room.  
Critics of new materialism suggest that it can ignore the contributions of the 
cultural turn, moving focus away from the ideological and political (Bolt, 
2013: 12) and taking an ‘anticonstructive’ stance (Schneider, 2015). An 
optimistic view of ‘vibrant’ materiality can obscure the political reality that 
some humans and some things live more precariously than others 
(Schneider, 2015: 13).  This is of particular urgency given the current 
environmental fragility for human and non-human cultures, life forms and 
ecologies.  In this context, Schneider highlights the danger that attributing 
agency to matter might also let humans ‘off the hook’ – and therefore some 
new materialists are more cautious, for example suggesting materials have 
‘partial’ agency (ibid: 10).  In her earlier work, Bennett (2010) responded to 
similar critiques that new materialism can be seen as ‘anti-constructivist’ as 
follows.  First, aiming to deconstruct the hidden ‘will to power’ of humans 
does not develop positive alternatives – we need both critical and affirmative 
approaches.  Second, assuming that human power is at the centre of this 
‘will to power’ does not consider the power of other bodies, reducing political 
agency to humans (Bennett, 2010: 17).  She counters this by deliberately 
over-emphasising the political agency of non-humans (ibid: xvi).   
 
The emerging artefact has an agency that affects me – but that agency 
might be due to a kind of social ‘power’ that the artefact mediates in 
relationship with my remembered experience of actual things and the way 
that they have been judged. What constitutes ‘art’ is ‘socially’ determined (by 
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its inclusion in a curated exhibition, for example), but this determination 
would not exist without the artefacts themselves.  ‘Action’ is felt as a ‘node’ 
of agencies to be disentangled (Latour, 2005: 44).  The ‘judgements’ that I 
make in the studio may be influenced by a memory of artefacts which a 
material might suggest to me, and the interaction of myself, this memory, 
and the material form a ‘node’ out of which something happens.  Memory, 
history, and associations are human cognitive factors, but without the 
‘affordance’ of other ‘mediating’ actors (texts, photographic images, or 
paintings) those associations and memories would not occur.  Judgements, 
choices and actions are influenced by prior social learning, taking place in a 
context of embodied learning, shared patterns of meaning, and the 
affordances of mediating technologies.   
Although at some point I choose to ‘stop’, the materials, in their own way and 
in their own timescales, will carry on.  Light will affect the printed word and 
the paper, and the colours may fade; these are all considerations for the 
archivist.  But materials will also continue to change in meaning, in history 
and symbolism.  People will ‘read’ and experience them differently; 
interactions will depend on environment and context.  My agency may no 
longer be an active part of the finished ‘object’, but the artefact will join other 
assemblages of things, people and places, and will contribute its agency – 
power emerging through action.   
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has reflected on the second phase of studio practice to further 
address the research question: i) How do bodies and materials interact in 
creative practice?  Focussing on ‘materials’, it explored the gestural 
‘handling’ of tools and materials to form ‘artefacts’ (Figure 3.1).  The first 
section described the artist’s exegetical reflections from Keep Off to 
exemplify the sense-making cognitive processes that can be undertaken by 
the artist in the process of developing a body of work.   Themes that 
emerged from a detailed re(view) of, and reflection on, Keep Off included 
land ownership and territory, and the need to define boundaries of the 
‘collective’ as well as the ‘self’.  They included the associated geopolitics of 
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climate change, and the relationship between land ownership and natural 
resources.  ‘Self’ cannot be indistinct from ‘land’.  These are not new 
revelations or authoritative statements of the work’s meaning.  Instead, they 
suggest what the artwork might evoke from a tentative starting point of: Is it 
possible to explore and fragment agential and social boundaries of ‘self’?  
They exemplify how critical reflection on emerging artefacts made through 
material handling takes the creative work forward, connecting the personal 
to the political.    
The second section considered the artistic labour involved in making the 
painting, by examining the art ‘work’ processes involved.  It addressed the 
question of ‘rhythm’ raised in Chapter Two.  It described in detail how the act 
of handling materials through making is a process of thinking (rather than 
thinking, then ‘doing’).  An ‘art of inquiry’ involves a correspondence with 
materials to see what emerges from an intervention in processes that are 
already going on (Ingold, 2013).  These processes are corporeal, ‘material’ 
(physical), and ‘social’, and are affected by environmental factors.  In and 
amongst these processes, affordances are perceived as opportunities for 
action which may involve multiple ‘things’.  Having the camera in the studio 
raises awareness of the participation of a potential audience (social 
imagination).  The digital tools, introduced to the studio for documentation, 
also afford opportunities for art-making.  Once ‘things’ become engaged in 
relationship with each other, each has its own agency, its own tendency to 
respond and react in a way that affects the outcome.  Sensory qualities of 
materials and tools affect mood and stimulate contemplation.  Tactile 
imagination emerges out of the artist’s previous felt experiences of materials.  
Creative practice can be experienced as an exercise of material imagination, 
in which ‘mind’ extends onto the canvas in an imaginary habitation within an 
emergent image.  This image is formed by the interactions of materials, 
environmental conditions, tools, bodily sensation and movement through 
‘gesture’, a technical act in which hand, tool and material are brought 
together (Ingold, 2013).  This involves finding a rhythm and physical 
immersion in sensory experience to create a ‘flow’ state of concentrated 
awareness (or rhythmic imagination).  This can invoke a state of liminality, 
which may be a source of innovation in culture, and can dissolve boundaries 
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between self and world.   It occurs in an ecosystem in which environmental 
factors also play a part. And the environment is social as well as physical.  
Power relations are mediated by ‘things’ which have their own agency.  
Materials carry their own histories which are perceived and interpreted 
according to the artist’s history and the context of encounter.  Reworking 
these materials constitutes an intervention into ongoing social processes of 
looking and recording.  Action occurs between ‘mediators’ which include 
objects, materials, and humans within the ecosystem of the studio.  The 
artist still has her own agency (although not overall control).  The artist 
‘decides’.  Yet those decisions, which may feel intuitive, will be influenced by 
socially determined judgements mediated by the emerging artefact.  The 
‘social’ is inscribed in the material, affecting and affected by the artist.  The 
resulting artefact will carry its own mediating agency into future assemblages 
of things, people, and places.  
  
These insights suggest that a theory of material thinking could be expanded 
to include ‘sociality’.  The next chapter will consider the second practice 
event and how it helped me to achieve this extended understanding of 
material thinking.  
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Chapter 4 Thinking Together: Embodied Sociality and 
Collective Cognition47 
The aim of this chapter is to develop an expanded theory of material thinking 
that includes sociality.  It focuses on the ‘social’ lens of the model, and the 
intersections of ‘artefact’ and ‘habit(us)48’ (Figure 4.1).  It considers the 
embodiment of social structures in the artefact, social practices of art, and 
ways in which cognition extends to the ‘social’ body of the audience.       
 
Figure 4.1 Artistic labour as ecological cognition – 'Social' 
 
The chapter addresses the research sub-question:- 
ii) How do social processes, cultural and environmental factors interact 
with human and material bodies in creative practice?49     
It also addresses the questions that were raised from practice phase one (in 
Chapter Two):- 
                                            
47 Sections of this chapter have been taken from Kirk, 2014. 
48 The term ‘habit(us)’ references both Bourdieu’s theory of habitus, and Turner’s suggestion that 
this is made up from individual ‘habits’.  
49 This will consider ways in which the ‘social’ is material and corporeal, rather than bodies separate 
from the social and cultural. 
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 What meanings does a viewer make from seeing the work made?    
 In what ways can viewers’ awareness of their participation in the work 
of art be facilitated?  
 
The primary methods and sources used to consider these questions are:- 
 critically reflective autoethnography 
 design and analysis of second practice event (video; audience 
participation) 
The first section considers studio making as a social process.  It reviews 
concepts of ‘practices’ and ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977; Narvaez, 2013) and 
applies these to consider how social processes, cultural and environmental 
factors interact with human and material bodies in creative practice.  
Adopting a critical new materialism (Coole & Frost, 2010) it considers how 
the social is embodied in and performed through individual habits and public 
objects (Turner, 1994).   It continues the previous chapter’s exploration of 
materials and artefacts as mediators of what is socially determined as ‘art’, 
thus having ‘political agency’ (Latour, 2005; Bennett, 2010).   
The second section considers audience responses from the second event, 
Feeling a way through ….  It discusses ways in which cognition may extend 
to the collective social body of the audience.  It proposes an addition to 
Bolt’s (2007) theory of artistic process and authorship as ‘co-responsibility’ to 
consider the audience, exploring how ‘making’ is a relational and ongoing 
performance in which artistic subjectivity is ‘distributed’ amongst artist, 
audience, and artefacts.  It proposes that framing painting as a social 
practice of inquiry could open up new spaces of understanding mediated by 
paintings and people as part of an event in which artistic agency is 
‘distributed’.  It raises questions of what this means for painting viewing 
practices, including the place of the artist’s voice.      
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4.1 Section One: Creative ‘practice’ and the embodiment of 
the ‘social’ 
 
Figure 4.2 Courbet The Artist’s Studio, 1854 – 1855, Oil on Canvas 
 
It has been suggested that Figure 4.2 is an allegory of the artist’s role as 
‘mediator’ in society. On the right are what Courbet called "shareholders […] 
friends, fellow workers, art lovers”, whereas the left shows “the other world of 
everyday life” (Lewandowski, 2015).  This painting would suggest that, for 
Courbet, society was in the studio.   
This section considers the ‘social’ immanent in creative practice, explicitly 
rejecting a conception of studio work as a solitary activity of making artefacts 
which then get put into the ‘public’ domain.  It will look at how ‘intuitive’ 
engagement with materials in the studio has an inherent sociality by 
addressing the question: ii) How do social processes, cultural and 
environmental factors interact with human and material bodies in creative 
practice?   First it will outline the critically reflective autoethnographic method 
used, and introduce a critical incident (Crisp et al, 2005) from studio practice.  
It will then consider this case study using the framework of practices as 
‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977).  It will consider the role that the ‘sensory’ might 
play in triggering collective embodied cultural memory (Narvaez, 2013), and 
discuss how social structures become ‘embodied’ in the artefact such that 
they affect the artist, thus having political agency (Bennett, 2010).  Finally, it 
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considers how habitus is ‘reproduced’ (Turner, 1994) to question how 
‘practices’ get ‘transmitted’ and what role ‘objects’ or ‘artefacts’ play in this.   
4.1.1 Critically reflective autoethnography 
Autoethnography is an autobiographical approach that connects the 
personal to the cultural.  By recording my personal reflections on studio 
practice I created a rich description to critically reflect on, identifying frames 
of reference used and what these might suggest about the cultural.  I kept an 
autoethnographic journal, in which I prompted myself to jot down social and 
cultural influences.  At the head of this journal was written: Culture, context, 
conversation, boundaries, rules, where am I in this?, power, politics, social 
relations.  I was able to reflect on these journal entries after a period of 
elapsed time to find new learning (Moon, 2004).   By critical reflection on my 
first-person account, I aimed to challenge unquestioned assumptions and to 
make visible the social structures within which I am embedded.         
Effective autoethnography, suggest Ellis and Bochner (2000), is written in an 
engaging first person narrative to facilitate critical reflection from the reader.  
However, as noted in Chapter One, critics of autoethnography challenge the 
realist notions of ‘self’ that appear in these accounts (de Freitas and Paton, 
2008).  Therefore, rather than carefully constructing a narrative, I have 
openly shared a two-layer process of: i) recording reflections; ii) critical 
analysis of those recordings, through which I aim to understand the ‘social’ 
immanent in the reflections through the theoretical frames above.  I have 
focused on one ‘critical incident’ which involved an “element of surprise” 
(Crisp et al, 2005: 7), and which was “indicative of underlying trends, 
motives and structures” (Tripp, cited in Crisp et al, 2005: 7).  I show this 
critical incident through a combination of digital story (hyperlinked) and 
extracts from journals. 
4.1.2 Ruffles – introduction to critical incident 
In July 2013 I audio-recorded a spoken realisation that the sensory activities 
of using ruler and pencils reminded me of childhood learning.  I also 
recorded a sudden notion that the cut-out card figure reminded me of paper 
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fashion dolls50.   This realisation was pivotal, and triggered a chain of ideas 
which I developed through studio activities and audio-reflection.  The digital 
reflection video Digital story for Jetty making shares these studio reflections, 
and will be referred to in the following analysis.  These reflections led me to 
think about the contemporaneous tragedy of the Rana Plaza factory collapse 
(April 24, 2013)51.  I was aware of connections between this event and the 
consumerist impulses which have human, environmental, and climatic 
consequences.  The following analysis shows how those connections 
became clearer through painting, video, and reflection on the artefacts 
produced.  Below is the painting that I developed.  I created the video 
Ruffles from footage of studio activities whilst making the painting.  This 
video was presented alongside the painting in the second event Feeling a 
way through …, and I will refer to it throughout the following analysis. 
 
Figure 4.3  Ruffles, 2013, acrylic and collage on panel, 40 x 34cm 
 
                                            
50 Press-out card ‘dolls’ with cut-out clothes which could be attached to the doll with folded paper 
tabs, circa 1970s. 
51 1,129 garment makers died in the factory collapse (Butler, 2013). 
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4.1.3 ‘Practices’ and ‘habitus’ 
To consider how the social is immanent in creative practice, it might be 
useful to reflect on what is meant by ‘practice’ (and indeed by ‘social’).  
Taking a posthumanist view of the ‘social’ involves moving beyond pure 
discourse to consider ways in which the ‘social’ is corporeal and material.  
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977) suggested that social structures 
are embodied, and that ‘practices’ can be understood as ways of 
‘generating’ social structures through the simultaneous embodying (copying 
or learning) of the habits that make them, and the ‘doing’ of rituals, gestures, 
or routines.   This brings a social dimension to understanding ‘gesture’ as 
learned and embodied through repetition.  (This ‘social’ dimension of gesture 
will be further explored in Chapter Five in relation to the audience.)   
Bourdieu uses the term ‘habitus’ to describe this production of structures, as 
“systems of durable, transposable dispositions” (1977: 72), where 
‘disposition’ can mean “the result of an organizing action; […] a way of 
being; a habitual state (especially of the body); and […] a predisposition, 
tendency, propensity, or inclination” (ibid: 214) [original emphasis].  The 
responses or ‘propensities’ of the habitus comprise a set of possibilities 
available in the present moment, “things to do or not to do, to say or not to 
say” (ibid: 76).  Relating this to Gibson’s ‘affordances’ (what humans 
perceive are opportunities for action) the concept of ‘habitus’ suggests that 
these opportunities are culturally learned, even perception itself.  For 
example, visual perception involves brain activity, cultural ‘contents’ (which 
we learn to interpret), and affect (embodied response).  According to the 
sociologist Rafael Narvaez, we apply ‘visual templates’ from memory to help 
us to ‘read’ what we see and feel (2013: 161).     
This is relevant to thinking about my starting point for the Ruffles painting – 
the selection of a source image: 
I looked for images of the Bangladesh factory on Google, and I was 
so upset by them that I felt I could not use them.  It felt disrespectful 
and inappropriate […] I do not want to trespass on others’ grief […] I 
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follow a ‘creed’ (in Tony’s52 voice) to ‘follow your sensibility’ or 
intuition, or paint what you want to paint, but at times like that, it ‘feels 
wrong’.  Despite the fact that I do want to paint the picture.  Although 
it would be upsetting.  I am also afraid of upsetting people, despite the 
fact that what is at stake is clearly people’s lives.  By not being aware 
of the connections between fashion, cheap clothing, obsession with 
self-appearance, and the kinds of working conditions for those who 
labour to grow, harvest and process cotton, and then to machine it 
into badly-made cheap throw-away clothing.  The social and 
environmental cost (water, chemicals, loss of wildlife habitat, lost of 
human life) is too high.  Why, then, am I afraid of ‘upsetting 
people’?????  […] I ‘feel’ my way through intuition (or ‘want’ – what I 
want to paint) but I sometimes encounter boundaries.  Sometimes 
these boundaries are imagined consequences.  I don’t want to upset 
people. 53 
Here, there is a choice to act (or not) on the ‘felt’ impulse to use that source 
image.  Bourdieu suggests that habitus is embodied as ‘propensities’ to act.  
Employing Narvaez’s description of visual perception, the image contains 
‘cultural contents’ and affect.  The ‘cultural contents’ include the hand 
holding a family snapshot, a familiar object that speaks ‘family’ and demands 
empathy.  In the journal extract, affect is indicated by ‘upset’ and ‘distress’.   
There is imagined social consequence, being ‘afraid of upsetting people’.   
But there is also a felt propensity to paint the image.  This is followed by a 
rationalising why I might paint the picture (moving beyond the felt ‘want’ to 
paint it), and then back to the felt ‘barrier’ of upsetting people.  There are 
propensities to act, and embodied barriers or rules to not act.  ‘Things to do 
or not to do’.  Prior social learning has created barriers that are felt in the 
body.          
Bourdieu describes the habitus as a “durably installed generative principle of 
regulated improvisations” (1977: 78); and as “history turned into nature” 
(ibid.) as the stories of our past are internalised, informing our actions.  
                                            
52 ‘Tony’ was one of my tutors at art college. 
53 Journal 12/07/13 
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Tony’s voice – ‘follow your sensibility’ – represents an internalised voice; a 
predisposition that I have developed, a ‘generative principle’ that involves 
listening to intuition.  The fear that I was expressing in the above extract was 
that people will say ‘how can you make money / success out of others’ 
misfortune’?  This is based on previous ‘stories of my past’ where people did 
say that in response to my paintings of Madeleine McCann54.  In that 
instance, I was being ‘disciplined’ by those voices for breaking an unseen 
‘code’, ‘value’ or ‘rule’.  The memory of this judgment ‘regulates’ my 
improvisations in the studio – a kind of social imagination.   This example 
might indicate what Bourdieu refers to as ‘symbolic violence’ – the 
maintenance of the dominant social order in a way that feels ‘natural’ and 
that removes people’s capacity to experience “the indignities imposed by the 
social order as indignities” (Narvaez, 2013: 40) [original emphasis].  By not 
provoking critical discussion into these ‘distressing’ things, and through 
avoiding the imagined risk of alienation that might result from asking 
challenging questions about participation in ‘fashion’, I become complicit in 
the indignities of those fashion workers.  And yet it “is critical […] to see the 
interconnections among the greenhouse effect, the status of women, racism 
and xenophobia and frantic consumerism” (Braidotti, 2013: 93).  By painting 
the dead women, I bring these issues to attention – but only if the painting 
does bring them to attention.  I presented the painting without supporting 
information and the audience did not mention the factory collapse.  Had the 
event already been forgotten?  Or was the painting too ambiguous?  And 
what does my response say about ‘artistic intentionality’?  I wanted the 
audience to know its source.    
I then move onto thinking of other rules i.e. “but I’m an artist – my role 
is to ‘shock’, to ‘estrange’, to raise awareness, to make people think”.  
And these are conflicting ‘rules’:- be nice to others to be social ‘glue’ 
and smooth the path of interactions; vs take responsibility to show a 
‘mirror’ or not stand for inequality.  These conflicting ‘rules’ affect what 
I paint, whether I put an image back down or don’t print it off in the 
                                            
54 Madeleine McCann went missing from Portugal in 2007 just before her 4th birthday.  Her 
disappearance has had and continues to have a high profile in the UK media. 
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first place.  […]  If I perceive ‘affordances’ these are moderated by 
‘laws’ or ‘rules’ – a whispered “no, you mustn’t do that”.  Are these 
immanent in practice?  They certainly affect it, and I feel they can get 
in the way of what I might do. 55 
Although studio-work happens alone, it is embodied (through emotional 
affect) and it is social (involving learned responses).  The making of artefacts 
is in the service of a social body – having the camera in the room, I became 
aware of a potential audience.  And it represents a tricky negotiation of two 
kinds of ‘habitus’ – that of the compliant female who avoids conflict, and that 
of the contemporary artist who does risk ‘upset’ and exclusion.   A gendered 
subjectivity is clearly apparent in both the reflections above, and in the 
artwork itself.  To reflect briefly on this, Narvaez (2013) discusses gender as 
an example of ‘symbolic violence’; discourses of ‘femininity’ that direct the 
way women move and speak, and the roles they perform, such that they 
become ‘invisible’ to themselves. The ideology of ‘womanhood’ is 
constructed though an enactment of “such ‘natural’ female characteristics as 
self-abnegation” (2013: 43).  ‘Self-abnegation’ (or self-denial) is relevant to 
my analysis here, as what may be occurring is the removal of my voice.  I 
am trying to speak, but at the same time I am silencing myself, and this 
behaviour is enculturated.   
Although not ‘live’ interactions, imaginary relationships are always present; 
imagined consequences, discussions, or criticisms.  These voices threaten 
to regulate my actions.   As discussed in Chapter Three, ‘fear’ is a learned 
affect, made up of previous and current experiences which are present in the 
emergence of ‘imagination’.  Imagination is ‘social’.  Agents both produce 
and re-produce meaning through actions (unconsciously performed) from a 
pre-existing mode of operation, and these contain an ‘intentionality’ of which 
they are unaware (Bourdieu, 1977: 79).  The ‘internalised voices’ suggest a 
desire to ‘smooth over’ despite the obvious human suffering.  Does this 
‘smoothing over’ contain a prior ‘intentionality’ to act in the interests of the 
powerful rather than the powerless?  If so, why could I not see this at the 
time?  Bourdieu tells us that as the habitus is repeated across a community, 
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and therefore familiar, it becomes taken for granted or invisible (ibid: 80).  
Narvaez however challenges this notion of habitus as invisible (and 
therefore unchangeable) by reintroducing the notion of individual agency via 
the ‘pre-social’, or id: “a psychosomatic agency that, Freud suggested, is in 
constant conflict with the agents of culture” (2013: 6). He suggests that 
whilst socialisation can suppress individuality, it can also be seen that 
disruptions to the ‘cultural’ are a historical constant – ‘biology’ and ‘culture’ 
modify each other (ibid: 7).  As can be seen in the above extracts, ‘intuition’ 
can be experienced as conflicting.  I ‘want’ to paint that picture, set against ‘it 
feels wrong’.  Is this the ‘id’ at work (‘I want’) in conflict with culture?     
Narvaez is clear that the concept of ‘id’ is necessary to understand the 
complexity of human phenomena, which cannot be ‘known’ precisely using  
hypothetico-scientific method in the way that physical ‘matter’ can be known 
(ibid: 198).  We are never truly ‘free’, suggests Narvaez, as our options are 
“preceded by organic and cultural structures” (ibid: 198) – and yet we are not 
totally determined either.  “What makes us human,” he says, “is the fact that 
we do not follow laws and patterns in the same way in which lower animals 
or things in the organic world do” (ibid: 198) [my emphasis].  What he seems 
to be saying is that humans must have agency because they demonstrate 
unpredictability.  This assumption, that humans are complex and 
unpredictable whilst other ‘organic’ things are not takes a human-centric 
view.  Humans are also ‘organic’, and possibly more predictable than we 
would like to think (market research, for example, does take a scientific 
approach to predicting human behaviour).  And as Bennett (2010) tells us, 
materials (and other ‘organic’ things) are less predictable and more 
improvisational than we might think. ‘Things’ affect ‘humans’.   
4.1.4 Embodiment of social structures in the artefact 
I ‘wanted’ to paint that picture.  It moved me.  The image ‘did’ something.  It 
had agency.  It affected an outcome in a ‘node’ of actants (Latour, 2005) 
interacting in an assemblage in which I was emotionally ‘moved’.   Set 
against it were the competing agencies of the imagined dissenting voices, 
and my own felt distress.  In the previous chapter, I suggested that social 
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structures are ‘inscribed’ on the artefact, as the artist’s decisions 
(consciously or unconsciously) are influenced by memories of socially 
determined judgements.  This section looks in more detail at how the ‘social’ 
is embodied in artefacts by exploring how ‘practices’ include ‘objects’. 
Bourdieu suggests that the meaning of an object is ‘done’ by a practitioner of 
a habitus, rather than being inherent in the object itself.  ‘Objects’ are 
products of a particular practice of constructing that world of objects (1977: 
91).  The way that we understand art objects, therefore, depends on 
practices of art.   Bourdieu says: “every made product – including symbolic 
products such as works of art […] exerts by its very functioning, particularly 
by the use made of it, an educative effect which helps to make it easier to 
acquire the dispositions necessary for its adequate use” (ibid: 217).  We 
learn the function or value of objects by observing how they are ‘used’.  How 
we view an ‘art object’ and what use we make of it will be influenced by what 
artists ‘do’, by our exposure to art experiences or education, and by the way 
the art object is presented and discussed.  If paintings are encountered in a 
hushed environment, supported by organised talks by an ‘expert’ who tells 
you the history of the artist and points out things to look at, this sets an 
expectation of the art ‘object’ as a sacred thing, ‘containing’ a prior 
intentionality which you have to correctly guess, or be told.  The ‘disciplining’ 
voices in my journal assume a view of art as about ‘making money’.  How 
could we instead adopt a ‘use’ view of the art object as a participant-in-
inquiry (rather than a repository of wisdom, or a means of making money)?  
How would an ‘exhibition’ as a collective inquiry challenge ‘viewing’ 
practices?  Section Two will consider these questions. 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s habitus, Narvaez (2013) investigates the ways in 
which collective memory exists in embodied social structures which become 
invisible, taken-for-granted.  Does the sensory engagement with materials 
and objects make this embodied memory visible to us?  The digital 
reflections from the video Digital story for Jetty making suggest that 
embodied memory was triggered by sensory experiences (the smell of 
fabrics and pencils; the feel of fabrics and paper and textiles).  
Improvisational play stimulates sensory embodied collective memory 
through imagination as re-enactment, making a sensory link to the ‘cultural’.   
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In Ruffles, the patterns, scissors and fabrics (the feel of cutting them, the 
smell, the distinctive sound of dressmaking scissors) powerfully brought 
back childhood memories of making clothes.  And this is connected with the 
Bangladesh event; the careless delegation of dressmaking to an unseen 
group of bodies.  In the Ruffles source image, the fabrics that cover the 
bodies connect to the fabrics that I was laying out in the studio.  The 
resonances in the Ruffles video of recreated studio play get stronger each 
time I view it.  This is what I describe as working ‘intuitively’ –  exploring a 
concern in a multi-sensory, playful way, where ‘play’ is not ‘joyful’ but is the 
way we cope as children, dealing with difficult experiences through 
improvising with objects.  Play is ‘attached to history and culture’, as the 
story of my childhood included making clothes.  This history is shared and 
may be triggered by sensory experiences.  This one critical incident 
entwines social, material, sensory corporeal and cultural memory.  If I want 
the audience to share these connections, I need to share the source of the 
image.  Learning from this, the third event (discussed in Chapter Five) 
included details of the source image with each painting.   
If the sensory experience of materials – fabrics, patterns, and scissors – 
triggered embodied memory for me, these might also be shared as objects 
that have political agency (the third event did share objects, as discussed in 
Chapter Five).  With reference to ideas from Dewey, Latour, and Rancière, 
Bennett (2010) develops a notion of a materialist political ecology, in which 
humans and non-humans are actants.    Latour, says Bennett, proposes that 
political action responds to ‘propositions’ (rather than enacting ‘choices’), 
where ‘propositions’ are experienced as a ‘weighting towards’ a particular 
direction.  Action comes about as a result of various propositions and 
energies in a situation, rather than as a result of deliberations; feeling a way 
through rather than ‘thinking’ or conscious choice.  In the ‘making sense’ of 
my responses in that critical incident there were various propositions felt in 
the ‘form shaping’ of creative practice.  That image ‘moved’ me; it had 
agency.  In looking closely at the image, I experienced a ‘punctum’ (Barthes, 
2000) – the fabrics shrouding the bodies drew my attention.  This triggered a 
compulsion to pull out a stash of fabrics kept in a drawer.  The distinctive 
feel and smell of them reminded me of making clothes.  I shook out their 
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folds and laid them out, watched by the camera.  Latour, says Bennett, 
“distributes agentic capacity also to the ‘event’” (2010: 103) – in action, there 
is always an element of ‘surprise’.  She cites Latour: “Whenever we make 
something we are not in command, we are slightly overtaken by the action” 
(Latour, cited in Bennett, 2010: 150).      
Where I felt ‘overtaken’ was in play with paper dolls: 
Playing in my studio like a child with all things I used to do – 
dressmaking, paper dolls.  […]  The paper doll clothes are 
deliberately careless and rough.  But the process of drawing cutting 
colouring and ‘trying on’ still feels like familiar play56.     
The cut-out girl was a physical reminder, which prompted a compulsion to 
re-enact ‘trying on’ with the materials of paper, crayons and scissors.  
‘Playing’ in the studio with materials brings back memories, the same 
feeling, the same improvisational actions, from childhood processes of social 
learning.  This pays attention to the sensory nature of the learning of the 
habitus through imitation, the role of materials in that, and the embodied 
sensory memories triggered by re-enactment.  I also felt ‘overtaken’ in the 
play with the pattern paper.  It was the relationship between my body and 
the material and auditory propensities of the paper that created opportunities 
to influence the outcome.  This was improvisation with the paper, knowing 
the camera was there, responding to the qualities of the material – the 
rustling sound, its transparency, and the markings on the surface.  In the 
unfolding play in the studio, the connection between childhood doll-dressing, 
dress-making, and the factory collapse occurs as an event (using Latour’s 
term).  The trace of this event remains in the video and in the painting.   The 
editing of the video aimed to recreate those moments of ‘felt’ compulsion to 
inter-act with materials.  The video ‘shows’ the rigour of play as a research 
method (Nelson, 2009); an improvisational event-full process.  Some of the 
actions re-presented on the video have meaningful potential.  The shadowy 
hand ruffles the pattern-paper with increasing urgency.  ‘Placing’ the paper 
doll onto the image, she (I) accepts responsibility.  But here, I might be 
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unconsciously playing into a social history of looking, of sexualisation 
performed through imaging (Rose, 2012: 154).  The paintings position the 
viewer as spectator, looking at a vulnerable, lost, powerless and passively 
watching little girl rather than looking with her.   
The ‘work’ of art (‘making’ and ‘viewing’) negotiates these social histories of 
looking, mediated by artworks as ‘public objects’ that participate in the 
history and ongoing production of the ‘habitus’ of art practice.  Philosopher 
Stephen Turner (1994) considers the role of ‘public objects’ in his discussion 
of how ‘practices’ are ‘reproduced’.   If shared practices are tacit (hidden) 
then how, he asks, can we be sure that the shared practice is the same for 
everyone?  An alternative to an internalised practice ‘object’, he suggests, is 
that participants perform the practice in a convincing enough manner to be 
taken as a member of that practice-community.  The means by which they 
produce that performance may be developed through ‘habituation’, and 
these invisible means may well differ from other individual practitioners, 
rather than the cause of the performance being a shared, hidden procedure.  
The contemporary painter’s gesture is evolved and embodied through 
repeated practice, rather than by copying another painter.  But this leaves 
the problem of how traditions persist, and how they are transmitted.  In terms 
of ‘persistence’, he proposes that traditions may comprise “individual 
additions to what is explicit and public” (ibid: 97) – in other words, public 
‘objects’ (artefacts or performances) play a part in the continuing 
performance of a tradition (or ‘practice’).  In terms of ‘transmission’, he 
proposes that individuals ‘emulate’ these explicit public observances and 
artefacts, the performance of which develops habits in the individual that 
enables them to reproduce these consistently.  These are individual habits, 
not collectively shared ones called ‘practices’.  I’ve employed the term 
‘habit(us)’ to signify this specificity. 
Determining an individual ‘habit’, however, can be problematic.  As Turner 
points out, ‘habit’ is a hybrid term which points to both: a) an observable 
repeated behaviour; and b) a ‘mental cause’ which has to be inferred.  
Turner points out that identifying a habit has epistemic difficulties because 
we can only infer it from observable signs – what an individual does or says 
(ibid: 15–17).   ‘Habit’, he says, can also be understood as a ‘habit of mind’, 
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which can only be inferred because there is no attached observable 
behaviour.  There are implications here in terms of applying a method to 
understand individual ‘habits’ of creative practice.  I can only make 
inferences based on the traces of my ‘mental’ habits (through journal writing) 
or habitual performances (through video).  Therefore any account that I 
present of my ‘habits’ will necessarily be tentative.   
[…]  I have been reflecting on the work of three female artists – […] I 
am making connections with these artworks, as if they can help me 
find my identity as a female artist.  Somehow.  I guess the question 
I’m asking is “what does a contemporary female artist ‘do’”, and does 
this help me think about what I do and how I do it?57 
In looking at these artworks as ‘public objects’, I navigate my ‘role’ – what it 
is to perform the practice of ‘contemporary female artist’ in a convincing 
enough manner to be taken as a ‘member’ of that practice-community.   I 
look at what other artists ‘do’, but I am not aiming to emulate their corporeal 
acts.  I’m looking at the traces of what they’ve done – video, painting, 
supporting information.  Public ‘objects’.  But I am not ‘emulating’ these 
objects either.  They are ‘credible stimulants’ – ‘credible’ because of their 
inclusion in a high profile arts space; ‘stimulants’ because they catch my 
attention, prompt thoughts, and live in my memory. I converse with them.  
They mediate my development of individual ‘habits of thought’ – and of 
gesture.  Another painting’s topography may affect me in a way that 
stimulates my own development of gestural handling of paint.    
If individual ‘habit’ is more helpful than a shared ‘habitus’ for explaining the 
transmission of practices, then bringing ‘I’ back into the picture might help us 
understand how creative practice is learned, performed, and transmitted.  
For example, the acquisition of drawing skills challenges ‘emulation’ as a 
transmission mechanism.  Drawing and painting are commonly taught by 
demonstration, but (certainly in my experience) this is not always successful.  
Success requires perception as well as motor skills, and perception cannot 
be observed (and therefore emulated).  Narvaez suggested that perception 
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is culturally learned (in terms of what we pay attention to), and this is what 
Edwards (2001) does – she tells artists what to pay attention to, for example 
boundaries (line) and light (form).  She gives artists the visual language to 
learn how to ‘look’.  Edwards developed this language through reflection on 
her embodied ‘knowing’ as a drawing practitioner.  She was able to account 
for her own tacit knowledge of how to draw, through a practice-led research 
process.  She identified perceptual skills in such a way that she could teach 
them (by setting practical activities for the learner to develop the skills by 
practising them, paying attention to feedback from the emerging image, 
rather than by copying her).  Her work illustrates the potential pedagogic 
value of self-reflection on tacit (individually developed through habituation) 
knowledge.   
4.1.5 Summary of section one 
Looking at ‘practices’ and ‘habitus’ raised questions which helped me to 
consider the ‘social’ immanent in my creative practice.  What have I been 
‘copying’ such that it has become ‘embodied’ in repeated gestures, habits 
and performances?  What have I learned ‘from body to body’?  What 
unconscious intentionality is already-embodied in these repeated acts or 
performances?  What predispositions or propensities to act (propositions) do 
I feel, and in what ‘events’?  How does the artefact have political agency in 
the ‘practice’ of art-making?  What does it mean to ‘perform’ art in a 
‘convincing enough manner’?  Considering these questions through 
reflection on practice, I argued that I learned, not from ‘body to body’, but 
from ‘artefact to artefact’ through looking at public artworks and making my 
own, all the time asking ‘how do I make artworks that are art?’  In shaping 
the emergent artefact, I am informed by social memory of public objects, and 
with these ‘credible stimulants’ I work out (through practice) my own 
habituated ways of putting on a ‘good enough’ performance.  I’ve discussed 
‘feeling a propensity’ to act (or not) in the selection of a source image, the 
‘internalised’ voices (or historical narratives) that make up this ‘weighting’ as 
social imagination, and the conflicting ‘habitus’ between the contemporary 
artist who risks ‘upset’ and the compliant female who ‘smoothes over’ which 
may represent ‘symbolic violence’.  I have described ‘events’ in which 
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interactions with materials, through improvisational play following 
‘propositions’, stimulated sensory memory which is also cultural – such that 
materials and the emerging artefact have political agency, influencing the 
outcome.  But what are the effects of those artefacts in the world?  And is it 
possible to create a viewing practice in which the artefact is a participant in a 
collective inquiry?   The next section will start to consider these questions by 
reflecting on the second event.   They will be addressed in more depth in 
Chapter Five in relation to the third event.    
4.2 Section Two: Audience experience 
Bolt’s (2010) description of the material process of allowing art to emerge 
and the ‘shift in thought’ that can occur through the exegesis is clearly 
important for the artist (as illustrated in Chapter Three).  But what effects 
occur for a viewer, and how can these be gauged?  This section brings in 
the audience.  First, it introduces the second event ‘Feeling a way through…’ 
and describes the two main practice-led research methods used: video 
editing, and audience participation.   It goes on to explore audience 
meaning-making from seeing artistic process on video.  It discusses ways in 
which cognition may extend to the collective social body of the audience, 
and develops a notion of ‘co-responsibility’ that encompasses the viewer in 
the process of inquiring and making meaning.  Audience observations are 
discussed, drawing on the theoretical frameworks of actor network theory 
(Latour, 2005; Bennett, 2010) to explore the ‘social’ agency of the artefacts, 
and active spectatorship (Rancière , 2011) to explore audience co-
authorship.     
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4.2.1 Feeling a way through …   
 
Figure 4.4 Still from Feeling a way through …, 2013 
 
On 17th December 2013, I created an installation of paintings and videos in 
Alec Clegg studio, stage@leeds at the University of Leeds.  This was the 
invitation: 
‘Feeling a way through …’ is an invitation to participate in the 
‘work’ of art.  In a shared exploration of paintings and video 
made during the artist’s ongoing project of making sense of 
climate change responsibility, you will share your readings and 
responses to the artwork – through reflection, conversation, 
dialogue.  Come and feel part of it.   
The event is documented here: Feeling a way through ….  You may find it 
helpful to watch this video before reading on. 
 
The next section summarises the research methods used to address the 
questions that arose from The Gesture of Thinking (in Chapter Two).  
4.2.2 Methods 
4.2.2.1 Video  
What meanings does a viewer make from seeing the work made?   
I used video to explore this.  I recorded improvisational play in my studio, 
and used this digital material to edit and juxtapose video fragments through 
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digital reflection, aiming to recreate that playful experience; to share the 
‘feeling that I get’ as I’m making the painting.  I presented the paintings and 
videos adjacent to each other.   
4.2.2.2 Audience participation 
In what ways can viewers’ awareness of their participation in the work of art 
be facilitated?   
I invited participation to explore how ‘co-responsibility’ encompasses the 
‘viewer’ as well as the artist in the process of inquiring and making meaning.  
In my introduction to the audience, I explained that the artwork is part of my 
ongoing project of making sense of climate change responsibility, and invited 
them to participate in making the artwork, telling them: “There are no ‘right’ 
answers – I ask questions with my studio practice and the work is in making 
sense of it”.  I gave each participant a hand-made sketchbook and a pencil 
and invited them to respond in writing or drawing.  I invited the audience to 
touch the paintings if they wanted to, and included ‘touch’ labels on the 
artworks.  After 30 minutes, I facilitated a group discussion which I 
introduced with three questions: i) Where is the artwork?  ii) What did it 
mean to you?  iii) Who made it?  If they didn’t mention ‘touch’, I prompted 
them by asking how touch affected the meaning of the work (if at all).  The 
sketchbooks and the discussion were intended to be part of the experience 
of the artwork as well as providing a ‘trace’ of audience reflections.   
Methodologically, however, there were ethical and philosophical difficulties.  
One concern is the relationship between the experience itself, and the 
audience member’s ability to consciously articulate that experience.  
Assuming that audience members mean what they say is both necessary 
and problematic according to audience researcher Matthew Reason (2010).  
It is necessary because it is unethical to attempt to reinterpret responses.  
How do we know ‘better’?  And problematic because as Reason says, “we 
cannot and do not always say what we mean – or indeed know what we 
mean” (2010: 17).  Another difficulty is that asking audiences to analyse their 
experience might disrupt their ability to know how they felt (ibid: 17).  
Reason has worked with drawing to help audiences explore embodied or 
intuitive responses: “drawing introduces opportunities for change, accident 
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and intuition to interrupt the process; for slippage to occur between intention 
and realisation” (ibid: 28).  As this is one of my own motivations for painting, 
it is appropriate to offer drawing to audiences as a means of making sense 
of their experience.  Sketchbook prompts also aimed to stimulate immediate 
(rather than analytical) responses: ‘what are you noticing? what are you 
feeling? what are you wondering?’     
Through this intervention, I am inviting the audience to ‘co-create’ meaning 
or interpretation.  Within arts marketing, discussions on managing the 
audience experience have coined the term ‘co-creation’ to describe the 
increasing involvement of audiences in creative processes.  ‘Co-creation’ 
has been defined as working with audiences “to create something together: 
it could be meaning or interpretation; a space or exhibition; an online 
resource or collective response” (Govier cited in Walmsley & Franks, 2011: 
7).  However, as Walmsley and Franks have highlighted, not all audience 
members want a high level of involvement, and there are still important 
questions about co-creation, including the extent to which audiences can 
“really become part of a collective creative process” (ibid: 8).  Boorsma 
(2006) points out that co-creation requires willingness from participants, an 
open mind, acceptance of the challenge, and belief in the potential of the 
artwork to tell them something new, and this requires an atmosphere of trust.  
Brown and Ratzkin also suggest that ‘co-creation’ encompasses the idea 
that “audiences increasingly want to see ‘under the hood’ of a work in 
progress” and that being “part of the creative act itself” deepens their 
experience (Brown & Ratzkin, 2011: 68).  It is these two aspects of co-
creation (creating meaning together and making artistic process visible 
through video) that I investigate in the next section. 
The event had a fixed duration of an hour, and was run twice with an 
audience of around ten each time.  At the end, I collected the sketchbooks 
(participants could choose to have them returned).  I recorded and 
transcribed the discussion.   
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4.2.3 Observations and analysis 
I will now share selected observations from audience responses and reflect 
on insights they might offer (bearing in mind the difficulties in audience 
research outlined above).  First, I will look at audience responses to the 
videos.  Second, I will introduce and discuss how a notion of ‘co-
responsibility’ might encompass the viewer as well as the artist.  I use the 
term ‘co-responsibility’ rather than ‘co-creation’ (above), as I will explain.   
4.2.3.1 Seeing the ‘making’ 
What meanings does a viewer make from seeing the work made?   
Bolt (2004) argues that processes of ‘material thinking’ put ‘reality’ into the 
painting, and the painting reflects this back into the world, creating real 
effects.  She argues that the resulting painting is not purely representative, 
but is ‘performative’ such that it brings “into being that which it figures” 
(2004: 3–4).   If knowledge emerges in the material processes of making, the 
above question sought to understand whether it is the painting (as a noun) 
that is ‘performative’ as suggested by Bolt, or whether it is painting as a verb 
– and if so, whether that process needs to be shared.  I aimed to explore 
how seeing an edited video of studio making affects the meanings that are 
made from the artwork.  Does seeing video of the painting develop enhance 
or stimulate a sense of ‘inhabiting’ paintings for a viewer?  To help me 
understand whether there is meaning in seeing the work ‘done’, and whether 
this is experienced as part of the work, or simply documentation, I looked for 
responses in which participants seemed to be commenting on the video, or 
on the relationship between the video and the paintings.  The following 
observations have been drawn thematically from audience sketchbooks and 
discussion transcripts.    
 Craft processes get noticed: enjoyment in watching process, a 
sense of the physicality of the making process, a feeling of ‘being 
there’, noticing the activities of my hands. 
 For some participants, seeing my hand touching the work on the 
video made them want to copy it. 
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 Symbolic connections were made between the paintings and video, 
‘the girl in blue’ is both the girl in the painting and me-the-artist in my 
blue shirt.  
 Some responses suggested that certain actions carried meaning in a 
sense of the action doing something – using a ruler to draw a line; 
the repeated painting of several girl figures; the actions of moving, 
placing, and cutting out the girl figure.    
 Associations or memories are triggered by processes shown on 
video. 
 Artefactuality is exposed though seeing the making of the artefact. 
 Video footage draws attention to features of the painting, for 
example the scale of the girl, and the layering of materials. 
 Layers of process are revealed which are not visible in the painting.  
 For some, seeing the process seemed to be experienced as a 
distraction, detachment or disconnection from the narratives or 
meanings that could be experienced from the work’s content.  
The stories of memories and associations suggest that the video triggered 
connections with personal experience.  Some of these actions were no 
longer visible in the painting, so these connections may not otherwise have 
been made.  In this way, my exploratory and playful activities in the studio 
made a direct connection with audience members.  In the case of maps, 
participants’ accounts of their memories and associations are consistent with 
my own feeling of our strong connection to place and identity, and our 
compulsion to mark out, map and own the land.  Clearly, the actions on 
these videos had meaningful potential.   The above responses also suggest 
a ‘feeling of being there’ and of wanting to ‘copy’ the video.  This sense of 
participating in the action and copying it will be further explored in Chapter 
Five through the final practice event.     
It is also worth looking at what these videos don’t do.  Whilst the audience 
were clear that the work was about climate change, for some of them 
‘process’ became a distraction from ‘content’.  (This seemed to be further 
exacerbated by the invitation to ‘touch’ the work, which was experienced as 
a distraction rather than adding meaning to the work.)  In terms of whether 
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the videos enhanced a sense of ‘inhabiting’ paintings, some responses 
suggested that the explicit footage of crafting activity (such as a time-lapse 
video of the painting Amber) may actually distract viewers from an 
imaginative ‘state’, feeling, or experience.  The artist Michael Jarvis 
discusses the potential difficulties in the ‘making visible’ of artistic process, 
citing the example of Namuth’s documentation of Pollock’s material practice: 
“observation of intimate transactions between an artist and his/her material 
processes can blunt and even ossify practice” (2007: 202).   It can also fall 
into the trap of ‘fictional fakery’, he suggests, “a performance put on for the 
benefit of an audience” (ibid: 203).  My videos seem most useful where they 
draw attention to a feature of the painting such as scale or repetition, and 
where they show a layer that is no longer visible.  But the video has to form 
part of the narrative, otherwise it seems to break the flow of imagination and 
distract from content.  This raises a question for my future practice: How 
might the work enhance a sense of collective imaginative engagement?  
This could be achieved through paying attention to the meaningful qualities 
of the work, avoiding a focus on craft.  Actions such as placing and replacing 
figures, rather than showing skills of ‘making’ images, have meaningful 
potential; suggesting something, not just documenting.  This is constructed 
and conscious, using the camera as a new tool, but still part of an 
imaginative playful process.  As I rearranged the cut-out girl figures on the 
map, I was exploring something intuitively. At the same time, I knew I was 
recording it and could use that footage.  I am not recording the ‘authentic’ 
process of making a painting which, as I would agree with Jarvis (2007: 
203), can only be treated with suspicion.  I know the camera is there, as is 
the ghost of a potential audience. 
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4.2.3.2 Co-responsibility 
 
Figure 4.5 Audience sketchbook, Feeling a way through … 2013 
 
I will now consider how a notion of ‘co-responsibility’ (Bolt, 2007) might 
encompass the viewer as well as the artist in the process of inquiring and 
making meaning (audience contributions are indented).  The Origin of the 
Work of Art (Heidegger, 1971) explores the ‘riddle’ of art, which goes thus: 
What is the origin of the work of art?  The art is found in the artwork – but 
what is the origin of the artwork?  It is not a work of art without being made 
by an artist.  But what is the origin of the artist?  The artist is defined by 
making the work of art, therefore the origin of the artist is the work of art.   
The essay explores this circle from various vantage points, including 
materials, form, context, and the cultural systems of critique and commerce 
within which the artist operates.  Heidegger suggests that a work of art is not 
just a ‘thing’, ‘formed’ out of ‘materials’ – it is something in the presence of 
which the ‘unconcealedness’ of being of things comes to presence.  This is a 
‘happening’, an ‘unconcealment’ rather than a static thing.  But who is 
present at this ‘happening’?   
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Bolt’s posthuman understanding of artistic process and authorship is partly 
based on Heidegger’s notion of ‘co-responsibility’ of artist, tools and 
materials in the process of making art:  “in the artistic process, objects have 
agency and it is through the establishing conjunctions with other contributing 
elements in the art that humans are co-responsible for letting art emerge” 
(2007: 1).  Her description here suggests consistency with my working 
definition of ‘agency’ as power emerging through action.  But she does not 
include the audience in her analysis. I have attempted to do so via a notion 
of ‘co-responsibility’ that encompasses audience as well as artist in the 
process of ‘unconcealment’, and this is why I use the term instead of ‘co-
creation’58.  The sketchbooks and discussion facilitated viewers’ awareness 
of their participation in the work of art.  The sketchbooks were intended to 
stimulate reflection in-the-moment, providing a tool for extended cognition – 
thinking on the page.  The discussion formed part of the art work, as 
participants worked together to construct meaning.  Reason terms this 
“experience as countersignature”, a presence in itself, and an integral part of 
the experience (2010: 27).  The discussion included the question: “Where is 
the artwork, and who made it?” to explore whether the audience experienced 
‘co-responsibility’.  One participant did seem to experience it in this way: 
In terms of where the artwork is, I kind of got the impression that the 
entire space was supposed to be the work of art?  […]  I also felt that 
us in the space was intended to be part of it; the fact that we’re being 
recorded, the way that we interacted with the space.  I really felt that 
[… ] I’ve written in the notebook that I was very conscious of my own 
impact on the space (some other sounds of agreement here), the 
sound of my own footsteps, casting shadows, obscuring people’s 
views, I felt that I was very much part of what was happening, and the 
artwork was actually the entire place, not specifically the painting or 
whatever.59 
                                            
58 As will become apparent in Chapter Five, the term ‘responsibility’ also makes an important 
connection with the content of the artwork in respect of climate change. 
59 Audience discussion 17/12/13 
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This self-awareness and feeling part of the work was echoed by another 
participant: 
conscious that I’m now performing in the piece  3 audience members 
looking at me60 
Another response suggested a sense of experiencing a moment in a 
continuing and shared process, in which the participants ‘take’ the work with 
them: 
the artwork at the moment’s in this room, I don’t think it’s going to stay 
there, it’s going to journey on out.  I think when we leave we’ll take 
some of that process with us.  But clearly it didn’t start in this room 
because you can see the process that led to this room61 
Another participant suggested that the ‘take out’ is unique to each individual, 
and the art exists in the interactions: 
when you say who made ‘it’, it could be the interactions, or even what 
we take out of this, in which case the ‘who made it’ is going to be very 
unique to each person, so there are as many ‘its’ as there are people 
in the space62 
These responses suggest a shared sense from some audience members of 
a ‘felt’ sense of ‘co-responsibility’.  For one participant, however, the ‘origin’ 
of the work of art rested with the artist: 
I would say you are the originating artist, and then there’s clearly from 
the credits at the end that there are people who helped facilitate its 
arrival in the space, and I think those engagement materials, so 
there’s layers of making going on, but in terms of the originating 
catalyst it’s still assigned to you63 
                                            
60 Audience sketchbook 17/12/13 
61 Audience discussion 17/12/13 
62 Audience discussion 17/12/13 
63 Audience discussion 17/12/13 
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Other agents in this assemblage which are co-responsible are artefacts.  
The paintings were mediators (rather than transmitters) of meaning – for 
example, some participants seek narrative – “what is the girl doing?”  The 
sketchbook gives them the space to write their own story mediated by the 
painting – “At one point I got lost and started a story of my own…”  The 
sketchbooks contain a trace of the viewer’s work of experiencing and making 
sense of the art.  They became an ‘external memory’ as their contents were 
shared verbally in the discussion, performing as mediators which shaped the 
event.   Some participants suggested they were “part of the artwork”.   These 
traces of audience responses take the studio work forward.  Examples of 
such responses include a comment about my use of recycled materials, 
creating a “unity of theme and form” which I had not fully appreciated.  This 
related to my anxiety about (un)sustainability of art materials, and led me to 
source used wood panels.  For one participant, the painting-over of the 
figure in Keep Off “absorbed” the girl, as if she had “dwelt there”, and this 
adds something new to my reading of the figure’s boundary remaining, her 
impact always visible.  These traces of audience experience are part of 
‘revealing’ and forward-shaping the studio work.  This represents a process 
of ‘co-creation’.  By seeing ‘under the hood’ the audience made further 
meaning from the artworks, and those meanings informed my future practice 
and ongoing creative process.   
But this required facilitation skills and an ability to ‘let go’ as discussed by 
Lynne Conner, a performance theorist and practitioner, and community-
based arts activist.  Conner’s model of ‘arts talk’ (2013) is based on the 
premise that sharing in the interpretation of meaning is pleasurable for 
audience members, and increases their engagement in the work.  The 
problem, she says, is that some arts workers either don’t want to give up 
control of the meaning-making process, or simply don’t know how to 
facilitate this.  Audiences, too, don’t necessarily have the preparedness or 
skills to participate in the meaning-making process after decades of 
meaning-making being imposed on them.  They are not used to public 
opportunities to participate in articulating meaning; social interpretation 
rather than individual meaning making.  She proposes that arts workers and 
their audiences can work together as a learning community to share 
- 113 - 
knowledge and insights from the art work.  She uses the term ‘arts talk’ to 
describe arts-centred conversations, dialogue, discussion, analysis, debate 
and exchange of views in a “productive arts ecology” (ibid: 5).  Her approach 
is particularly relevant to the understanding of artistic labour as ecological 
cognition which I have developed in this research, because she investigates 
interpretive meaning-making processes as both embodied and socially 
constructed (ibid: 9).  The ‘arts talk’ model, she says, “(1) creates a 
conscious relationship with the audience that is transparent in its goals; (2) 
offers productive facilitators and/or facilitation structures that ask, listen, and 
request rather than tell, lecture, or direct; and (3), begins and ends with the 
audience’s interests in mind” (ibid: 99). 
The audience are co-authors of meaning.  The French philosopher Jacques 
Rancière questions “the logic of straight, uniform transmission” (2011: 14) 
from artist to viewer, or a presupposition that an audience will ‘feel’ whatever 
the artist has ‘put in’.  For his ‘Emancipated Spectator’, the art object is a 
mediating object “whose meaning is owned by no one, but which subsists 
between them” (ibid: 14–15).  Sutherland and Acord (2007) also suggest that 
artworks as mediators have transformative power.  Making artwork in the 
studio is not the whole work – making sense of it is a fluid and social process 
that involves the artist and the audience in engaging actively with the work 
and each other.   The traces of the audience’s work mediate my own sense 
of the work’s ‘happening’.  I need “spectators who play the role of active 
interpreters” (Rancière, 2011: 22) and the echoes of their engagements 
accompany me in my studio.     
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to develop an extended theory of material thinking that 
includes sociality by focusing on the lens of the ‘social’ and the intersections 
of ‘artefact’ and ‘habit(us)’ (Figure 4.1).  Chapter Three showed the process 
of making paintings and videos as one of ‘extended cognition’ involving 
‘material thinking’, which artefacts both mediate and record a trace of.  The 
current chapter has shown how the ‘social’ is embodied in this process and 
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embedded in the artefact, through habitual performances, social imagination, 
and felt relationships between images, materials and bodies.   
Section one addressed the research sub-question: ii) How do social 
processes, cultural and environmental factors interact with human and 
material bodies in creative practice?  It suggested that ‘feeling a propensity’ 
to act is influenced by ‘internalised’ voices, a kind of social imagination.  It 
identified conflicts of ‘habitus’ between the contemporary artist who risks 
‘upset’ and the compliant female who ‘smoothes over’.  It described how 
interactions with materials through improvisational play stimulated sensory 
memory which is also cultural.  Learning how to be an artist involves 
developing ‘habitus’ through practice, developing habitual ways of putting on 
a ‘good enough’ performance.  Shaping the emergent artefact is informed by 
social memory of public objects as ‘credible stimulants’.   
The second section examined the social effects of those artefacts.  It 
showed how the form-shaping process included the design of the second 
event, Feeling a way through… which was designed to orchestrate and 
emphasise ‘co-responsibility’.  It reflected on this event to address the 
questions raised from event one.  From asking: What meanings does a 
viewer make from seeing the work made? key insights included: (i) craft 
processes were noticed, and for some were experienced as a distraction 
from the content of the work; (ii) the video seems most useful where it is 
narrative, where it draws attention to a feature of the painting, and where it 
shows a layer that is no longer visible; (iii) personal connections were made 
by watching exploratory and playful studio activities.  These insights raised 
the question: How might the work enhance a sense of collective imaginative 
engagement?  This is addressed in the next chapter. 
From asking: In what ways can viewers’ awareness of their participation in 
the work of art be facilitated? key insights included: (i) the sketchbooks and 
discussion facilitated viewers’ awareness of their participation in the work of 
art as ‘co-responsible’ agents; (ii) some discussion responses suggested a 
shared ‘felt’ sense of ‘co-responsibility’, mentioning factors such as the use 
of a theatre space, being recorded, feeling watched, and interacting with 
people and space; (iii) the sketchbooks mediated and recorded traces of the 
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viewer’s sense-making of the artefacts, and became an ‘external memory’ 
mediating the discussion; (iv) these traces of audience experience affect the 
forward-shaping of the studio work.   
By framing ‘painting’ as a social practice of looking, feeling, imagining and 
talking, we can open up new spaces of understanding mediated by paintings 
and people, in which artistic agency is ‘distributed’ amongst artist, audience 
and artefacts.  However, if artistic agency is ‘distributed’ in this way, I am left 
with the question of what this means for my own artistic subjectivity:   
iii) What is the place of the artist’s voice in a shared ecological artistic 
subjectivity?   
 
The next chapter, along with the third and final event, explores the 
implications of ‘distributed’ artistic agency.   It describes how drawing 
attention to collective meaning-making parallels the content of the artwork – 
a collective responsibility in relation to climate change.  
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Chapter 5 Making as thinking: Artistic labour as ecological 
cognition  
The aim of this chapter is to explore the implications of ‘distributed’ artistic 
subjectivity, including the place of the artist’s voice.  It describes how a 
growing ecological sensibility has shaped my studio practice and the way in 
which I share artistic process through video.  It addresses in more detail the 
artist’s work of mediation of the encounter with artefacts.  It performs a 
selective analysis of the third practice event, focusing on audience bodies 
and their interactions with materials and each other.  Previous chapters have 
explored in detail the work of the artist and the artefacts.  This chapter seeks 
to understand the artistic labour of the audience using the ecological 
cognition model.  Rather than focusing on one lens at a time, the chapter 
entwines them, as if the model were a cross-section of rope (Figure 5.1).  It 
focuses on the model overlaps and interactions between lenses.         
 
Figure 5.1 Artistic labour as ecological cognition – overlaps 
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The chapter brings together research insights from the previous chapters to 
focus on the primary question:  
How does painting evolve a practice in line with new norms around 
‘spectatorship’, and how can we understand this labour?   
It shows how understanding artistic labour as ecological cognition has 
enabled me to develop an artistic practice in which artistic subjectivity can be 
experienced by artist and audience as distributed.  It also addresses the 
research sub-question raised in the previous chapter: 
iii) What is the place of the artist’s voice in a shared ecological artistic 
subjectivity? 
The primary methods and sources used to consider these questions are:- 
 Reflection on third phase of studio practice 
 Design and analysis of the third practice event (audience 
participation; digital reflection) 
 
The first section reviews how insights from my research have shaped studio 
practice together with my sharing of that practice64.  It reflects on the third 
phase of practice to consider ways in which understanding artistic labour as 
ecological cognition has enabled me to develop an artistic practice in which 
artistic subjectivity can be experienced by artist and audience as distributed.   
The second section turns to the third event. It reflects on my event design 
decisions, reviewing the means by which I mediated an experience of 
distributed artistic subjectivity.  It then performs a selective analysis of what 
that event did using ‘gesture’ as a meaning-making device that recognises 
overlaps between the ‘body’ and the ‘social’ (Noland & Ness, 2008).  It 
argues that meaning was realised in action, shaped by a sense of 
‘infectiousness’ from watching the creative work of both artist and audience.  
It proposes that a human compulsion to ‘make’ things was enacted, a 
                                            
64 Chapter One explained how sharing artistic process is increasingly seen to form part of the art 
‘work’ in a ‘post-aesthetic’ arts context. 
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‘performance’ of the ‘social’.  It considers the place of the artist’s voice and 
proposes that mediation skills could include voicing the ‘social’ that is being 
made to raise awareness of its ‘happening’.   
 
First, let me briefly introduce the third practice event upon which the analysis 
is based.  The Garden of Earthly Delights was held on 18th May 2017 in Alec 
Clegg studio, stage@leeds at the University of Leeds.  It was advertised as 
an inquiry into the feelings that arise from being affected by climate change 
– and from knowing that we are affecting climate.  Participants were invited 
to participate in making the art work through reflection and dialogue.  The 
event sought to navigate a tension between creating space with an audience 
to ‘make’ the work, and the need for the artist to be clear about where 
intention needs to be voiced (such as sources of images). It had two aims:- 
 to focus on relationships between artist, audience, artefacts, and 
environment; and 
 to facilitate a sense of immersion in making the work (being with it) to 
create a sense of collective imaginative engagement.   
The event addressed two questions that were raised from the previous 
phases of practice: 
 In what ways can ‘painting’ help us to make sense of climate change 
responsibility? 
 How might the work enhance a sense of collective imaginative 
engagement?   
These are addressed through the practice, and responses to them are 
embedded within the outcomes of the event itself.  I have curated some of 
these in Appendix A. 
It should be noted that participants included the examination and supervision 
teams.  Contributors therefore had differing levels of power in terms of their 
impact on this project.  Being transparent about this, I have included, 
respected and valued all contributions within the analysis.   Whilst the event 
invitation was posted on a general arts email list, the ten participants who 
chose to come were artist-researchers, and this will have influenced 
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outcomes.  An audience who were not arts practitioners may have behaved 
differently.   
5.1 Section One: Evolving a practice of distributed artistic 
subjectivity 
I will start by reflecting on the form-shaping of the ‘artefacts’ from the third 
phase of practice to review how insights from my research have helped me 
to evolve an ecological sensibility that shapes my work.  
5.1.1 Intention and attention65 
   
Figure 5.2 Fat Fun; Huts; Shelter. 2014, acrylic and collage on board, 40 
x 34 cm 
 
These paintings were presented with the video Seals, which will be referred 
to throughout this section so you might find it helpful to view this now. 
 
The UK storm surges of December 2013 demanded my attention.  A media 
storm that closely followed the meteorological storm made hundreds of 
images available.  As discussed in the previous chapter, these images had 
agency; they prompted me to act.  I was swept up in a social storm, held by 
an uncanny fascination with this manifestation of the implications of a 
warming planet.  Ingold suggests that we come to understand the world as 
we engage with it, tracing paths of becoming to “follow what is going on” 
                                            
65 Marshall (2001) in her practice of action inquiry works in cycles of ‘intention’ and ‘attention’, the 
former setting the frame for her inquiry, and the latter adopting an attitude of careful observation 
within that frame.   
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(2011: 12–14).  I wanted to follow what was going on by immersing myself in 
the event.  I did this by noticing what I was reaching-out-towards.   As I 
discussed in Chapter Two, ‘intentionality’ in Husserl’s phenomenological 
sense refers to consciousness always being of something; it is a holistic 
action. Consciousness is the reaching-out-towards, rather than 
consciousness first, which then reaches out.  Artistic intentionality can be 
understood in this sense of reaching-out-towards (rather than preconceiving 
an idea).  This involved physical affect and a propensity to act (a political 
action responding to a ‘proposition’66) which was both ‘corporeal’ and 
‘social’.  Perception is culturally learned.  Learning about climate change 
affects what I pay attention to.       
I particularly reached-out-towards the seal pups. They ‘pulled’ at me.  I had 
observed seals at length during a holiday in Pembrokeshire, and my sense 
of being ‘pulled’ came not just from the images but from the memory of being 
with the seals, lying on a cliff, haunted by their cries.  The corporeal memory 
of being in that environment was part of the ‘pull’.   In the presence of the 
camera, the paper seal became the focus for play.  The cut-out paper forms, 
fitting into the palm of my hand, reminded me of tiny fish.  Only now, as I 
write, do I remember the story of the herring gulls coming inland to feed 
because herring populations crashed through overfishing.  I was told this by 
an RSPB warden years ago, and his story, unconsciously, found its way into 
the video in the gulls’ cries.  My hands handling the ‘fish’, and my ears 
‘fishing’ for sounds, made the connection before my conscious mind caught 
up.  The story shaped what I had learned to pay attention to. 
In Chapter Two, I introduced Ingold’s ‘dwelling’ perspective (2000; 2011) 
which transcends the split between ‘things’ and their ecosphere.  ‘Things’ 
interact with elements such as temperature or airflow, so our engagement 
with them is corporeal and cultural and mediated by the properties of things 
and surrounding elements.   In ‘handling’ the cut-out seals I noticed the 
flimsy paper responding to air movements caused by bodily motion or 
breath.  I watched them flutter gently, before blowing them off the board.  
Playfully, I became the storm.  The camera afforded the opportunity for that 
                                            
66 See Chapter Four. 
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kind of attentive play.  Through developing an aware studio practice where 
the camera is present, interactions with materials and tools become an 
opportunity for experimentation and play, such that artistic agency shifts 
around in the ecosphere of the studio.  I have learned to pay attention, to 
become aware of the materials, tools and environment as co-active agents 
in an art of inquiry.  I become aware of the present moment, being with 
materials, allowing myself to be led by them.  I have developed the 
sensitivity and confidence to notice and follow moments of ‘agency’ where 
materials ‘make’ me do things.  The video creates a trace of this – yet this is 
an edited trace; the editing software is another artistic tool.   
These recorded and edited moments of intention (reaching-out-towards) and 
attention (noticing what is going on) add layers of meaning.  They record an 
awareness of being and a tracery of paths for others to explore.  Gibson 
suggests that a picture is a record which “preserves what its creator has 
noticed and considers worth noticing” (1986: 274) [original emphasis].  A 
painting is a trace of movement which can be felt (ibid: 275).  Pictures, he 
says, are not ‘representations’; rather the markings on the surface record an 
awareness – a trace of paying attention.  A picture can locate the observer in 
an environment in which they see themselves: 
What is induced in these pictures is not an illusion of reality but an 
awareness of being in the world.  This is no illusion.  It is a legitimate 
goal of depiction, if not the only one. (Gibson, 1986: 283–284) 
This can be described as poietic.  The Greeks distinguished praxis (a will 
expressed through action or ‘doing’) from poiesis (to produce, as in ‘bringing 
into being’) (Dionea, 2012).  Feedback from Feeling a way through … had 
suggested that videos of studio craft (praxis) distracted from content (poiesis 
or ‘bringing into being’ of the artwork).  This raised the question: How might 
the work enhance a sense of collective imaginative engagement?  To 
address this, I ‘felt’ for meaningful actions with poietic potential, sharing play, 
discovery and inhabiting the work rather than showing technique.   From my 
analysis in the previous chapter, actions on video that were narrative or had 
meaningful potential were less likely to distract from ‘content’.  The videos 
seemed most effective where praxis and poiesis merged into each other, 
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such that the ‘doing’ had the function of ‘bringing into being’.  This created 
meaningful potential.  By sharing my imaginative process (intuitively 
exploring the unfolding present moment) I aimed to engage the audiences’ 
imagination, inviting an experience of ‘production into presence’.  The Seals 
video provides a trace of imaginative engagement with the paper cut-outs 
that is doing something, not just ‘documenting’.  The video is a record of 
what I noticed during the journey of exploring an event that caught my 
attention; a trace of an emergent awareness of being in the world.     
5.1.2 Artistic agency as ‘distributed’ – shared inquiry into ‘being’  
Ingold cites Merleau-Ponty: “The painter’s relation to the world […] is one of 
‘continued birth’ […] of the world becoming a world” (2011: 69).  The Garden 
of Earthly Delights sets up a relation with the seaside world which is real, 
drawn from actual embodied and cultural experience.  Ingold suggests that 
knowing something involves knowing its story and connecting it to one’s own 
(ibid: 160–161).  The Garden of Earthly Delights suggests a continuous 
unfolding of stories and invites the viewer to connect these to their own. 
Through sketchbooks and discussion, these stories can be shared and 
further stories emerge.   This is a shared exegesis or “a mode of revealing” 
(Bolt, 2010: 34) through exploring and articulating what emerges from the 
‘artefacts’.  In this collective process of ‘making as thinking’, a social world 
unfolds.  A fundamental component of the ‘art’ is made during this event.  
And this event is also a ‘making’ of the world, a ‘becoming’ which is 
ontological as the next section will explain.   
5.1.3 Creative labour as ontology 
We learn about the world by interacting with it, and we interact with the world 
through labour.  Philosopher Bruno Gulli (2005) discusses ‘labour’ in this 
expansive sense of sensuous purposive human activity in which we are 
always immersed in the world.  The central thesis of his book, Labor of Fire, 
is that the economic concept of labour as understood under Capitalism is not 
the same thing as ‘labour’ itself.  This understanding of ‘labour itself’ is 
distinct from concepts of production, productivity and profit as understood in 
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economic terms.  Gulli argues that to be human is to labour.  As social 
beings, we have always communicated, organised, and transformed things.  
He says: “world is nothing but the making and the having been made of 
labor” (2005: 6).  Labour makes a social world: “as labor enters into the 
constitution of a social praxis, that is, the work of ideas, the constitution of 
communities, the structures of governance, the shaping of individuality […] it 
also makes what is properly called a world” (ibid: 9).  Thus Gulli contends 
that ‘labour’ is to social and political ontology what ‘being’ is to pure 
ontology.  He explains this with reference to Polanyi, who said “[l]abour is 
only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself” (Polanyi, 
cited in Gulli, 2005: 3).  Making ourselves as beings through labour, we 
enact society. This ontological concept of labour ‘sits above’ both economy 
and culture.  “Labor is being as sensuous human activity” (ibid: 147).  The 
concept of ‘sensuous’, Gulli says, takes us to aesthetics as a metaphysical 
concept relevant to both artistic production and (non-artistic) production.  
Looking at artistic production, Gulli refers us to Heidegger’s work on 
Nietzsche in which the artist brings forth into Being (ibid: 149) (which I 
referred to in Chapter Four).  He cites Heidegger as saying “[to] be an artist 
is to be able to bring something forth.  But to bring something forth means to 
establish in Being something that does not exist” (Heidegger cited in Gulli, 
2005: 149) [my emphasis].   Here, Gulli suggests that Heidegger misses 
Nietzsche’s “emphasis on the sensuous and on this world”, instead 
introducing the “supersensuous” and “metaphysical split that Nietzsche 
explicitly rejects” (ibid: 149).  By rejecting a metaphysical ontology of an 
‘apparent world’, Gulli suggests that we are left with the sensuous as “the 
world we are” (ibid: 149).  Gulli insists that the emphasis on ‘this world’ is 
important to heal the split between our concept of ‘world’ and the world-we-
are.    
Methexis heals this split.  Gadamer explains the meanings of methexis in the 
context of Plato’s use of it in place of mimesis.  He tells us that mimesis is 
‘re-presentation’ or ‘approximation’ of the thing itself; whereas ‘methexis’ 
(participation) incorporates the “idea of the whole and the parts” and 
“Participation […] completes itself […] only in genuine being-together and 
belonging-together” (2007: 310–311).  There is a participation of form and 
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substance (or idea and material) rather than one ‘representing’ the other.  
Our sense-making of world (idea) inter-twines with the world that we are 
(material); they belong together as “a concurrent actual production” (Carter, 
cited in Bolt, 2000: 205).  Performance theorist Laura Cull (writing in the 
context of participatory performance) uses the Deleuzian concept of 
immanence to describe attentive participation in this world as distinct from a 
transcendent escape to another world.  For Deleuze, Cull says, “immanence 
means there is only one kind of thing or being in reality” rather than a 
separation between the ‘real’ and its ‘representation’, and this one ‘thing’ is a 
‘process’ (2015: 7).  The whole “expresses itself in the parts” or bodies and 
this expression is ontological participation (ibid: 168) – or methexis.  This will 
be discussed further later in this chapter.    
The world that I make as an artist is not another world; not a subjective or 
psychological inner world.  The world in the painting as it is perceived is the 
world that we are.  Gulli’s concept of ‘creative labour’ is relevant to 
understanding the work of both artist and audience, as I will now explain.  
Gulli bases his philosophy on Vico’s practical metaphysics “of the human 
being as a being in the world with the material and spiritual needs of dwelling 
in it and making sense of it” (2005: 13), which Vico based on the ‘first truth’ 
that “verum (the true) and factum (what is made) are the same” (ibid: 14).  
For example, Gulli explains that in Vico’s metaphysics, ‘thinking’ is a 
practical activity in which we gather up what is already there and, in that 
process, we make something new:  “We make the truth and add to it” (ibid: 
14).   Being comes about through making; they exist in each other.  He says 
“what labor does is constitute a praxis that makes a world.  The power of 
praxis, that is, labor, is at one and the same time the power of poiesis […] 
making and judging as true” (ibid: 7).  Gulli argues that if you cannot 
separate production (making) from action (doing), then production (‘what is 
made’) cannot stand on its own – it contains ‘action’ within it, such that it 
becomes ontology (ibid: 153).  In terms of ‘artistic’ production, the thing that 
is made (such as a painting) contains labour (action) within it, and the labour 
that made the painting exists only through that act of ‘making’ or 
‘transforming’ that made the painting.  ‘Painting’ is an act, both being and 
becoming, and the ‘artefact’ contains the action within it in the marks of its 
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making.  Gulli, however, removes distinctions such as art or craft, seeking to 
connect action and production as ‘creative labour’ (which collapses together 
‘labour’ as action (praxis) and ‘creative’ as transformation (poeisis)).  
‘Production’ is not either economic or artistic, but can include any ‘world-
making’ transformation through action; action that makes something that 
contains the action within it (transformed material).  This can also be 
understood in terms of social production, in which labour is a ‘doing’ that at 
the same time makes a world, and that world that is made contains the 
‘doing’ within it.  This is relevant to thinking about the work of the audience, 
as their making sense of the artefacts is also a making of a world, as I will 
now explain. 
The previous chapter outlined Heidegger’s (1971) suggestion that the work 
of art ‘holds open’ a space in which being of things can be revealed; ‘coming 
to presence’ as a happening.  Heidegger also tells us that techné (which is 
present in both craft and art) denotes “a mode of knowing”, and was 
understood by the Greeks as “a bringing forth of beings” rather than an 
action of making (ibid: 57).  As I argued in the previous chapter, techné 
includes the work of mediation; creating the conditions of encounter with the 
work in which ‘being of things’ can be revealed.  This is important because 
the ‘creative labour’ of the audience (their labour of ‘doing’ that ‘makes’ 
something) constitutes society.  And this leaves a trace, as “being constantly 
changes, and the changes brought about into it by thinking are traces of 
permanence” (Gulli, 2005: 172).  Creative labour is ‘social’ labour.  
Referencing Adorno, Gulli tells us that society is immanent in artworks – not 
just a reflection of society, but constituting it.  I propose that this immanence 
of society in the work extends to viewing practices (what we make of the 
work, rather than something the artist ‘puts into’ the work).  I make paintings 
with figures of children and these often look ambiguous and unsettling.  My 
paintings have been interpreted as ‘expressing’ troubles from my childhood, 
assuming individual artistic intentionality ‘reflected’ onto the painting.  
However, from a perspective of creative labour as social labour, I argue that 
these interpretations enact a wider social anxiety around children which is 
mediated by the painting. Society is constituted by the dialogue with the 
paintings.  This immanence of society in art, Gulli suggests, points to what-
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could-be.  Art’s autonomy, rather than being limited to a resistive, critiquing 
of society, can make it.  It can have “the affirmative power to ground and 
sustain a radically different concept of the social”, which he admits may 
remain at the level of potentiality: “not merely a question of reproduction, but 
rather one of original production” of society (2005: 188) – methexis rather 
than just mimesis.  This is why it is important to pay attention to how we 
‘view’ paintings; how we ‘use’ them.  I’m proposing that painting as inquiry 
can be understood as an ‘extended’ dialogic practice which encompasses 
the form-shaping of the event (mediation as techné).  If this is so, then what 
are the means by which I mediate such an event, and what does this do?  
How can I create the experience that Gulli points towards, of ‘making the 
social’?  The next section considers these questions through reflection on 
the third event.  
5.2 Section Two: Creating an experience of distributed 
artistic subjectivity 
I will first describe my form-shaping of The Garden of Earthly Delights and 
the influences on my event design decisions.  I will then consider what the 
event did through a selective analysis.  First, let me briefly introduce the 
format of the event.  On arrival, participants were greeted with a spoken 
introduction before they entered the space.  In the space itself, there were 
four ‘workstations’ arranged on the floor, with artefacts, sketchbooks, paper 
cut out figures, mark making materials, and stick-glue.  Each sketchbook 
belonged with a particular piece of artwork.  After 50 minutes, participants 
were invited to join a discussion, and to bring an object that had particular 
resonance or meaning for them.  The event is documented here:  The 
Garden of Earthly Delights.  You might find it helpful to watch this video 
before reading on.     
5.2.1 Meaningful space 
I aimed to create a ‘meaningful’ space in which the audience could develop 
a dialogic relationship with the artefacts and each other.  In this ‘dialectical 
practice’ “meanings are ‘made’ from the transactions and narratives that 
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emerge and these have the power and agency to change on an individual or 
community level” (Sullivan, 2009: 50).  The aesthetic experience is 
relational, moving artworks from a conception of ‘display’ to “a period of time 
that has to be experienced, or the opening of a dialogue […]” (Bourriaud, 
2006: 160).  Relational aesthetics as “a state of encounter” (ibid: 160) has 
three themes: (i) being-together; (ii) the ‘encounter’ between viewer and 
painting; (iii) the collective elaboration of meaning (ibid: 161).  I used these 
three themes as a loose framework to guide my mediation design, as 
follows.  
5.2.1.1 Being-together  
I learned from event two that a fixed duration (rather than ‘drop-in’) could 
facilitate a shared experience of being-together.  The collective task in the 
third event to contribute to sketchbooks located with each artefact (rather 
than with individuals) invited participants to be affected by, and add to, each 
other’s responses, creating a sense of working together.  I also considered 
the audience’s being-together with the artist.  Would I be present in the 
space?  Would I participate with them, or just be present at the introduction 
and discussion?  Would feeling ‘watched’ affect their experience?  I chose to 
return to my role as ‘maker’, cutting out figures as I did in the first event. I 
increasingly recognised the meaningfulness of this repeated gesture, and 
gave it prominence by performing it live.  The cut-out figures draw attention 
to processes of reproduction: ecological, artistic, and commercial.   
[…] that fact that you've spent hours cutting them out, all that meaning 
behind it, and the making, the repetition, they've all got a little aura 
because I know you've done a lot of that.67  
Providing scissors and glue afforded opportunities for participants to join me 
in that meaningful action. 
                                            
67 Audience discussion 18/05/17 
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Figure 5.3 Still from The Garden of Earthly Delights 
   
5.2.1.2 The ‘encounter’ between viewer and painting  
Gulli suggests that our dialogue with paintings involves a labour of ‘thinking’ 
that constitutes a world of everyday life (2005: 171), a “questioning” which is 
“not putting questions, but listening to the question that comes by itself and 
speaking back to it in essential conversation” (ibid: 172).  This is the 
conversation that I aimed to facilitate – not interpretation, but rather ‘coming 
to apprehension’ or ‘gaining value’ in dialogue with the work.  The spoken 
introduction to the participants was one mechanism by which this 
relationship was set up: “I’m inviting you to make sense of the artworks for 
yourself, to make them meaningful by having a conversation with them”.  
My aim was to engage the audiences’ imagination through opportunities for 
mark-making and ‘handling’.  The paper cut-outs created opportunities for 
imaginative engagement: noticing air movements, placing them in 
arrangements, and sticking them in the books.  My invitation to “have a 
conversation with each other” was taken up, and shared stories, drawing, 
and other play in the sketchbooks suggest imagination was enacted through 
the materials.  The wording of reflection prompts was carefully considered to 
focus on content rather than process: ‘What do you make of it?’     
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5.2.1.3 The collective elaboration of meaning 
I invited shared artistic subjectivity by opening out the elaboration of 
meaning through sketchbooks and discussion, staging the ‘exhibition’ as 
collective inquiry.  This was made explicit in the introductions to the event 
and the discussion, as I explain below.  This brings me to the question 
raised in Chapter Four: iii) What is the place of the artist’s voice in a shared 
ecological artistic subjectivity?  I experience a tension between providing 
supporting information and leaving space for audience meaning-making.  
However, I learned with Ruffles that I wanted people to know its source.  I 
also learned from the second event that I didn’t want process to distract from 
content.  I want the audience to focus on the work of making sense of 
anthropogenic climate change.  Given the ethical provocation in my work, 
there are times when I need to ‘impose’ meaning, thus I don’t entirely 
delegate meaning to the audience.  Mediation includes judging where 
‘content’ needs to be explicit, and contriving subtle ways of providing enough 
information for the audience to co-create an emergent set of meanings in the 
context of the overall inquiry frame.  This frame has to be voiced by the 
artist.  I did this in the introduction to the third event: “The artworks are part 
of my ongoing project of making sense of climate change, and particularly of 
being responsible for it.   I realised that I can’t do this on my own.  Climate 
change is something we all experience and we all affect.  So I saw this as an 
inquiry that needed to be shared.” 
Implicit in this introduction is an analogy between the aim for collective 
meaning-making in my work, and the need for collective meaning-making in 
respect of the content of the work – a collective responsibility in relation to 
climate change.  Within this frame, I sought to avoid a traditional artistic 
subjectivity in which it is assumed that ‘I’ hold authorial authority.  In the 
discussion set-up I reiterated that we have a collective responsibility for the 
elaboration of meanings, that these may be emergent and tentative, and that 
all contributions are valid.  I invited participants to choose an object, asking: 
“What drew you to that object?”  Following this, I asked: “Do you have any 
responses for each other?” which aimed for collective elaboration of the 
emerging themes.  “Are there any final reflections on any of the themes that 
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have come out of this discussion in relation to our query about climate 
change?” aimed to bring the discussion back from ‘process’ to which it had 
wandered – although this didn’t dominate.  No-one asked me what I ‘meant’ 
or ‘intended’; this group seemed comfortable with an open space of shared 
meaning-making (another audience may not have been). 
But does ‘participation’ automatically assume that meaning is democratised?  
5.2.2 Participation 
Cull (2015) notes that ‘participation’ has come to be seen automatically as 
‘democratic’ – with the ‘participant’ more involved in authorship of ‘art’.  
Rather than uncritically making such assumptions, Cull suggests that we 
need to examine the extent to which participatory practices provide 
opportunities to experience immanence (introduced earlier).  Cull considers 
the example of the artist Allan Kaprow’s participatory Activities.  She 
describes these as “attention training” (2015: 150), using Bergson’s theory of 
‘attention’ which suggests that whatever you pay attention to changes, and 
also changes the perceiver.  Cull suggests that Kaprow’s Activities 
developed a concept of “attention as a particular mode of observation in 
which ontological participation – or being part of the whole – might occur” 
(ibid: 155).  Kaprow was concerned with breaking habitual ways of attending 
to performances, thinking in the task differently, and really paying attention 
to it (ibid: 160–161).  The Activities devised ways of making an everyday 
action (such as sweeping) strange, employing distancing mechanisms that 
make the participant aware of the activity.  “Meaning is experienced in the 
body, and the mind is set into play by the body’s sensations” (Kaprow, 
1986).  Activities involved participants in paying attention to embodied 
experience as ‘immanent’ in a world that is process (Cull, 2015: 171).   
But what if they don’t want to participate?   
5.2.3 Enforced participation? 
One concern with ‘participatory’ practices is whether audiences feel ‘forced’ 
to participate.  Performance theorist Adam Alston, writing about ‘immersive’ 
theatre in which the participatory is “the site of aesthetic appreciation” (2013: 
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130) has argued that such experiences demand ‘entrepreneurial’ 
participants, valorising neoliberal values such as individual risk-taking.  
‘Risks’ can include not knowing what to do or what is expected, or feeling 
silly (ibid: 135).  Alston suggests that a shared sense of vulnerability might 
also be productive, by fostering a ‘mutual accountability’, and that “the risk of 
participating […], arising from an awareness of agency, may well promote a 
desire for mutual responsibility premised on an uncomfortable recognition of 
accountability for one’s actions” (ibid: 136).   
Returning to my event, the initial briefing and reflection prompts were 
designed to address these concerns, to be clear about what I was inviting 
the audience to do.  The briefing was clear that the audience could simply 
watch and listen if they chose.  Cull points out that ‘observation’ is also 
participation; itself a kind of action (2015: 145).  A potential ‘risk’ was the 
shared sketchbooks – contributions could be seen by others which might be 
inhibiting compared with having personal books.  There might also have 
been a reticence to participate in the discussion, a fear of ‘getting it wrong’.  I 
aimed to mitigate against this by saying there are “no right or wrong 
answers, any contribution is valid”.  However, as one participant pointed out, 
given the context of the inquiry, it would be hard not to participate:  
Because to not act here would be a big act […] there were pools of 
darkness from which to retreat, and you were very careful in the pre-
material that we received that action wasn't required, […] but to opt 
out is a massive, massive statement, it’s actually possibly easier to 
opt in […] inaction was a massive action68   
This suggests that that they did feel ‘forced’ to participate through a sense of 
‘mutual responsibility’ (Alston, 2013).  Inaction would be conspicuous, a 
‘risk’. 
This critical examination of ‘participation’ raised questions for my event 
design, as I will now elaborate. 
  
                                            
68 Audience discussion 18/05/17 
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5.2.4 Design questions 
The first event led me to realise opportunities for audience participation.  The 
second event was concerned with raising the audience’s awareness of their 
participation in the ‘work’ of art.  For this third event, I focused more critically 
on what this ‘participation’ meant.  Cull’s challenge to increase opportunities 
to experience immanence led me to consider how I could create a “‘sense of 
the whole’ through practices involving the undoing of habit, the 
defamiliarization of routine and the training of attention” (Cull, 2015: 177).   
How might embodied attention and ontological participation be encouraged, 
given that I am working within the lineage of the ‘painting exhibition’?  Can 
‘painting’ as an event perform immanence?  To help me consider this, I 
looked to immersive scenographic performance research because of its 
concern with audience experience.  I do not claim to create ‘immersive 
performances’; rather I am ‘borrowing’ from this particular performance 
genre to think differently about painting.  The artist-researcher David 
Shearing (2014)  creates immersive environmental performances designed 
for audiences to explore and interact with.  He seeks to understand the 
design relationship between spectator, space and other elements through a 
concept of landscape that is action-centred rather than scopic; something 
that is done by bodies as they move through their environment (2014: 41).  
He devises ways to encourage body motility to “forge a deeper, more 
intelligent perception” (ibid: 49), inviting agency and choice.  This led me to 
consider how understanding my event as a landscape that is ‘done’ by 
bodies could influence my design.  How could I encourage bodily motility 
and choice as to how participants navigate the space? 
Reflecting on this question informed my design thinking.  Presenting 
paintings on the floor (rather than at eye-height) provided an estrangement 
which also encouraged body motility69.  The participant was invited down to 
the level of the child in the paintings.  Sitting on the floor afforded the 
opportunity to dwell with the work, inviting an intimate encounter.  Another 
estrangement involved turning the backs of the paintings to the entrance.  To 
                                            
69 Chairs were available to cater for participants who may not be mobile enough to crouch or sit on 
the floor.   
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see the work, participants had to walk around it.  Instead of the exhibition 
being ‘laid out’ to be ‘spectated’, these small estrangements aimed to 
encourage attention ‘training’, breaking the ‘habit’ of scanning the exhibition.  
The workspaces had to be ‘inhabited’.  Embodied participation was 
encouraged.  The perspective of immanence, Cull says, “suggests that 
participants are produced by processes of participation” (2015: 147).  This 
layout ‘produced’ a more mobile participant, one whose perception is shaped 
by increased somatic experience such that meaning can be experienced ‘in 
the body’.   
The inquiry framing, the sharing mechanisms, and the estrangements aimed 
to increase opportunities to experience immanence or ‘being part’ of the 
whole, an ongoing process of sense-making which mirrors the change we 
need to see in the world in respect of climate change. 
As one participant described the experience: 
I really like […] the invitation to perform […] yes, it's led by visual art, 
which we are I guess acculturated to adopt a certain relationship to 
which is spectatorial and not necessarily engaged and dialogic, but 
[…] you're encouraging us to do that, and in a sense it then becomes 
our responsibility to do that […] I did feel implicated here, and I did 
feel I was helping to perform it 70 
5.2.5 What did this do? What did participants make of it? 
The third event directly addressed the first part of the primary research 
question through practice: How does painting evolve a practice in line with 
new norms around ‘spectatorship’71?  The rest of this chapter reflects on 
practice to address the second part: how can we understand this labour?  It 
does this through a selective analysis which refers to instances from the 
event (hyperlinked in the text), using the model of artistic labour as a guiding 
framework.  I have focused on the overlaps (Figure 5.1) as I move towards a 
                                            
70 Audience discussion 18/05/17 
71 These ‘new norms’ were explained in Chapter One. 
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holistic understanding of ecological cognition that sits in the centre of the 
model.  It becomes harder to categorise as I shift focus between the lenses.  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Journal page 
 
After the event, I kept a journal of reflections whilst documenting it.  I audio-
typed the discussion.  Two participants emailed me with their reflections.  I 
worked through the audience sketchbooks, writing and drawing my own 
responses to them.  I watched videos of the event, grabbed stills that 
interested me, and wrote observations.  Finally, I drew upon the digitized 
material in a process of digital reflection through video editing, intuitively 
working with images, juxtaposing them with sketchbook pages and sounds, 
noticing what drew me.  After a period of elapsed time, I watched this video 
and wrote a prose-poetry journal account of it.  I then interrogated that 
document to focus on what I noticed through the juxtapositions.  My intention 
was to reflect on the material in a practice-led way, rather than purely relying 
on linguistic sources.  The resulting video was the migration of gesture …. I 
have used this video as both a source and a guiding mechanism for the 
- 135 - 
following selective analysis of the event, and I’d encourage you to watch this 
before reading on.   
 
The following analysis suggests a cross-section of insights which exemplify 
the research.  There may be many other insights and perspectives which I 
don’t have room for.  In this analysis, I employ ‘gesture’ as a meaning-
making device.  So far, I have considered the role of the artist’s gesture in 
‘making-as-thinking’.  I will now consider ‘gesture’ in relation to the audience.   
The book Migrations of Gesture demonstrates ways in which gesture can be 
used as a hermeneutic tool (Noland & Ness, 2008).  Noland (2008) 
describes how gesture, from latin gerere “to carry, act, or do”, can be 
understood as both body ‘expression’ which is ‘indexical’ of the human 
subject (for Merleau-Ponty, gesture is a way of knowing generated by 
movement) and cultural signification of meaning.  Noland cites Thomas 
Csordas, whose cultural phenomenology I described in Chapter One, who 
says we need to appreciate both embodiment as being-in-the-world and 
“textuality and representation” (2008: xv).  Thus gesture is a tool consistent 
with ecological cognition; thinking that is done as a ‘body’ moves through its 
‘environment’, at the same time informed and shaped by the ‘social’ and 
cultural.  This brings together the different understandings of ‘gesture’ that 
have developed through the previous chapters.   Migration of gesture is 
understood as geographic movement, but also as moving from one support 
to another; for example, the painterly gesture moves from hand to canvas 
support (ibid.).  Thus it recognises interactions of the ‘body’ and ‘material’, as 
well as interactions between bodies (‘social’).     
I will now turn to the migration of gesture video which forms the guiding 
narrative for the analysis.  The indented boxes indicate extracts from my 
journal account of this video, acting as ‘snapshots’ to indicate which part of 
the video is being referred to.  These extracts lead the analysis, providing 
cues for the theoretical discussions which follow them.   
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5.2.5.1 Kinesthesis 
Starting from the level of the floor, our focus moves towards the artist.  
Gentle sound of water lapping.  A girl is lying on her stomach [...]72   
Participants noticed the ‘material’ sensation of the floor, the difference with 
and without a cushion, taking shoes off to get closer to it.   
I was aware of the cool floor […] on my knees, elbows, forearms and 
tops of my feet as I crouched in a prayer position/child's pose […] This 
helped me connect with the freshness of the sea sounds73 
Contact with the floor encouraged embodied attention.  Body responses to 
the floor are dictated by individual flexibility, which affects posture, 
perspective, and perception through kinesthesis.  We perceive information 
through awareness of movement through our environment, an awareness 
generated by the body’s vestibular, muscular and visual systems, which 
“cuts across the functional perceptual systems” (Gibson, cited in McKinney, 
2012: 4).  Gesture, understood in this way, is a dimension of thinking and not 
just an expression of an inner thought (as discussed in Chapter Two).  
Crouching in child pose generates body knowledge of itself through the 
perceptual systems, whilst also signifying meaning (albeit unconsciously) – 
thus I interpret such actions as ‘gesture’.   The movements required to lower 
the body to the floor “offer opportunities for kinesthetic experience” (Noland, 
2008: ix) – through nerve stimulation, body knowledge of itself emerges 
through the movement of the gesture (ibid.).  The invitation to the floor 
increased somatic experience, encouraging body motility and movement as 
‘body’ interacts with the ‘material’ of the ‘environment’.  It would also appear 
to interact with other bodies, as follows.   
5.2.5.2 Mimesis of gesture 
people sitting on the floor, their postures are identical, symmetrical, 
mirror images.74   
                                            
72 Journal 15/06/17 
73 Participant email 19/05/17 
- 137 - 
As I watched footage of the event, I started to notice multiple occurrences of 
bodies ‘mirroring’ each other.  There was an apparent mimesis of gesture.   
 
Figure 5.5 Still from The Garden of Earthly Delights 
 
Earlier, I referred to a distinction between mimesis and methexis.  The Greek 
mimēsis, ‘to imitate’ is used as a theoretical principle in art, meaning “re-
presentation” rather than “copying” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017).  Plato 
used the term mimesis to distinguish the ontological difference between the 
‘copy’ and the ‘original’ (Gadamer, 2007).  The ‘mirroring’ could be 
understood as ‘re-presentation’ of one body by another.  However, this 
would imply that one participant was an ‘original’ being re-presented by 
another.  Plato’s use of methexis, on the other hand, “implies that one thing 
is there together with something else” (Gadamer, 2007: 311) and suggests a 
“relationship of participation” (ibid.).  ‘Mirroring’ of gesture might be better 
understood as methexis, a physical manifestation of being-together; a 
‘relationship of participation’.  It may also have been indicative of ‘habitus’ 
(Bourdieu, 1977), a process of socially negotiated ‘staging’ of the body, as 
follows.   
  
                                                                                                                           
74 Journal 15/06/17 
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5.2.5.3 Gesture as socially negotiated 
Gestures refer partly to the self-expression of a singular body with particular 
physical capabilities, but also take meaning from their performance in 
specific cultural and historical locations – a “staging of the body through 
structures of signification that are not necessarily the body’s own” (Noland, 
2008: xv).  In Chapter Four, I explained how habitus is partly composed of 
learned, repeated and embodied gestures.  The options available to each 
participant given the invitation to work on the floor may have been drawn 
from a tacit understanding of what is culturally appropriate – ways to sit, 
kneel, crouch, or lie down.  These are learned responses particular to a 
Western European culture; a ‘habitus’75 formed through repeated situated 
body actions.  These postures may have different meanings in different 
cultures.  From the instances of ‘mirroring’, it seems that gestures 
consciously or unconsciously migrated from body to body, and may have 
been collectively negotiated.   Responses to the floor may feel ‘natural’, but 
might be partly copied, partly learned ‘habit’, and partly dictated by 
musculature and flexibility.  The bodily responses to the floor would also be 
dictated by context – this was a performance space, yet an intimate space.  
‘Body’ responses are informed by ‘habitus’ and ‘space’.  Bodies also ‘read’ 
and respond to other bodies – and in this analysis, they have been ‘read’ 
and ‘inscribed’ through the medium of video.   
  
                                            
75 Embodied production of social structures, as explained in Chapter Four. 
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5.2.5.4 ‘Inscribed’ gesture  
 
Figure 5.6 Still from event, showing ‘mirroring’ juxtaposed with 
audience sketchbook page 
The sketch of coloured lines seems almost like a choreographic score, 
an annotation of the postures of the bodies on the floor.76     
‘Choreographic score’ in the above journal extract leads me to the idea that 
these gestures are inscribed via the medium of film editing.  In Migrations of 
Gesture, Lippit’s essay looks at how bodies inscribe gesture onto film, which 
becomes a medium for editing (Noland, 2008: xx).  Editing gesture can 
change its meaning.   By editing the digital reflection video I am constructing 
meaning – I see the material in a certain way, and represent it out of its 
original context, frozen in time.  I notice ‘mirroring’ because I first ‘inscribed’ 
those gestures through the medium of the video still.  I reached-out-towards 
something that drew my attention and my hand clicked ‘pause’ as my body 
recognised the symmetry.  Someone else might not have noticed.  I 
choreographed the material.  Schneider notes that the word ‘choreography’ 
is used in new materialist discourse (its relationship to dance often 
unremarked) pointing towards embodied sense-making (2015: 8).  My video 
editing ‘choreography’ makes meaning from the ‘social’ relationships of 
                                            
76 Journal 15/06/17 
- 140 - 
‘bodies’77.  It also makes meaning from bodies’ relationships with things 
which shape the body’s gestures.  The next section explores the 
participants’ relationships with objects, weaving together the ‘body’ and 
‘material’ through ‘handling’ – whilst still intersecting with the ‘social’.  
5.2.5.5 Affordances – intentionality and improvisation 
two figures, reaching across the floor, a sense of movement towards 
(in the sense of affordances perhaps).78   
The body has to curve inwards to move towards the affordances of objects.  
(In Chapter Two I introduced Gibson’s concept that consciousness is the 
intentional movement towards affordances.)   One participant tentatively 
feels the scissors.  Her hand ‘knows’ them.  But this is a learned knowledge 
– so can we understand it in terms of ‘affordance’?     
 
Figure 5.7 Still from The Garden of Earthly Delights 
 
The psychologist Harry Heft (1989) suggests that we can.  The range of 
affordances that can be perceived are relative to the physical characteristics 
of the perceiving body.  For example, an object that can be held within a 
handspan affords ‘grasping’.  Following Merleau Ponty, Heft suggests that 
                                            
77 This is not to invalidate the insights gained.  Taking a practice-led cultural phenomenological 
approach, this deliberately subjective method values the subjectivity of my embodied, cultural 
experience, in that I was also part of the event and one of the bodies present. 
78 Journal 15/06/17 
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the body also comprises an ‘intentional repertoire’ of goal-directed actions – 
a range of possibilities “instantiated in a particular form in interaction with 
situational factors” (1989: 11).  He proposes that affordances can be 
perceived “in relation to the body as it participates in a particular goal-
directed act” (ibid: 13), enabling us to extend the concept of affordances to 
include socio-cultural meanings of objects.  The scissors afford the 
opportunity for cutting because the participant knows how to use them.  This 
‘knowing how’ is situated knowledge, developed over time in relation with 
object, body and a history of intentional action (ibid: 13).   
For a long time, the above participant sat watching.  Then she reached out 
and touched the scissors, turned them around, and with a decisive motion 
picked them up, selected a picture, and started cutting.  Her ‘intentional 
repertoire’ includes ‘knowing how’ to use scissors, and the scale of the tool 
is suited to her particular handspan.  Heft’s intentional analysis suggests that 
“the perceived affordant meaning of an object resides neither in the object 
[…] nor in the mind […] but […] emerges from their relationship” (ibid: 14).  
‘Meaning’ is situated in an intentional act in which the perceiver brings into 
being some of the potential meanings of objects available to them (ibid: 15).  
This participant brought into being the meaning of cutting through the act of 
doing it. 
Affordances can also be discovered.  One participant picked up pieces of 
paper left from my cutting-out of figures, and started to play.  
 
Figure 5.8 Audience stencil works 
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I was interested in the space created by the removal of the figures, 
and used those as stencils […] colouring in the gap […] before 
removing the stencil to reveal a new figure – or is it a ground?  […] I 
felt connected and grounded as I used your pile to create something 
[…] 79 
The cut-away negative shapes, once grasped, afforded the opportunity for 
stencilling, which was partly from a learned action (‘stencilling’), but also 
involved repurposing, from ‘waste’ to creative opportunity.  Performance 
theorist Teemu Paavolainen (2010), writing in the context of cognitive 
studies in theatre and performance, employs the perspective of affordances 
to explore how ‘props’ afford theatrical action.  He proposes a nuanced 
typology of affordances as “intentional, immediate, and improvised” (2010: 
118).  ‘Intentional’ here is not a phenomenological intentionality (as in Heft’s 
analysis), but refers to the ‘proper’ use of objects; what they are designed for 
(such as cutting with scissors).  ‘Immediate’ refers to physical affordance 
irrespective of design or expectation (a letterbox affords the deposit of 
objects other than post). ‘Improvised’ affordances refer to widening the 
range of use beyond what is ‘proper’ (ibid: 122–123), for example through 
imaginative play.  The participant who made stencils grasped the cut-outs 
and played with them.  She widened her ‘intentional repertoire’ of goal-
directed actions through play, discovering an ‘improvisational’ affordance 
within the activity of repurposing waste cut-outs.  This was not designed or 
anticipated, but was a creative outcome which was unexpected.     
Her playfulness extended to wanting to mark the floor:-   
Touch was allowed but not marking.  Somehow we all knew this.  
Perhaps if there had been no note-book this would have been 
different, as the only other spaces to draw and stick would have been 
the floor (I was tempted, as you know! But my orange crayon didn't 
mark it so I didn't try!)80 
                                            
79 Participant email 19/05/17 
80 Participant email 19/05/17 
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Paavolainen says affordances do not cause action, so much as “make it 
possible within a very precise set of constraints” (ibid: 120).  Participants 
suggested there were tacit rules.  Despite the estranging mechanisms, rules 
of traditional artisanal practice were still in play.  The sketchbooks, 
presented horizontally, were the space for mark-making.  The paintings, 
presented vertically, were for ‘looking at’.  The ‘intentional repertoire’ (Heft, 
1989) was constrained by ‘tacit rules’ that were inherent within this situated 
interaction.  These ‘rules’ limit the interpretations that can be made, 
encouraging some and discouraging others.  For example, the types of 
materials provided encouraged a certain set of meanings.  Drawing in wax 
crayon afforded emotive responses in bold mark-making and colour, and 
seemed to evoke childhood comfort rituals.  Participants described retreating 
to the crayons, wanting to be that child that you know you’re not – being 
reduced to playing like children.  The stubby crayons were small relative to 
an adult handspan, requiring awkward ‘grasping’.  The gestures afforded by 
the crayons therefore differ from those afforded by painting materials.  This 
‘hierarchy’ of artistic materials was noted by the audience81.  The meaning of 
crayon-drawing is instantiated in the child-like grasping and gestural 
movements, within the situated context of the event.     
 
 
Figure 5.9 Audience sketchbook page 
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Paavolainen suggests that the ‘field of potential affordances’ enables or 
constrains “what the spectators can possibly make of it” (2010: 124).   
Interpretation is grounded in perception, and meaning is realised in action.  
For my event, actors were also spectators, both acting and meaning-making.  
Their ‘doing’ made something, collapsing together praxis and poiesis (Gulli, 
2005), as I will now illustrate. 
5.2.5.6 Migration of gesture 
Two artists, balletically leaning over in the same direction, focused on 
their work on the floor.  Their spatial arrangement echoed by the ‘S’ in 
the sketchbook, the seals in circular motion, ‘power of the artist, make 
them whirl around’.  The same two artists, symmetrical spiral of 
bodies in a circle of focus on making.  A circular process.  ‘It never 
stops’. 82 
‘Making’, a process, circular, and infectious.  One participant used the 
phrase the migration of gesture to refer to a sense of ‘infectiousness’: 
all I knew was that I really wanted, I think, to imitate what I saw in the 
video83 
The making gesture of the artist – a gesture of ‘thinking’ – migrated to 
audience-bodies.  This ‘infectiousness’ is a theme that follows from previous 
events.  From asking: What meanings does a viewer make from seeing the 
work made?84 I have learned from audience feedback from all three events 
that process is infectious.  Artistic labour wants to be shared.  But ‘making’ 
has consequences:     
                                            
82 Journal 15/06/17 
83 Audience discussion 18/05/17 
84 See Chapter Four. 
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Does art, in the sense of craft, involve the same kind of doing/making 
with the doings that brought about climate change?85  
The ‘felt’ and infectious sharing of artistic labour becomes analogous to a 
human compulsion to make.  The provision of sketchbooks, cut-outs, and 
mark-making materials afforded an opportunity for the audience to enact that 
compulsion, to participate in ‘making’.  The ‘form’ of the event created 
opportunities to find a way into the ‘content’ of the work.  Whilst the 
‘infectious’ artistic labour witnessed by the audience could not be exactly 
‘imitated’ using the materials provided, it could be ‘re-presented’.  And this 
shared activity of ‘making’ seemed to lead to an experience of coming 
together.   
I could feel us all becoming connected86  
Participants described a ‘conversation’ developing, a ‘creative generation’ 
and ‘momentum building’87.  The activity in the books stimulated participants 
to further creative contributions.  This infectiousness spread between 
participants.  Gestures – the artist’s and participants’ actions of ‘making’, and 
the corporeal responses to the floor – migrated between bodies and 
between supports (from hand to crayon to book). 
 
Although I can’t extrapolate beyond this event (another audience might have 
behaved differently), I suggest that the apparent mimesis of gesture may 
have enhanced a sense of social ‘being’.  The themes of infectiousness and 
migration of gesture, in which bodies move together in repeated processes 
of making and sense-making, suggest “a concurrent actual production” 
(Carter, cited in Bolt, 2000: 205) or methexis.  The actions of the audience 
brought into being the meaning of objects such as scissors, and gestures 
such as cutting.  Within this situated interaction, participants enacted a 
human compulsion to ‘make’.  A ‘participation’ of form and idea was realised 
through performing immanence – ‘being’ the social.  This ontological 
                                            
85 Participant email 13/06/17 
86 Participant email 19/05/17 
87 Audience discussion 18/05/17 
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participation, the whole expressing itself in the parts (Cull, 2015: 168), was 
an “original production” of society (Gulli, 2005: 188) – albeit in an academic 
context with arts practitioners.  There are implicit parallels between the 
content of my work, the explicit invitation for collective meaning-making, and 
the need for ecological awareness and collective responsibility (or ‘co-
responsibility’) in respect of climate change.  There are also 
complementarities between my growing awareness of ecological modes of 
cognition in arts practice, and the need for a more ecological way of ‘being’ 
in the world.  The art ‘work’ and the event of its encounter contains 
potentiality within it for this ‘world’ of ecological awareness to emerge.   
But do I ‘delegate’ meaning entirely to the encounter?  Is meaning-making 
totally democratic, or do ‘I’ still hold some responsibility for artistic 
intentionality?  This leads me to the question: iii) What is the place of the 
artist’s voice in a shared ecological artistic subjectivity?     
5.2.6 The artist’s voice 
In Chapter Four, I considered whether I withheld the Ruffles information for 
fear of ‘upsetting’ which might be a learned (gendered and enculturated) 
‘silencing’ of ‘symbolic violence’.  This question of ‘voice’ and silencing 
emerged again in the final stages of the third event discussion.  There were 
some valid concerns about what would change as a result of a seminar room 
discussion, and whether the work should be taken ‘out of Uni’.  Whilst this 
discussion was constructively suggesting that ‘art as activism’ might need to 
move ‘outside’, the dynamic that was immanent in the room was a present-
moment lived-performance of a familiar pattern of responses to climate 
change.  What will change? What can we do? Take it to another community 
to make them change.  Some contributions seemed to recognise this 
immanence of the ‘social’ in the room: 
what you were saying about process was very interesting, which is 
kind of continuing, isn't it, we're kind of all actors in this process, and 
we make the decisions to change things, or not88 
                                            
88 Audience discussion 18/05/17 
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and 
what was happening here was people starting to acknowledge each 
other in that space, and that I guess is what we've got to do with 
climate change is to acknowledge each other89 
One place for the artist’s voice might have been framing the ‘social’ that was 
being made in the room, voicing these patterns.  The artistic labour of 
mediation may need to include the skill to be fleet-of-foot enough to notice 
these ‘happenings’.  In Chapter Four, I discussed how sociality (my 
relationship with ‘society’) is embedded in my tendencies to act (or not).  
This requires sustained attention and building awareness over time to a) 
notice what is happening; b) notice any reluctance to ‘voice’ the ‘happening’; 
and c) develop skills and strategies to frame the ‘happening’ carefully but 
clearly.  The aim of doing so would be to facilitate immanence as attentive 
participation in this world, one reality as an ongoing and present-moment 
process – adopting Bergson’s theory that what you pay attention to changes, 
and changes the perceiver (Cull, 2015: 150).  My work raises the question of 
living an ethical life – the nature of our being in the world.  It is important that 
I do not allow the ‘artist’s voice’ to be silenced, but instead, speak out and 
issue that ethical provocation.  And then trust the participants to work with it. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the implications of ‘distributed’ artistic 
subjectivity with a focus on the audience, addressing the primary research 
question: How does painting evolve a practice in line with new norms around 
‘spectatorship’, and how can we understand this labour?  It also considered 
the sub-question: iii) What is the place of the artist’s voice in a shared 
ecological artistic subjectivity?  It described how I have developed an 
ecological sensibility through repeated focus on the lenses of the model 
(Figure 5.1), evolving a practice of ‘painting’ (which includes curating and 
mediating encounters) that has self-consciously promoted an experience of 
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distributed artistic subjectivity for artist and audience.  The first section 
reviewed how insights from my research have shaped studio practice 
together with my sharing of that practice.  Using ecological cognition (Ingold, 
2011; Gibson, 1986) as a framework, it explained how artistic intentionality 
can be understood in a phenomenological sense of reaching-out-towards.  
This involves paying attention, becoming aware of ‘body’, ‘materials’ and 
‘environment’ as co-active agents.  Addressing the question from practice 
phase two: How might the work enhance a sense of collective imaginative 
engagement?  it showed how in editing video, I ‘felt’ for meaningful actions 
with poietic potential, sharing my imaginative process to engage the 
audiences’ imagination.  Recorded and edited moments of intention 
(reaching-out-towards) and attention (noticing what is going on) leave marks 
on the artefact that record an awareness of being, creating paths for an 
audience to explore.  The way I make work becomes a way for an audience 
to encounter the work.  Reviewing Gulli’s concept of creative labour (2005), 
it proposed that this shared art of inquiry can be ontological as well as 
epistemological.   The ‘work’ of art includes paying attention to how we 
‘encounter’ paintings.  The artist’s voice, present in the form-shaping of the 
artefacts, is also present in the skills of mediating encounters with them.         
Putting this into practice, it described how the third event was designed to 
create a ‘meaningful’ space in which the audience could develop a dialogic 
relationship with the artefacts and each other.  The event design aimed to 
increase opportunities to experience immanence, and to encourage bodily 
motility and hence body knowledge through kinesthesis.  Reflection on this 
event suggested the following insights: 
i) The inquiry frame was voiced as an invitation to participate in making 
the artwork ‘work’ within the context of a shared inquiry about climate 
change.  This was experienced as ‘insistent’; it would have been hard 
not to act, suggesting a sense of ‘mutual responsibility’.   
ii) ‘Mirroring’ of bodies was observed (as ‘inscribed’ through the medium 
of the video still).  This insight was explored using the notion of 
‘migration of gesture’, referring to both apparent mimesis of gesture 
and infectiousness – ‘bodies’ moved together in repeated processes 
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of making which may have been a collectively negotiated ‘habitus’; ‘a 
concurrent actual production’ or methexical making of the ‘social’.   
iii) Audience meaning making was instantiated in gestural interactions 
with ‘materials’ and objects through ‘handling’.  Grasping affordances, 
participants brought into being the socio-cultural meaning of objects 
through ‘intentional’ and ‘improvisational’ action.   
iv) The invitation to work on the floor encouraged embodied attention, 
shaped by tacit understandings of culturally appropriate ways to 
sit/kneel/crouch, and by the nature of the space and environment. 
v) Tacit rules were inherent within this situated interaction, encouraging 
some meanings and discouraging others.  ‘Social’ rules were 
attached to ‘artefacts’: paintings were for looking at, sketchbooks 
were for altering.    
vi) This encounter of ‘mutual responsibility’ contained potentiality within it 
for ecological awareness to emerge through the parallels of form and 
content.   
vii) The artist’s voice could help to mediate awareness of this by framing 
the ‘social’ that is being made in the room. 
Understanding creative labour as social labour suggests that society is 
constituted by our dialogue with paintings which enacts wider social 
concerns.  A key insight arising from this practice-research is that artistic 
labour understood as ‘creative labour’ (Gulli, 2005) is a shared art of inquiry 
that reveals social ‘being’ and is therefore ontological and not just 
epistemological.     
 
So far my research has focused on one case study of my own practice.  But 
what are the methodological implications of the insights gained, and how 
might they inform current debates and research?  The next chapter will 
summarise the insights gained, and consider wider implications. 
  
- 150 - 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
The central aim of my research has been to understand the contemporary 
artistic labour of painting as inquiry in a ‘post-aesthetic’ view.  Through my 
research I have developed an extended practice of painting as a method of 
inquiring into cultural responses to climate change, addressing the wider 
need to consider our relationship with different kinds of knowledge, including 
practice-based forms (Wilson, 2010).  My research has explored decentred 
artistic subjectivity from within painting to evolve a practice in line with new 
norms around ‘spectatorship’ and participation, and sought to understand 
how we might understand this labour as a cognitive process.   It has done 
this through using a central framework of ‘ecological cognition’ to develop a 
theory and practice of painting as emergent knowledge that unfolds in 
relationships between bodies, materials, the ‘social’, and the environment.  
This offers an embodied, practice-led perspective to understanding cognitive 
processes of contemporary artistic labour, contributing to the need to 
understand creative work in the creative industries.  It offers a ‘social’ 
perspective to understanding the work of both artist and audience in 
practice-led research in painting.     
 
This final chapter returns to the research aims and questions and 
summarises the insights gained and their implications.  It considers 
methodological implications of my research for painting as inquiry, reflecting 
on what has been learned from the research methods used.  It suggests how 
the research insights might contribute to current debates in creative work 
and painting as research.  It considers limitations, and questions for future 
research.   
First, let me recapitulate the key insights.   
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6.1 Summary of insights 
Insights emerged from reflection through practice, and these were 
documented in the conclusions of Chapters Two, Four and Five and are 
embedded in the practice itself.  Appendix A shows some selected audience 
responses from The Garden of Earthly Delights that are suggestive of ways 
in which painting (as an extended practice that includes video and 
mediation) helped the audience to make sense of climate change 
responsibility.  What follows is a brief thematic summary of these responses.  
Participants shared personal stories and memories, making links with their 
own childhood.  They made metaphorical or symbolic connections from both 
the artefacts and the form of the event itself.  They referred to a sense of 
scale, of vulnerability and fragility, and to a sense of personification of 
people affected by climate change.  What I find most interesting in terms of 
my future practice is the responses that suggest a sense of parallels 
between the form and the content of the event.  This could be a focus for 
future research in terms of what this does, or could do. 
However, the core focus for this written thesis is to reflect on practice to 
understand the creative work of painting as inquiry.  What follows is a 
summary of the insights gained, showing how the research aims (in italics) 
and questions have been addressed. 
The primary aim was: To develop a situated case study of painting as inquiry 
which offers an account of decentred artistic subjectivity, agency and 
authorship, and contributes towards understanding the conditions of ‘post-
aesthetic’ creative labour.  My research has developed an understanding of 
the creative work of painting as ‘emergent knowledge’.  It proposed that 
‘making’ is a process of ‘thinking’ during which imagination (rhythmic, 
material, and social) is enacted through movement, gesture and handling.  In 
this enactment, materials and emerging artefacts form part of an extended 
cognitive apparatus, and ‘gesture’ is a dimension of thinking rather than an 
externalisation of thought.  It suggested that artistic intentionality can be 
understood in a phenomenological sense of reaching-out-towards, an 
intentional movement which is perception (rather than the traditional 
understanding of artistic intentionality, in which the artist has an idea which 
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they wish to communicate).  Recorded and edited moments of intention 
(reaching-out-towards) and attention (noticing what is going on) leave marks 
that record an ecological awareness of being, creating paths for an audience 
to explore.  ‘Painting’ is an act of perception, and the artefact contains that 
action within it in the marks of its making.   
My research considered: i) How do bodies and materials interact in creative 
practice?  It suggested that materials and artefacts contribute their own 
agency90, as the artist intervenes in ongoing processes which are corporeal, 
material, social and environmental.  Creative practice can be experienced as 
material imagination, in which ‘mind’ extends onto the canvas, inhabiting an 
emergent image whilst immersed in sensory experience.  It raised the 
question: ‘If ‘thinking’ happens in movement, does rhythm enhance this in 
some way?’ and suggested that finding a ‘flow’ state (rhythmic imagination) 
can invoke a state of liminality; a source of innovation, and a dissolving of 
boundaries between self and world.         
It considered: ii) How do social processes, cultural and environmental factors 
interact with human and material bodies in creative practice?  It showed how 
the emerging artefact facilitates the artist’s cognitive processes of sense-
making through an exegetical process of critical reflection on artefacts made 
through material handling, connecting the personal to the political.  This 
deepens the inquiry, carrying the body of work forward.  It described how 
sociality is in the studio by looking at the embodiment of social structures in 
the artefact and individual habitual practices.  It described how the memory 
of social judgments ‘regulates’ improvisations in the studio – a kind of social 
imagination.  Interactions with materials through improvisational play 
stimulate sensory memory which connects to cultural processes of learning.  
Navigating, learning and performing the role of artist involves developing 
through practice habitual ways of putting on a ‘good enough’ performance 
(habit(us)).  Repeated gestures of making become embodied and learned 
through practice rather than by copying.  This process can be informed by 
artworks as ‘public objects’ which are ‘credible stimulants’ – ‘credible’ 
because of their inclusion in a high profile arts space; ‘stimulants’ because 
                                            
90 In the sense of power emerging through action, rather than enacting an intention (Chapter Three). 
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they mediate the development of individual ‘habits of thought’.  My research 
proposed that the ‘social’ is therefore inscribed in the material in the 
processes of making, affecting and affected by the artist.  It developed an 
expanded theory of ‘material thinking’ that includes movement, gesture, and 
sociality.  Building on Bolt’s (2004) analysis of artistic process and 
authorship in painting based on Heidegger’s ‘co-responsibility’, it contributed 
a sociological perspective to develop ‘co-responsibility’ to encompass the 
audience as well as the artist in the process of inquiring and making 
meaning to make the art work. 
The third and final phase of practice exemplified how understanding artistic 
labour as ecological cognition has enabled me to develop an artistic practice 
in which artistic subjectivity can be experienced by artist and audience as 
distributed  amongst body, materials, the ‘social’, and the environment.  
Addressing the primary question: ‘How does painting evolve a practice in 
line with new norms around ‘spectatorship’, and how can we understand this 
labour?’ the final event was designed to create an experience of distributed 
artistic subjectivity.   By undertaking a selective analysis to understand what 
the event did, I observed ‘mirroring’ of bodies and ‘migration of gesture’ or 
‘infectiousness’, as bodies moved together in repeated processes of making.  
An apparent mimesis of gesture co-emerged with a methexical making of 
society; an experience of being-together in a co-performance of compulsive 
‘making’.  A sense of ‘shared responsibility’ was set up by the inquiry frame.  
Understanding creative labour as social labour (Gulli, 2005), my research 
suggested that society is constituted by our dialogue with paintings which 
enacts wider social concerns.  The art ‘work’ and the event of its encounter 
is an original production which contains potentiality within it for a ‘world’ of 
ecological awareness to emerge.  A key insight arising from this practice-
research is that artistic labour understood as ‘creative labour’ (Gulli, 2005) is 
a shared art of inquiry that reveals social ‘being’ and is therefore ontological 
and not just epistemological.  Considering the question: iii) What is the place 
of the artist’s voice in a shared ecological artistic subjectivity? it proposed 
that the artist’s voice is present in the skills of mediation, clear voicing of the 
inquiry frame, and framing the ‘social’ that is being ‘made’. 
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In Chapter One, I highlighted the potential conflicts in trying to combine 
‘social’ and ‘new materialist’ philosophical approaches, such as risking a 
division between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, and of ‘disembodying’ the body by 
moving it from ‘biology’ to ‘culture’ (Ingold, 2000).  The insights summarised 
above are rooted in instances of everyday skilled practice; in bodily 
interactions with materials, and the ways that previous experience (of the 
voices or artefacts of other people) affect that body, becoming part of 
gestures, actions and decisions that might feel ‘intuitive’.   I’ve employed 
Gulli’s (2005) concept of the ‘social’ as the ‘creative labour’ of 
communicating, organising, and transforming things.  The insights show the 
‘social’ as instantiated in bodies through these activities, continually 
produced and reproduced through the ongoing development of habits and 
skills of practice.  They show biological and material bodies making culture, 
affecting each other in ways that produce power relationships and influence 
outcomes.  Agency is distributed.  This brings me onto a more detailed 
consideration of the methodological insights and implications from my 
research. 
6.1.1 Methodological insights 
One of my research aims was: To critique Roberts' view of a decentred 
authorship aligned with general social technique and to address the 
question: iv) What are the implications of decentred artistic authorship 
(Roberts, 2007) for practice-led research in painting?  Roberts does not 
clearly address painting, as he develops his theory by setting post-Cartesian 
practice against traditional artisanal practice.  By explicitly focusing on the 
creative work of painting through the lens of decentred artistic subjectivity, I 
have shown how it can form part of a wider skill-set for the post-Cartesian 
artist.  My research argues for painting as having value in inquiry through 
gesture and rhythmic movement, involving tactile and sensory awareness 
such that the artist is aware of this world.  It proposes that there is value in 
the ‘expressive’ painterly gesture beyond the monetary one defined by 
‘uniqueness’, in that it is a physical trace of an intentional movement towards 
and of paying attention that can be directly perceived by the body of the 
‘viewer’.  Rather than the artisanal artistic subject relying on ‘expressive 
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unity’, my research shows how painting as inquiry can be understood as 
‘decentred authorship’ – social, collaborative, and distributed across a range 
of traditional and modern tools, materials, skills and technologies.   
I have also shown how ‘painting’ – in its broadest sense, including the 
sense-making of artefacts – is methexical.  In Roberts’ descriptions of 
painting he suggests that it is mimetic.  He suggests that the use of the 
readymade “releases the hand from the tedium and preposterousness of 
expressive painterly mimeticism” (2007: 101).  And that it “relieves the artist 
of the burden of mere representation” (ibid: 49).  However, my research has 
shown, with reference to Bolt (2000), that painting is also methexical.  Bolt’s 
argument is that the methexical engagement with materials leaves a trace 
on the painting such that it has real effects in the world (2000: 212).  I agree, 
but have expanded on this to suggest that methexis extends to the 
encounter with the artwork.  Through the trajectory of my research I have 
shown how the ‘creative labour’ (Gulli, 2005) of artist, audience and artefacts 
can be ontological; a process of enacting or ‘becoming’ society, leaving 
traces that mediate in a continuing process of inquiry into ‘being’.  Through 
developing an expanded theory of ‘material thinking’ as ‘creative labour’, I 
propose an epistemological and ontological grounding for the extended 
practice of painting as inquiry that I develop in this research.  This addresses 
the aim: To contribute an epistemological grounding for practice-led 
research in painting that accounts for social structures and artistic agency. 
In terms of the implications of this, I propose that painting as inquiry would 
need to evolve its practice in line with a view of authorship as ‘distributed’.  
This challenges the economic view of the ‘painting’ as an object of financial 
value. Instead, the ‘value’ of the artefact might be understood as its efficacy 
as affective mediator, or its potential agency.  Johnson describes Dewey’s 
notion that “the value of an artwork lies in the ways it shows the meaning of 
experience and imaginatively explores how the world is and might be” (2010: 
149).  I would emphasise that the ‘artwork’ includes the event of its viewing. 
The artefacts, rather than being bodies of knowledge, exist “as enacted in 
and through us”, a “way of organizing experience” and a “particular way of 
engaging a world” which as a form of knowing “can be more or less 
successful in helping us carry forward our experience” (ibid: 150).  Their 
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value can be judged in these terms.  This proposal challenges traditional 
views of the painting ‘exhibition’, instead viewing the creative labour of 
‘painting’ as an ongoing event with ontological power.  This requires a 
reframing of ‘viewing’ practices as dialogic, allowing a voice for all 
participants – artist, audience and artefacts.  Understanding artistic agency 
as ‘distributed’, ‘viewing’ practices as dialogic, and the artefact’s ‘value’ as a 
mediating agent requires painter-researchers to consider the role of 
mediation and the creative labour of the encounter with the work as part of 
the research process.  Whilst my research has started to consider the labour 
involved in terms of mediation skills, it is based on one case study and this is 
therefore an area for further research.  However, there is more to be learned 
from reflecting on the methods used.   
6.1.1.1 Reflection on research methods 
My research aimed to contribute insights to practice-led research methods, 
in particular ‘digital reflection’ (Kirk & Pitches, 2013).  I will now address this 
by reflecting on two methods used: audience participation, and digital 
reflection.        
Audience participation  
One method that I used to explore implications of decentred artistic 
authorship was to consider how painting could learn from research into 
audience experience of immersive scenographic performance, in terms of 
both design and research methods.  Thinking through the lens of 
performance has helped me to broaden the way that I think about ‘painting’.  
It has given me practical and theoretical tools with which to think about 
audience experience and ways of mediating encounters.  The experience of 
the first event led me to look at ‘immersive’ performance, partly because of 
the role of sound in the space, and partly because of the absorption of the 
audience in activity.  Reflecting on this event, I recognised a need for a 
shared meaning-making space, prompted by immersive practitioners such 
as Punchdrunk.   Reason (2010) led me to think of this shared meaning-
making as part of the experience, a ‘countersignature’ – and also to think 
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critically about the audience member’s ability to articulate their experience.   
I borrowed his use of drawing to help audiences explore embodied or 
intuitive responses.  Reflecting on my own experience from attending 
immersive scenographic performances of Shearing (2014) and noting the 
theatrical devices he used to encourage participation, helped me to think 
about creating meaningful spaces.  Cull (2015) helped me to think critically 
about what I mean by participation, and to employ the perspectives of 
immanence and attention training to think about the final event design and 
mediation, and perceived ‘risk’ of audience participation (Alston, 2013).  
These performance researchers and practitioners have given me conceptual 
lenses, critical frameworks and practical mechanisms to expand painting as 
inquiry beyond singular artistic exegesis, towards developing the event-
space as an experience of distributed artistic subjectivity and shared art-of-
inquiry.  These insights could be transferable to other painter-researchers to 
help consider the work of mediation. 
Digital Reflection  
I was keen with my PhD research to further explore the potential for digital 
reflection (Kirk & Pitches, 2013), asking: v) What can digital reflection as a 
method contribute to practice-led research?  Moving beyond pure 
documentation of practice, the process of recording and editing became part 
of the research itself – and one of its artistic outcomes.  Initially, I set out to 
circumvent difficulties of Cartesian dualism by observing my body to see the 
experience from the ‘outside’.  Ravetz filmed herself whilst making 
landscape art, describing this as “an attempt to report on the experience 
whilst being deeply immersed in it” (2002: 19).  This parallels my initial aims 
for recording studio work.  I was aware of how I ‘felt’ during studio practice 
and could watch the video to see how I ‘looked’.  Video-recording provided a 
method of attempting to remain absorbed in practice, allowing the video to 
‘watch’ me.  However, I am aware of being ‘watched’ – a danger of this 
‘sweatbox’ method that has been highlighted by Gray and Malins (2004) – 
but also a productive opportunity, as described below.  The process of video 
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editing led to new insights on ‘flow’ and rhythmic movement91.  The raw 
footage became ‘material’ which I manipulated intuitively in an exploratory 
manner.  The video evoked memories of sensory experiences.  I aimed in 
the editing to ‘recreate the feeling that I get’ in the studio, and found that 
watching these videos could bring back those feelings.  Thus I hoped to 
create a trace of those feelings for a viewer.  One participant in the first 
event wrote on her postcard “cut. paste. make. draw. paint. For myself.” 
which suggests a sense of ‘infectiousness’ or compulsion that I felt myself on 
re-watching edited footage.  This ‘infectiousness’ of the videos became a 
theme throughout the three events, and a key artistic outcome.  
Having the camera in the room, I became aware of its potential to capture 
playful processes that would not be apparent in the final painting.  I noticed 
how the cut-out seals moved in air currents, and gently blew at them.  This 
awareness of being ‘watched’ stimulated hyper-awareness of the materials 
that I was using, and of their interactions with movement, air, and sound.  
The presence of the camera stimulated an ecological awareness and 
sensibility.  In the edited videos, these captured observations offered new 
layers of meaning to the artworks.  Digital reflection became an emergent 
development of my practice, rather than reflecting on my practice as a ‘static 
object’.  The edited videos which were originally intended to ‘show’ my 
practice became part of the artwork itself.   
This extended beyond purely recording studio work. One of the questions 
arising from the first event was:  Do the videos create a sense of ‘haptic’ 
touch, where seeing the making can activate “a sensory involvement akin to 
touch?” (Machon, 2013: 78).  I aimed to share the feeling of inhabiting the 
painting, which occurs whilst exploring the surface visually and with 
fingertips.  To recreate this feeling, I created zoom-and-pan footage of the 
surface of the paintings, and footage of my hand feeling the work.      
For some participants, seeing my hand touching the work on the video made 
them want to copy it.  
                                            
91 See Chapter Three. 
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When I saw the video you touch the painting.  I want to touch it too; 
can I duplicate what is happening in video?92   
Some participants suggested the ‘hand’ footage created a haptic experience 
which was more satisfactory than touching the actual painting.  It gave them 
a sense of how it felt to me which they could not replicate by touching the 
work themselves.     
[…] the video of your hands was, there’s something imbued in that 
that I can’t get when I’m touching the painting. So I think the strong 
sense of touch for me is watching that hand […] 
I agree, I felt like with your hand touching, I was touching it with you 
(Yeah, yeah, yeah) and I was touching it more looking at that than 
when I was touching the painting.    (Exactly.) 93    
This ‘participatory’ function of practice documentation was identified by 
Lehmann who suggests that “demonstration incites pleasure in the viewer 
through kinaesthetic identification with the depicted process” (2012: 9). 
There were also responses that suggested the scanned surface images 
seemed more textured than the actual objects:  
Texture in the video seems much more pronounced than in the actual 
objects.94   
This is an interesting comment on digitisation – the scanned, zoomed and 
panned digital image, projected large-scale, seemed more ‘real’ than the 
painted artefacts, such that one person needed to take up the invitation to 
‘touch’ to check this out:  
In the video, the painting of the girl on the pier looked more 3-D than it 
did in real life – I wanted to touch it to find out why.95   
                                            
92 Audience sketchbook, Feeling a way through … 17/12/13 
93 Audience discussion, Feeling a way through … 17/12/13 
94 Audience sketchbook, Feeling a way through … 17/12/13 
95 Audience discussion, Feeling a way through … 17/12/13 
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There was also disappointment that when touching the work, the experience 
was not as the video had ‘promised’:   
Actually my touching of the object is slightly disappointing given 
watching your hands touch96  
These responses suggest that the audience did experience a sense of 
‘haptic’ touch.  This seemed to be experienced as ‘more satisfying’ than the 
experience of touching the artwork itself, and the footage of the scanned 
surface seemed ‘more real’.  These responses surprised me, and thus I 
learned something new from the audience’s reflections on the digital 
material.   
‘Looking again’ at the edited videos showed significance in actions and 
material tendencies, and suggested new meanings.  Materials such as glue 
took on metaphoric or symbolic significance.  The video made present the 
environment: change of seasons, geographic location, weather, the space of 
the studio, my clothing.   The audience noticed significance in these details; 
insights and meanings that were new to me.  Zooming in on detail revealed 
significance that I had not noticed when actually handling materials.  
Juxtaposition of elements suggested new connections and meanings.  
Things became apparent when watching the video full size; significant 
details that I hadn’t been able to see when I was editing the video using the 
small preview window.          
In summary, a key insight was that digital reflection as a method for practice-
led research can contribute more than just reflection on process.  Processes 
of capturing, reviewing, creatively manipulating, and sharing digital artefacts 
can contribute new insights, new creative outcomes, and lead to new 
processes. 
6.2 Implications of insights 
The implications of these insights for understanding the artistic labour of 
painting as inquiry in a ‘post-aesthetic’ view are threefold.  First, moving 
                                            
96 Audience discussion, Feeling a way through … 17/12/13 
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away from the traditional understanding of the encounter between ‘viewer’ 
and ‘painting’ as a one-to-one relationship, the creative work of ‘painting’ can 
instead be understood as an experience of collective responsibility in which 
artist, audience and artefact are co-responsible.  This implies that painter-
researchers need to consider mediation as a research skill.  Second, 
Chapter Five exemplified how understanding the creative ‘work’ of painting 
encompasses the artistic labour of the audience, which can also be 
understood as a process of ecological cognition; a collective ‘thinking’ 
experience shaped by space, environment, bodies, objects, artefacts and 
the socio-cultural.   Using the model of artistic labour as ecological cognition 
to inform this understanding of the audience’s labour can help to shape 
mediation skills.  Third, in a post-aesthetic era where sharing process is the 
‘norm’, the creative work of the audience can be facilitated by video of studio 
process, and through the provision of materials that enable the audience to 
enact artistic labour. 
I will now suggest how the insights might contribute towards current debates 
in the fields of (i) creative work; and (ii) painting as research. 
6.3 Contributions to current debates  
6.3.1 Creative work – artistic labour, subjectivity and agency 
My research contributes a situated case study of painting as inquiry which 
offers an account of decentred artistic subjectivity, agency and authorship, 
and contributes towards understanding the conditions of ‘post-aesthetic’ 
creative labour.  Chapter One outlined some of the features of the 
contemporary conditions of creative practice, including changing notions of 
spectatorship and audience engagement.  Artists draw upon ancient and 
modern technologies and increasingly work with collaborative and facilitative 
methodologies.   My research has considered some of the implications in 
terms of the nature of artistic agency and labour in a ‘post-aesthetic’ view.  
Specifically, it has considered what these new conditions of practice mean 
for artistic subjectivity for painting.  Debates on creative work in the cultural 
industries employ social constructionist approaches.  These are inadequate 
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for developing a posthuman rethinking of subjectivity (Braidotti, 2013), and 
tend to ignore normative issues (Hesmondhalgh, 2010) or ‘good work’ in the 
cultural industries.  I make paintings about climate change because I am 
deeply concerned about it.  Analysing that statement purely as a ‘narrative 
construct’ would ignore the ethical impulse that I am acting upon to set the 
agenda for my creative work.  Focusing on strategies to ‘demystify’ the 
‘human will to power’ promulgates a human-centric view of the world and 
does not develop positive alternatives or result in positive action (Bennett, 
2010).  My research contributes to these debates through practice, taking a 
posthuman, new materialist approach that values my embodied cultural 
phenomenological experience rather than doing a kind of ‘identity’ work.  By 
intervening in these debates in a practice-based way, my research has 
stepped ‘inside’ processes of artistic labour with ethical purpose.  
Responding to Taylor’s call to understand creative work from the perspective 
of human cognition “to tie creativity back to socially situated individuals as 
creative agents”’ (2011: 45), it has developed an understanding of artistic 
agency as neither uniquely individual nor socially constructed, but 
distributed; a shared art of inquiry, as follows.     
6.3.2 Painting as research 
 
Figure 6.1 Artistic labour as ecological cognition 
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My research contributes a model of artistic labour as ecological cognition 
which is offered as a methodological framework or tool for understanding 
(rather than representing) artistic labour for painting as inquiry in a post-
aesthetic view.  This framework can be used to understand the creative work 
of painting as a process of inquiry that enables us to think differently about 
our being-in-the-world: a way of thinking together that also makes the social.  
It provides a frame for understanding ‘distributed’ artistic subjectivity as a 
decentred, participatory form of art making fit for the Anthropocene.  The 
Anthropocene thesis and associated issues of climate change demand a 
posthuman rethinking of subjectivity (Braidotti, 2013: 83) to develop a 
relational understanding of ways of knowing and being.   My research has 
explored our ‘knowing’ with the world through a dialogic practice of painting 
as inquiry that developed and rehearsed a ‘felt’ experience of distributed 
subjectivity, experimenting with “modes of posthuman subjectivity” (ibid: 
141).       
This might also inform the field of visual anthropology.  Grimshaw and 
Ravetz (2015) highlight ways in which artists and anthropologists have 
expanded the ‘ethnographic’ as follows: incorporating modernist techniques 
such as montage and surrealism as an experimental ‘mode of inquiry’; 
viewing art as being potentially “good for anthropology to think with” (2015: 
424); an “anthropology with art” as “a generative way of moving through, and 
making, the world in collaboration with others” (ibid: 425); and ‘ethnographic 
conceptualisation’.  The latter, rather than representing culture, 
manufactures it, with the exhibition as “a catalyst for, or activator of, 
relationships between authors and audiences, people and objects” (ibid: 
425).  Grimshaw and Ravetz also highlight important differences.  
Anthropologists communicate their insights to an audience, whereas art 
work is made in the encounter with the viewer, as emergent knowledge (ibid: 
430).  In exploring cultural representations of climate change, I have 
engaged with the source photograph’s affective and open qualities (Ravetz, 
2007: 257).  In this process of inquiry I combined modernist techniques of 
montage and collage with the more traditional artisanal skill of painting.  The 
child snapshot figure surveying the landscape played with time and 
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displacement, and invited viewers to connect with their own childhood 
memories.  This ‘exploration’ by artist and audience was a process of 
making connections with climate change, memory, culture and history.  I 
mediated processes of encountering the artefacts, and came to understand 
the event of this encounter as ‘making the social’ – manufacturing rather 
than representing culture.  This was an open intervention, which aimed not 
to ‘document’ but to inquire with ongoing processes of immersion in visual 
culture. It did not seek to communicate a ‘message’; rather it issued an 
invitation to dialogue. The event did the work of anthropological inquiry.  It 
intervened in an ongoing process of finding paths through an unsettled world 
that is changing around us, changed by us, and changing us.   
An example of a debate that indicates the relevance and potential 
contribution of my research is the ERC Advanced Grant funded project 
‘Knowing from the inside’ led by Tim Ingold which aims to “reconfigure the 
relation between the practice of academic inquiry in the human sciences and 
the knowledge to which it gives rise”, studying with things such that 
knowledge grows “from our direct, practical and observational engagements 
with the stuff of the dwelt-in world” (Ingold, 2015).  ‘Telling by hand’ is one of 
five sub-projects and seeks “to extend the interface between contemporary 
art practice and anthropology” (ibid.).   It asks “how we can tell what we 
know, and how we are able to transform our knowledge and practices as 
creative practitioners into something that can be understood in some way by 
others” (Hodson, 2015).  In an earlier project, Ingold (2016) calls for a ‘re 
drawn’ anthropology that explores drawing and handwriting – specifically the 
making of ‘lines’  – as methods of research.  I have explored painting as a 
method of inquiry – not the tracing of lines, but the rhythmic and affective 
engagement of the whole body and audience bodies with colour, form, 
texture, light and shade.     
In summary, my research contributes to thinking differently about how we 
know and make ourselves in the world, how we see ourselves in our 
environment, and our notions of subjectivity.  There are, however, some 
questions outstanding, and some limitations to my research. 
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6.4 Future research, and limitations 
6.4.1 Mediation skills 
I have suggested that post-aesthetic creative work needs to encompass 
mediation skills.  The techniques that I developed (as exemplified in the 
practice) could be transferable to other projects, so it is worth reflecting on 
what skills I used and how I used them.   The reflection-on-action method I 
have used is typical of action inquiry approaches (Marshall, 2001; Torbert, 
2001) – but it must be noted (as I think these authors do make clear) that 
habits and behaviours, even once noticed, tend to hide again and are 
difficult to change.  For me, the issue of ‘voice’ and ‘silencing’ is one that 
needs sustained attention within my future practice.  As identified in the 
previous chapter, this awareness may be an important mediation skill.  
Mediation techniques and skills that I used for the events included the 
design, curation and layout of the space; the wording of invitations and 
confirmation emails; the spoken introduction to the event; the reflection 
prompts and discussion facilitation; the provision of meaning-making 
materials; and the design of the event format.  Principles that I evolved 
included voicing a clear inquiry frame, and setting a tone of shared inquiry.  I 
recognised a need to balance democratisation of meaning with the need to 
be clear about where I do have an ‘intention’.  The skill of mediation included 
voicing this intention appropriately, in supporting information and in the event 
facilitation.  My own group facilitation skills were developed in previous roles 
in coaching and management development.  They are influenced by ideas of 
management theorist William Isaacs, and writer and researcher John Heron.  
Isaacs’ notion of dialogue as a way of thinking together is based on the 
principle that “how we talk together definitively determines our effectiveness” 
(Isaacs, 1999: 3).  I use facilitation skills informed by Heron (1999), and in 
particular the idea of research as a ‘co-operative inquiry’ which involves 
collective reflection on shared experience (ibid: 117), and ‘imaginal 
interpretation’ (ibid: 107) that uses symbolic means of interpretation, stories 
and memories, myths and metaphors.  This informed my use of objects and 
of drawing to facilitate audience meaning-making in the final event.   
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In the third event, I raised a further question as to the role of the artist when 
facilitating the discussion.  Do you just let the ‘happening’ happen, or do you 
intervene to point out or ‘frame’ what is ‘happening’?  This question may be 
relevant to any artistic practice underpinned by the idea of a performance 
Happening.  In Kaprow’s work, the human agents who are the ‘medium’ of 
the Happening affect the outcome – and yet these events were heavily 
scripted (Cufer in Wood, 2012: 28).  There was a play between the ‘score’ 
and the ‘unexpected’ (Cufer in Wood, 2012:  27), suggesting that Kaprow’s 
‘voice’ was clearly present in the ‘script’.  This is an area for further research; 
one where painting could continue to learn from immersive theatre practice 
and from audience research (particularly theories of ‘co-creation’) about how 
to mediate audience experience.  One particular model that could inform the 
development of mediation skills for future research is Lynne Conner’s ‘arts 
talk’, introduced in Chapter Four (Conner, 2013).  
6.4.2 Audience participation 
Throughout my research, I’ve been unsure what to call the ‘audience’.  My 
work demanded a higher level of engagement than that required of ‘viewers’. 
Performance theorist Steve Dixon, writing in relation to digital performance, 
suggests four levels of audience engagement: (i) navigation; (ii) participation 
(joining in); (iii) conversation (opportunity for dialogue); and (iv) collaboration 
(co-authorship of artistic outcome and meaning) (in Pitches & Popat, 2011: 
168).  Reflecting on the trajectory of the three events, I recognise a transition 
from navigation (event one), to participation (event two), to collaboration 
(event three).  But what sort of audience is needed to work as collaborators 
in this shared-inquiry type of event?  This ‘role’ requires increasing levels of 
engagement and willingness from participant-collaborators to ‘make’ the 
work.  Would it work with an audience of non-academics or non-arts-
practitioners in the same way? The value of investigating this for future 
research is that this type of ‘shared responsibility’ event brings ethics into 
how we value the ‘cultural’ (Taylor, 2015).  There also seems to be an 
appetite for a more engaged type of experience, with spectators demanding 
a more active role (Bishop, 2006). This type of inquiry event may be 
appropriate to offer to audiences who want a more engaged experience.  
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However, how would the invitation be posed to be clear about what is 
offered and expected?  And how would the introductory framing and other 
‘cues’ be clear about what is expected from a ‘collaborative’ audience?  
Such dramaturgical decisions about audience ‘prompts’ form a key 
consideration in immersive theatre design in terms of demands made on 
audiences and could inform future research into mediation skills. 
Throughout, I have struggled with what to call the ‘event’, and this would be 
a consideration for any future research.  If the audience are ‘collaborators’ 
and this is a shared experience of ‘making’, what is this event?  A ‘workshop’ 
evokes team away-days.  ‘Happening’ focuses carefully on the present 
moment, but suggests a certain type of event which historically moved away 
from artisanal practice.  Perhaps the event is a ‘Making’.  This ‘naming’ of 
the event for future practice might be productively ambiguous, as there are 
no set rules for a ‘Making’.     
6.4.3 Limitations of research 
My research relies on self-reflective inquiry practices (Marshall, 2001) and 
audience responses (Reason, 2010), and is therefore subject to the limits of 
personal awareness, ability to self-report, and the available frames of 
reference that have been chosen to ‘make sense’ with.  It is also a situated 
account of one painting practitioner, with all the social and practical 
advantages of access to University resources.  As such, it makes no claim to 
be universally applicable.    The research took place in a higher education 
(HE) environment within a skilled academic interpretive community97.   Non-
academic or non-artistic audiences may have behaved differently.  Whilst it 
can offer insights to the HE community, future research could explore 
through non-HE environments how the ‘value’ of the painting artefact can be 
redefined as a participant in inquiry, and how the role of the audience in 
‘making’ the work can be facilitated – without alienating those audience 
members who prefer ‘passive’ experience (Walmsley & Franks, 2011).   
                                            
97 The three events occurred in the ‘laboratory’ environment of stage@leeds.  Most of the 
participants were members of the academic community, both inside and outside the University of 
Leeds.   
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There is more to understand in terms of the way ‘painting’ has been used as 
part of a wider multi-media set of tools, and particularly how ‘digital making’ 
might be understood as ‘material thinking’.   The events created a sense of 
equivalence between digital and analogue materials of making, breaking 
down artistic material hierarchies.  They highlighted similarities and 
differences between traditional and digital skills and processes.  As 
mentioned earlier, this evokes the ‘post-medium debate’ in which practice 
can no longer be defined by its medium, instead relying on ‘technical 
support’ (Krauss, 2006: 56)98.   What this might mean in terms of ‘material 
thinking’ for a post-medium ‘painter’ is an area that needs further reflection.      
My research raised the question of mediation and facilitation skills for the 
artist, and this is another potential area for further research and practice.  
Research with wider audiences in traditional and non-traditional arts venues 
could test the transferability of the mediation skills and techniques developed 
in my research.  For example, the tools of artistic making that were provided 
were ‘non-artistic’ or childlike and afforded a particular set of meanings.  
Further research could investigate different types of materials for audience 
interaction.  Questions for future research include: What skills does a painter 
require to create a ‘meaningful’ space which disrupts the traditional 
authority-model of artist or curator?  Does this require new skills?   What 
skills are required of her audience?  And in what ways might this mediated, 
facilitated, ‘meaningful’ space hold potentiality within it? As one of the 
participants asked: 
How does this as a gesture of thinking continue repeating and 
proliferating out into action?99  
A potential clue was provided by another participant, who said: 
I wondered about the child who highlights the individual, rather than 
[…] think about the group […] what people have spoken about is 
feeling individually responsible […] I would think about that as political 
                                            
98 I have continued throughout this thesis to use the term ‘painting’ as it forms the core of my 
practice which the ‘digital’ always references. 
99 Audience discussion, The Garden of Earthly Delights 18/05/17 
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[…] neoliberalism wants us to be individual and wants us to not act in 
solidarity […] we need to feel separated out […] it may be interesting 
to consider how we might be taken to another kind of feeling […] 
which is less about individual responsibility and more about solidarity 
and action.100 
It seems significant in relation to this that the artwork I was making in the 
final event had two child figures, walking together … 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Two child figures 
 
…marching towards purposive action?  Or walking away from the issue?  
This research has stopped short of developing a detailed exegesis, instead 
focusing on the form-shaping (the ‘making’ of the artefacts and events).  
Future research could consider in more depth the ‘meanings’ made from the 
work, and in particular Gulli’s contention that the immanence of society in art 
points to potentiality, to what-could-be: “to ground and sustain a radically 
different concept of the social” (2005: 188).  
 
  
                                            
100 Audience discussion, The Garden of Earthly Delights 18/05/17 
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Appendix A Responses to climate change inquiry  
This document curates some of the audience comments and sketchbook 
pages from The Garden of Earthly Delights that seem to form a response to 
the questions that I had for my final event, which were: 
1. In what ways can ‘painting’ help us to make sense of climate change 
responsibility? 
2. How might the work enhance a sense of collective imaginative 
engagement?   
In what ways can ‘painting’101 help us make sense of climate change 
responsibility?   
The following suggested responses to the above question are from the 
audience discussion on 18th May 2017.  There are many others in the 
sketchbooks, some of which are included in the responses to the second 
question below.     
 You can actually believe there might be some action as a result of saying 
'look mate this is what's happening' ... and I think that this book and these 
paintings are doing that as well.  
 I chose the little cut out of the girl in the pool.  It illustrates to me the idea 
of protection from the elements, we're creating artificial space and that 
can be construed as one of the problems; that we seem to be afraid of 
nature, we admire nature, but we want to create a safe environment, and 
the action of creating that safe environment is one of the problems. 
 I had the same object too, the little girl in the pool, for me it was like a 
little subuteo model, particularly when I saw the whole team, and it struck 
me as a kind of as an interesting metaphor, those large forces coming to 
bear, on a tiny scale, on this little individual that was just literally being 
flicked around the landscape.  
 This image of this figure is the only one I think that has a tool in her hand, 
and she just made me think about, like, what are the tools that we … like 
the tool is to shovel the car out, or the tool is to beat off the potential 
threat of an animal, and there's something to do with the scale of that, 
like how big she is in relation to this animal, or just the scale of the 
                                            
101 By ‘painting’ I refer to my extended practice that includes other media and mediation, whilst 
remaining firmly rooted in painting.   
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problem, or questions that I have around climate change and it feels like 
we only have a shovel to work with – so the metaphor around the tool, 
the tools that we have somehow resonated with me in that particular 
figure. 
 A metaphor, those bigger gestures of making, creating, constructing, 
making making making stuff, can have all sorts of consequences. 
 For me the initial, and still the overwhelming impression was of 
innocence and fragility, and the way you reduced us to the floor playing 
with crayons and the sticky tape and all that kind of thing.  And of course 
the child image and the seal image, the seal pup image, which is so 
powerful because it's an innocent affected by these overwhelming forces, 
that's the overwhelming, the overall impression that I got from this.  
 For me that was captured in the figure of the girl looking away, I hadn't 
really seen that figure before, I'd always been drawn to the figure in the 
red coat and the blue, but this time I was looking at the figure looking 
away, and that fragility, that sense of critical commentary that comes with 
that, I have to turn my back on this future that you've given me, the fact 
that it's absolutely freezing cold and she's dressed in swimwear, and a 
kind of bodily gesture to her, which is almost broken and certainly in 
some kind of pain, so I found it quite haunting, and its iteration that 
makes it more haunting when you see it in other environments.  
 For me it just spoke of that guilt of culpability really and that you feel as 
fragile ...(?).... and sort of 'what have I done' except exacerbate the 
situation you know so that is kind of problematic, so that was ... there 
was a lot of retreating to the crayons and drawing and wanting to be that 
child that you know that you're not. 
 A woman observing there with the binoculars, which to me was a really 
potent metaphor of we're just idly standing by while drowning quite 
literally. 
 Yeah, my response to this girl was always meaning you, it was you, but 
my response to those individuals were always like, these are the people 
that we know have been affected so far, but we don't see them here, we 
don't ... you know sometimes there is the odd kind of flood here or there 
and we see it on the news, but it's not anything as tragic as what 
happens in other parts of the world, and to me this is what those figures 
always stood for, that kind of devastation in certain parts of the world, 
and it's just that we are the lucky ones and we're not there yet, and again 
goes back to questions of responsibility and ... are certain animals more 
important than others?    
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How might the work enhance a sense of collective imaginative 
engagement?  
Suggested responses to this are selected from audience sketchbook pages 
from 18th May 2017, many of which also suggest responses to the first 
question above. 
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